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Disclaimer: 
 
"Analyzing humor is like dissecting a frog.                       
Few people are interested and the frog dies of it." 
           E.B. White  
    
                  quoted in Carr & Greeves (2007) 
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Preface 
In one of the key practical guides to Conversation Analysis (CA), ten Have (2007) 
addresses the issue of presenting CA work. He argues that the nature of CA 
research does not lend itself to the traditional format, asserting that “there is not one 
ideal ordered way to use the data or refer to the literature” (ten Have, 2007; p221). In 
writing this thesis, it has been difficult to impose the traditional format on the research 
process. Reading ten Have‟s (2007) section on publication is reassuring that this is a 
common experience. The structure conforms where possible, but there are notable 
deviations in line with CA convention such as an alternative approach to the method 
section and combining results and discussion. It would be appreciated if the reader 
would bear these considerations in mind when reading this piece of work. 
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Chapter 1: Abstract 
This thesis explores the long-standing debate in the field of psychotherapy around 
the use of humour in psychotherapy and the shift from outcome to process research 
in psychotherapy research. In line with the social constructionist framework of this 
study, the researcher‟s position is outlined. The literature review describes the link 
between language and the construction of both the therapeutic relationship and 
humour. The functions of humour in psychotherapy are outlined, and the contribution 
that Conversation Analysis (CA) can make in this evolution. CA, with its focus on the 
social action of talk, is employed on three audio-tapes of psychotherapy within this 
research to identify the resources drawn upon by interactants, and to examine the 
sequential environments in which humour arises and the responses to humorous 
utterances. 
 
Linguistic devices used to create humour included hyperbole, irony in conveying 
contrasting incongruent frames of reference, repetition, empathic self-disclosure, 
sarcasm, facetiousness, normalising statements, humorous impersonation and 
anthropomorphic personification. Humour emerged in the sequential environment of 
repeating and elaborating on diverging viewpoints outside of therapy. Humour in the 
context of persuasion and resistance functioned to dismantle client resistance and 
contrast their competing perspectives.  Humour made in the context of uncertainty 
exaggerated pre-existing conversational disruption, allowing a move into repair. 
Humour was used to contrast new and old ways of viewing situations in the process 
of therapeutic change. Therapists used humour strategically to move into therapeutic 
tasks such as formulation, reinterpretation, lexical substitution, invitation to express 
emotion, praise for following an intervention and empathy.  
 
Results are discussed in relation to humour's potential place in pertinent areas of 
therapy such as the therapeutic relationship, empathy and emotional connectedness, 
unconditional positive regard, congruence, resistance, uncertainty and change. 
Clinical implications are summarised drawing on these concepts. Strengths and 
limitations of the project are outlined, future research suggested and reflections by 
the researcher conclude this thesis. 
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Chapter 2: Introduction 
 
Overview 
In this section social constructionism will be described as the overall theoretical and 
paradigmatic framework of this research. Assumptions around language, on which 
both humour and therapy are dependent, and psychotherapy research will then be 
addressed. In line with the framework, the researcher‟s own beliefs and experiences 
around the subject will be explained in order to maximise transparency of possible 
influences in the way therapy and humour in therapy may be construed. In the review 
of the literature which follows the unique aspects of communication in the context of 
therapy and the therapeutic relationship will be outlined, before providing a brief 
definition of humour. Having established humour and therapy as constructed in 
conversation, the specific functions that humour may perform in therapy will be 
outlined, with a focus on the use of CA in studying therapy and the use of humour. 
The introduction section will close with a rationale, specific aims and research 
questions for the study.   
 
Theoretical and paradigmatic framework 
  
At heart, the personal exchange defines psychotherapy. 
All else flows from it. 
      - Marzillier (2004, p. 394) 
 
Therapy can be viewed as communication or as rhetoric (Strong, Busch & Couture, 
2008). In studying communication, it seems necessary to consider existing definitions 
of the intended unit of analysis, particularly the relationship between language and 
what it may be considered to represent. At the 28th International Congress of 
Psychology, Gergen (2000) argued that there were three assumptions in this area 
that needed to be addressed as psychological science progressed into the new 
millennium.  
 
According to Gergen (2000), the realist assumption embodies those ideas that 
suggest that there is a discernible „reality‟, and that words can, and should, reflect 
this „reality‟. However, this perspective has been criticised as naïve by some for its 
simplicity and neglect of the centrality of how language creates and reflects meaning 
we make of the world (Burr, 2004). The subjectivist assumption reflects the widely 
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held belief that we exist in our own private worlds and that speech is considered to 
be an outer expression of the inner world. This is an important assumption to 
acknowledge in relation to therapy, given the perceived significance of the intimacy 
that is reflected in sharing independent subjectivities. However, Gergen (2000) 
cautions that one can never truly access another‟s inner world. Attempts at doing this 
unavoidably draw on the interpreter‟s stand-point as a framework for sense making. 
The strategic assumption politicises language as an influential promoter of social 
action. Thus language becomes reasoned and purposeful, but pessimistically 
characterises people as manipulative and self-serving.  
 
As questions are raised about the nature of language, the foundations of knowledge 
are then called into question. Psychotherapists engaging with this debate are 
becoming increasingly disillusioned with current ideology (Gergen, 2000). Questions 
are accumulating around proscribed diagnostic approaches to mental health, the 
rigidity and manualisation of treatment approaches, the questionable „truth‟ behind 
value-laden academic conclusions and how these truths can be inter-connected to 
create a seemingly ‟robust‟ assembly of ‟facts‟ that form the knowledge base 
(Gergen, 2000).  
 
Some of the literature reflects this idea, by sampling from a range of sources, from 
comedians, linguists, sociologists, playwrights, philosophers and psychologists. 
Humour is such a diverse and interesting field that it invites opinion from a range of 
perspectives, from which arguments can be made in varying degrees of eloquence 
and empiricism. From a social constructionist perspective value ascribed to each of 
these diverse sources remains equal, considering each perspective to contribute 
something insightful. The origins of these viewpoints will be outlined, in order that the 
relevance and empirical weight of these eclectic sources be gauged in relation to 
academia and the discipline in which this research is located: clinical psychology.  
 
It may be useful to consider how humour can be located within the paradigms 
described above. From a sociological perspective, Davies (1995) claims that humour 
is resistant to the methodological probing of realism and scientific empirical enquiry. 
Quantitative researchers have therefore redirected their curiosity (Wiseman, 2008). 
Davis (1995) claims the explicit logic of science is in combat with the ambiguous logic 
of humour. Mulkay‟s (1988) sociological view clarifies this point, suggesting that 
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scientists pursue a social phenomenon's single correct interpretation whereas 
humorists demonstrate its multiple interpretations. This point is echoed by the comic 
musician Victor Borge (1984), who argued there was “more logic in humour than in 
anything else, because, you see, humour is truth” (p1). However, it seems that his 
truth and logic differ greatly to empirical logic and realist „truth‟ to which scientists 
strive. A drive toward a single focus of attention generates scorn for the multiple 
interpretations of humor, as the scientific discourse regards the study of humour as 
„undisciplined‟, unaware that humour may require a different discipline. 
 
The framework of this research, social constructionism, embraces such multiplicity 
that is at the heart of both humour and therapy. Burr (2004) describes the principles 
underpinning this perspective for a clinical psychology audience. First, knowledge 
should not be taken for granted, but rather critically evaluated acknowledging the 
influence of inherent assumptions within which ideas are embedded. Second, these 
assumptions are a product of, and specific to, cultural and historical contexts. Third, 
these ideas are constructed and maintained in social interchange, in sharing ideas 
and negotiating versions of events. Fourth, constructions of the world enact some 
social action, promoting some responses and inhibiting others, further influencing 
what is permissible and how to interact.  Burr (2004) highlights the importance that 
language plays in constructing the world and draws the focus of interest, or unit of 
analysis in research, around to the conversation. It is language, she argues, both in 
its form and its use, that is central to the making, maintenance and contesting of 
meanings that contribute to how the world is socially constructed (Burr, 2004).  
 
To use social constructionism as a lens through which to focus on humour and 
therapy seems important. Humour is a feature of everyday conversation and, as 
discussed later, usually requires joint construction. Similarly, therapy is a 
collaborative process dependent on the interface between two ways of viewing the 
world. The multiple interpretative perspectives explored in therapy and the dichotomy 
of meaning inherent in humour both fit well with the multiplicity of a social 
constructionist framework in which this research is located. Having considered how 
the framework fits the subject area of the research, the methodology will now be 
situated within this framework.   
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Social constructionism not only takes a critical stance on knowledge, but also on 
what constitutes evidence and the means by which it can be produced. There has 
been a growing movement towards questioning psychotherapeutic evidence and 
research (Marzillier, 2004; Loewenthal, 2006). Strong et al. (2008) combine their 
clinical, academic and research perspectives in a peer-reviewed article to argue that 
two major assumptions require a critical stance. One assumption is reflected in the 
tendency for therapy research to separate the intertwined ideas of conversation 
(process) from evidence (outcome). The other is the privileged position bestowed to 
measurable and quantifiable outcomes within the evidence base. Strong et al. (2008) 
move for a shift from empiricism (“taken-for-granted and near exclusive use of 
experimental methods and psychometry in evaluating psychotherapy outcomes” 
p391), where outcome is evidence. Instead, they urge researchers to place a higher 
value on conversation as evidence for evaluating psychotherapy. Originating in 
Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) and cultivated in a medical paradigm, statistically 
derived evidence helps to argue questions of probability of effectiveness, but 
neglects questions such as „how‟ or „why‟ relevant in this research. Hierarchies of 
forms of evidence therefore need to be sensitive and specified to the research 
question being asked (Evans, 2003; Miller & Jones-Harris, 2005). This thesis is more 
interested to explore how and why questions, and will therefore put less emphasis on 
traditional hierarchies, which are headed by outcome evidence and randomised 
control trials (RCTs). Rather, the thesis places value on the process level research. 
 
Perakyla and colleagues (2008) collaborated to publish a selection of studies from 
this alternate conversation-based perspective in psychotherapeutic research. They 
critique the EBM paradigm and its assumption that brands of psychotherapy are 
treated as if the interactions in which therapeutic moves are achieved were uniform, 
and thus overlooked. This ignores the central tenet of psychotherapy: that each 
person is an individual (Leudar et al., 2005) and that therapy should reflect this 
(Stiles, 2008). Perakyla et al. (2008) have claimed that “the assumption about a 
standardised therapeutic „input‟ is therefore unjustified”. Conversational evidence, 
Strong and colleagues (2008) argue, reflects how therapists accomplish 
therapeutically relevant developments in their talk.  
 
RCTs have long been coroneted as the „gold standard‟ in research following the 
National Service Framework for Mental Health (Department of Health, 1999). 
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However, more recent political moves by the American Psychological Association 
(APA, 2006) widened the scope for other methodologies to receive higher positions 
in the realm of research. Whilst RCTs preside in the political domain, others remain 
more focused around how “change is the evolution of new meaning through 
dialogue” (Goolishian & Anderson, 1987, p.48). CA is a methodology that uniquely 
promises a detailed insight into how this is achieved (Streeck, 2008).   
 
In their book Psychotherapy Process Research Rennie & Toukmanian (1992) draw a 
similar distinction between paradigmatic (outcome) and narrative (process) 
approaches (Bruner, 1986). The CA methodology utilised in this research is 
considered by many to fall within the narrative realm (McLeod, 2003), fitting with 
Riessman‟s (1993) comments that narrative analysis:  
 
...examines the informant‟s story and analyses how it is put together, 
the linguistic and cultural resources that it draws upon and how it 
persuades a listener of authenticity. Analysis in narrative studies 
opens up the forms of telling about experience, not simply the content 
to which language refers. We ask, why was the story told that way? 
(p. 2) 
 
One of the principles of conducting research from a social constructionist and 
„narratology‟ perspective is that it is not value-free. In keeping with this principle, it is 
important to alert the reader to the author‟s own potential biases as a researcher in 
approaching this task, in order that the reader can consider why this story is being 
told in this way.   
 
Reflecting on the researcher’s position    
From a social constructionist perspective, it is important to make explicit the author‟s 
assumptions and experiences around humour and its use in therapy. Humour has 
always been an important part of my life, and perhaps part of how I construe myself. 
The first time I thought explicitly about humour was when someone at school 
surprised me by describing me as funny. For an „awkward‟ eight year old girl joining a 
school two years after most other children had negotiated and established their 
friendship groups, funny became for me both a social lubricant and a social 
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commodity. Whilst well received by peers, a frostier reception could be expected by 
some teachers, who perhaps viewed my use of humour, sometimes rightly, as an 
expression of defiance. Some of the greatest teachers for me were those who not 
only enjoyed the humour of the students, but also injected their own brand of humour 
into otherwise dull subjects.  
 
Since starting the DClinPsy course, I have become increasingly aware of my use of 
humour. For example, in „mindfulness‟ (Teasdale et al., 2004; Fauth et al., 2007) 
sessions on the course  I recognized that my reaction to novel and unusual 
experiences was an internal comic monologue and stifled laughter. As a Trainee 
Clinical Psychologist, my experience of academic teaching and clinical practice has 
raised the use of humour in general, and more specifically in therapy, as salient 
questions for me. This tendency towards the amusing became more questioned as I 
detected messages portraying humour as an unhealthy way of distancing oneself 
from strong emotion.  
 
Core conditions for developing a therapeutic relationship proposed that I remain 
congruent and therefore faithful to this aspect of personality. However, other 
messages that I was interpreting from training were that empathy is more formulaic, 
and that therapy is a serious business. This puzzling internal dilemma was 
represented by the discrepancy in styles of my first two supervisors: one prioritised 
establishing a sound therapeutic relationship and the other enthusiastic about 
technical aspects of therapy. Furthermore, the former fascinated me in his ability to 
convey therapeutic ideas seamlessly in an informal and often humorous way.   
 
An informal conversation with a group of Clinical Psychologists complicated matters 
further. Some viewed humour in clients suspiciously or as „pathological‟ in people 
who desperately attempted to amuse their depressed mothers, recycling the 
stereotype of the sadness behind the smile of the depressed comic1. They recounted 
their challenging experience of working with comedians, which they described as 
littered with jocular obstacles. From this confusing picture, I struggled to extract a 
satisfactory conclusion and was passionate about continuing this interesting debate 
through my thesis. The literature review which follows is an attempt to clarify the 
different perspectives in this contentious area.   
 
                                                 
1
 Interested readers in dispelling this urban myth are directed to Carr & Greeves (2007) and Rotton 
(1992) 
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Chapter 3: Literature review 
The previous sections on the methodological paradigm, theoretical framework of this 
research and the position of the researcher will hopefully have oriented the reader to 
the focus on the process level in the following literature review. First, the therapeutic 
relationship will be outlined as conversationally achieved in order to locate this 
important interaction within the chosen theoretical framework. A brief definition of 
humour will then be offered, which is viewed in a multiplicity of ways. Brief mention 
will be made of therapeutic approaches that make humour a goal of therapy, before 
outlining the function of humour in therapy. Following this, the function of laughter will 
be discussed separately. Finally, the contribution of CA to the use of humour in 
therapy will conclude the literature review.  
 
The therapeutic relationship 
The therapeutic relationship has been recognised as important in psychotherapy, first 
intuitively in clinical practice and then more recently quantitatively and academically 
(Catty, 2006). In the psychotherapy literature, it has been identified as one of the 
most powerful predictors of therapeutic outcome (Horvath & Symonds, 1991; 
Wampold et al., 1997; Lambert & Barley, 2001). Bordin (1979), emphasising the 
commonality across modalities, defines the therapeutic relationship as the client‟s 
“positive collaboration with the therapist against the common foe of pain and self-
defeating behaviour” (Catty, 2006: p. 221). Conceptualised by some to consist of 
tasks, bonds and goals (Bordin, 1979; Safran & Muran, 2003), the therapeutic 
alliance is often discussed as an interpersonal process or a conversational 
achievement. The concept of the therapeutic relationship remains complex, since a 
multiplicity of distinctions and similarities can be drawn between the therapeutic 
relationship, therapeutic alliance, working alliance and transference (Catty, 2006). 
The discourse in the literature is often around how it is the responsibility of the 
therapist to establish and maintain a therapeutic alliance, often overlooking the 
client‟s contribution (Lambert & Barley, 2001).  
 
Roy-Chowdhury (2006) recently posed the important question of how the therapeutic 
relationship is talked into being. Using discursive methods to analyze transcripts of 
family therapy, this systemic family therapist found that “it is necessary for the 
therapist to be a master conversationalist, capable of interrogating each speech act, 
by herself and others for the possible meaning concealed within it” (Roy-Chowdhury, 
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2006, p. 171). The therapeutic relationship as evidenced in his research by 
engagement was most successful when “there is a demonstrable flexibility of the 
therapist” (Roy-Chowdhury, 2006; p. 168), or the ability to be able to shift 
conversational strategy. Roy-Chowdhury (2006) argued that this engagement was 
necessary before specific therapeutic interventions could be deployed. The absence 
of such flexibility resulted in resistance. This resistance was conversationally 
speaking described as the repeated reemergence of unrepaired trouble sources in 
the conversation, which served to subvert therapeutic aims. This concept of 
resistance has been further elaborated through the use of CA, revealing a range of 
conversational strategies. These include the aforementioned reasserting or revising 
trouble sources, but also non-uptake of aspects of a prior turn, managing and 
rejecting topic shifts, and the withdrawal of cooperation (Madill, Widdicombe & 
Barkham, 2001). 
 
The therapeutic relationship, a  concept of considerable importance and originating in 
psychoanalysis, has been paralleled with Rogers‟ (1951a) humanistic core conditions 
of therapy (empathy, unconditional positive regard, congruence). Having broadly 
discussed the therapeutic relationship above, it is important to acknowledge that the 
core conditions are not mutually exclusive or distinct concepts from the therapeutic 
relationship but these terms overlap and interlink (Lambert & Barley, 2001; Catty, 
2006). No articles were found on how the latter two features of the therapeutic 
relationship are „talked into being‟. Therefore, literature on empathy will be given 
particular attention in the section below.  
 
Empathy has been defined as a general psychological concept as “the ability to 
imagine oneself in another‟s place and understand the other‟s feelings, desires and 
reactions” (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2009, p.1). Empathy is considered to be both a 
personality characteristic of the therapist and an important component of therapeutic 
conversation (Duan & Hill, 1996). Emotional connectedness is considered by many to 
be a pre-requisite for a successful psychotherapeutic relationship (e.g., Frosh, 1999, 
Pocock, 1997). Duan & Hill‟s (1996) article summarizing the research on empathy, 
highlighted the distinction between cognitive and affective empathy, the former being 
the intellectual understanding of another‟s experience and the latter being the 
partaking in the same emotional state as the other (Bachelor, 1988; Duan & Hill, 
1996).  
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Additional categories of sharing and nurturant empathy are suggested by Bachelor‟s 
(1988) content analysis of client perceptions of empathy. The former is the 
perception of empathic connection as a result of disclosure of relevant personal 
experiences or opinions, whilst the less empirically supported „nurturant empathy‟ is 
achieved through being perceived as attentive and supportive.  
 
Empathy has been described as an interactional achievement for almost 30 years 
(Barrett-Lennard, 1981), but it is only recently being demonstrated as such through 
the use of CA (Wynn & Wynn, 2006). Conversational phases of empathy can be 
identified as the therapist‟s „resonation‟ with the patient‟s experience, the therapist‟s 
expression of empathy, and the client‟s reception of it (Barrett-Lennard, 1981; Wynn 
& Wynn, 2006).  
 
Defining humour 
Humour theorists Chapman & Foot (1976) clarify humour‟s multiple meanings as a 
stimulus, response and disposition. They quote the dictionary as defining humour as 
referring to that “which causes „good-tempered laughter‟ (stimulus); or „cheerful and 
good-tempered amusement‟ (response); or „the capacity to see the funny side of 
things‟ (disposition)” (Chapman & Foot, 1976, p3). When considering humour as 
stimulus, there are three main theories offered by the field of philosophy to explain 
humour, summarised in a series of articles by Lippett (1994; 1995a; 1995b): 
incongruity, superiority and release.  
 
Incongruence between competing ideas gives rise to humour and includes concepts 
of “the absurd, the unexpected, the inappropriate or out-of-context events” (Foot, 
1997, p. 261). Some argue that incongruity alone is sufficient as long as it is 
perceived in a playful context (Rothbart, 1976), whilst others implicate the role of its 
sudden perception (Koestler, 1964) or resolution (Suls, 1972). This semantic theory 
is developed by linguists Raskin & Attardo (1994) into the General Theory of Verbal 
Humour and highlights the violation of conditions of truthfulness and relevance 
established in other forms of communication. The superiority theory explained 
humour as triggered by the observation of others‟ infirmities and failings, leading to 
the delight in the downfall of those we dislike or pity. Release theorists‟ ideas are 
wrapped up in expenditure and economy, explaining humour through emotional 
displacement, in that energies are expended on one emotion and the humorous twist 
can leave them redundant.  
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Stand-up comic Jimmy Carr, in his quest to understand his trade, concludes in his 
quasi-academic book that a person‟s affinity to each particular theory may be more 
telling about the theorist‟s outlook on life than about the nature of humour, using 
amusing examples of „promiscuous‟ release theorists and competitive „superiorists‟ 
(Carr & Greeves, 2007). This view links well with social constructionism. With as 
many explanations of humour as there are humour theorists, each theory of humour 
is as individual as each person‟s own sense of humour. An essay by Professor of 
Speech Communication John Meyer (2000) bolsters Carr‟s point, highlighting the 
ease with which each theory of humour can be enlisted to explain a humorous 
utterance. Meyer (2000) argues the importance of a departure from the mechanics 
towards understanding it as an active and strategic device employed to achieve 
certain ends (Dallos & Urry, 1999). 
 
Davies‟ (1995) sociological approach to the study of humour uses Mulkay‟s (1988) 
phenomenological slant of constructionism, symbolic interactionism and post-
modernism to describe a novel interpretation of humour. Mulkay (1988), viewing the 
world as constructed, arbitrary, multiple and tenuous, argues that humour is a mode 
of perception that can comprehend the social world's multiple realities (Davies, 
1995). The humorist, in this view, literally sees the world differently from the serious 
person. Rather than considering humour as incongruence, it shifts thinking towards 
the ability to perceive and hold simultaneously incongruent viewpoints. Seriousness, 
he argues, represents the search for certainty through a monistic unitary 
interpretation, viewing incongruence, inconsistency and paradox as problematic. 
Humour, however, considers them a given (Mulkay, 1988). Humorous discourse, 
whose language of collaboration accepts diversity, embraces the multiplicity of social 
realities more comfortably than the serious, in particular the scientific whose 
language opposes and dominates that to which it is exposed (Mulkay, 1988).  In an 
important distinction from other theories humour, in Mulkay‟s view, does not merely 
reflect social difference, but it is pivotal in revealing it (Davies, 1995).  
 
Given that humour can be seen as both a conversational device and interactional 
achievement serving a social function, interest should focus not on what humour is, 
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but rather on what people do. Similarly, the therapeutic relationship was described as 
a conversational accomplishment. Having established both humour and therapy as 
interactional accomplishments, the next section will explore the relationship between 
the use of humour in the context of therapeutic talk.  
 
Humour in therapy 
The use of humour in therapy has been a topic of great interest in the last 20 years, 
generating a collection of interesting titles (Buckman, 1994; Franzini, 2001; Fry & 
Salameh, 1993; Gelkopf & Kreitler, 1996; Haig, 1988; Kuhlman, 1984; Lemma, 1999; 
Rutherford, 1994; Saper, 1987; Strean, 1994). Martin‟s (2007) chapter on therapy in 
his text book Psychology of Humour summarises how its therapeutic potential is 
heralded by a range of diverging therapeutic approaches (Adlerian, behavioural, 
cognitive, psychoanalytic, rational-emotive and strategic family therapy) to treat a 
range of psychological problems (depression, stress-related disorders, obsessive 
compulsive disorder, phobia, personality disorder, schizophrenia and learning 
disability) using individual, group, family and marital counselling modes of therapy for 
clients across the life-span. 
 
Before talking about the function of humour in therapy, it may be worth briefly making 
special mention of when humour is viewed as the goal of therapy. Rational Emotive 
Therapists (RET) employ humour with people who are perceived to take life too 
seriously (Ellis, 1977a). A specific goal of RET is the development or re-discovery of 
a sense of humour and movement away from seriousness (Martin, 2007). Ellis‟ 
(1977a) use of humour has been criticised for being aggressive and confrontational, 
although he assures critics that it is done in an accepting way, promoting a form of 
self-acceptance of foibles. Provocative Therapy‟s (Farrelly & Lynch, 1987) use of 
humour resembles RET in challenging beliefs, feelings and behaviours, and for this 
semblance shares the same criticisms.  
 
Natural High Therapy (O‟Connell, 1987), emerging from the ideas of Jung and Adler, 
represents a less confrontational therapeutic approach. Resonating with the ideas of 
Maslow‟s (1943) humanistic hierarchy of needs, people strive towards self-
actualisation, a state of being whereby environmental, physical and basic 
psychological needs are met. A „healthy‟ sense of humour, as a defining 
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characteristic of self-actualisation, is both the desired destination and the route to its 
achievement, “the royal road towards self-actualisation” (O‟Connell, 1981; p561).  
 
The function of humour in therapy 
There is a wealth of diverse empirical research around social functions of humour, 
whilst much of what is written about humour in therapy is largely opinion-based with 
little investigated empirically (Golan & Jaffe, 2007). As mentioned before, and in line 
with the theoretical framework, the area of interest now lies in how and why people 
do humour rather than what it is. In this section theories around the function of 
humour in the wider field will be integrated with available academic and clinical 
opinion in the therapeutic setting in order to review the range of possible functions it 
could perform in this context. It is acknowledged that it is not clear whether these 
general humour studies are generalisable to the therapy setting. Given the paucity of 
empirical research in this field, the more general empirical research may add to an 
understanding of how humour might function in the therapy room. In the following 
section studies applying CA to therapy sessions will be presented in more detail to 
demonstrate empirical findings specific to this context.  
 
Meyer (2000) takes each of the philosophical theories outlined above and considers 
humour‟s possible function in a variety of situations: 
 
Each theory of humor origin does seem especially fitted to specific situations: 
relief humor for relaxing tensions during communication in disconcerting 
situations or relating to a controversial issue, incongruity humor for presenting 
new perspectives and viewpoints, and superiority humor for criticizing opposition 
or unifying a group. Their dilemma when explaining rhetorical uses of humor 
arises when each seeks to explain all instances of humor. (p. 316) 
 
There seems vast potential in therapy for the functions outlined above. Meyer (2000) 
used these competing theories to devise a continuum of humour‟s social functions 
which spanned identification, clarification, enforcement and differentiation. This 
organises the function from cohesion to division. Robinson & Smith-Lovin (2001) 
summarise the social function slightly differently by including meaning making, 
cohesion building, and tension relief. Whilst the former two can easily be located in 
Meyer‟s (2000) classification, tension-reduction appears to offer something new and 
will be added as a function separately in summarizing the literature below. Each of 
these five functions will be described in turn and used to structure the views and 
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available research around the function in therapy, although these categories may 
overlap.  
 
Much therapy outcome research attributes success to effective conveyance of 
empathy, caring and genuineness (Bachelor & Horvath, 1999), mirroring Rogers‟ 
(1951b) humanistic ideas. From this perspective the interpersonal relationship 
between the therapist and client is considered the main vehicle for therapeutic 
change (Teyber, 1988). Humour could be equally instrumental in conveying or 
contravening therapeutic conditions. Since there is general agreement on the 
importance of the quality of a therapeutic relationship, the potential role of humour in 
the triad of conditions necessary for a secure and trusting alliance will be discussed 
when relevant.  
 
Identification 
Humour‟s contribution to overall therapist effectiveness, independent of orientation, 
through its unifying function (Meyer, 2000) could be a valuable resource (Martin, 
2007). Yalom (1985) discusses the role of humour in group-belonging and 
acceptance, fostering care and mutual support. Meyer (2000) argues that humor 
functions to build a supportive relationship by identifying a person with others, 
creating cohesiveness (Graham, Papa, & Brooks, 1992).  
 
Nelson (2008) in her review article suggests that in the initial stages of therapy, 
humour could function as affiliative behaviour. As with other social relationships 
(Kuhlman, 1984), humour represents an important variable to establishing and 
maintaining a positive therapeutic relationship through building rapport. This has 
been confirmed both by clients through interview methods (Bedi, et al., 2005), and 
therapists through survey methods (Franzini, 2000). In the field of communication, 
Winick (1976) postulates that, in general conversation, feelings that might normally 
be blocked by the lack of a socially acceptable outlet may be communicated safely 
through the use of humour. The implications for both the expression of emotion and 
its facilitation to enhance empathic connection are clear.  
 
In the field of communication a sense of humour has been experimentally 
manipulated and found to be an important factor in developing relationships, 
particularly in reducing uncertainty (Graham, 1995). It is hypothesised to function as 
an attempt to release tension and make people feel more comfortable as they are 
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brought up to a more equal relationship (Meyer, 2000).  Given the power imbalance 
inherent in the therapeutic relationship, humour could operate to mitigate implications 
of this imbalance. This affiliative function, if taken to more compulsive levels, could 
form part of the client‟s clinical picture through placation. Nelson (2008) enlisted 
attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969) to argue that through humour‟s identification 
function, client use of humour may represent a form of compulsive care-giving, 
perhaps to entertain and lighten the mood of others.   
 
Franzini‟s (2001) article in the Journal of General Psychology constructed a case for 
the inclusion of humour‟s role in therapy, in order for greater awareness of its 
potential uses and risks. He claims that humour, through a process of constructive 
self-disclosure, allows the therapist to be perceived as human (Franzini, 2001). 
Gelkopf & Kreitler (1996), in reviewing the potential of humour in cognitive therapy, 
argued that the use of humour makes a therapist more attractive. These factors may 
influence and enhance their credibility (Chang & Gruner, 1987; Gruner, 1967, 1985; 
Malone, 1980), which will impact the likelihood a person will wish to identify with and 
listen to that person. Conversely, Kubie (1971) explains that as a form of self-
disclosure, humour can be considered as a violation of the neutrality of the therapist. 
However, Jolley (1982) criticizes therapists who do not use humour, suggesting that 
they might have difficulties with closeness and power. He explained that in using 
humour, therapists share some of themselves and lose some of the power privileged 
to the therapist through anonymity and the uni-directional flow of information. 
Therefore, the choice of whether to use humour may be a reflection of core principles 
around the nature of therapy and therapist preference. This makes relevant the core 
condition of congruence between both therapist and therapeutic modality.  
 
Clarification 
From other perspectives humour is used more as a therapeutic tool or technique, 
which can rely on humour‟s function of clarification. In Fry & Salameh‟s (1987) 
Handbook of Humor and Psychotherapy humour is thought to potentially 
demonstrate novel positive perspectives, and facilitate a new realisation that 
previously insoluble problems are solvable (Salameh, 1987). Killinger (1987) (in the 
same volume) talks about how sensitivity in therapy can be demonstrated by verbal 
picture-painting, with humour as a useful way to maintain psychic distance whilst 
shifting clients from a fixed view of themselves or the world. Similarly, in personal 
construct psychotherapy (PCP) (Kelly, 1991) humour is considered in terms of its 
 99 
potential to experiment with experience, break free from rigid interpretations and 
develop more flexible construing, which is argued to engender freedom, choice and 
empowerment (Viney, 1983). Humour dealing with multiple interpretations and 
meanings, fits well with PCP‟s constructivist perspective: it allows a person to move 
away from naïve realism and offers a change of perspective. It is also thought to 
provide a common ground for communication or a „play space‟ (Gelkopf & Kreitler, 
1996) between therapist and client, whilst maintaining and clarifying the complexity of 
a dilemma (Viney, 1983).  
 
Comic novelist Rosten (1961) described humour as “the affectionate communication 
of insight” (p15-16). Other writers, reviewing opinion around its therapeutic potential, 
support this idea and consider humour as a way of acknowledging and accepting 
another‟s imperfections (Lemma, 2000). Albert Ellis, founder of RET and proponent 
of humour in therapy, argued its benefits in an article (1977a) and video (1977b) in 
which he demonstrated some of his own therapeutic strategies through humour. He 
showed that humour may help a person to take a more tolerant view of themselves 
and what they see as their imperfections, but also of the world when it falls short of 
their expectations or generates feelings of uncertainty. In addition to its role in 
drawing attention to short-falls, humour could be pivotal as an agent of change. In an 
article about the contribution of developmental theory to understanding 
psychotherapeutic change, Stern (1998) talked about moments in therapy where 
there is an inter-subjective state engendered between therapist and client. This inter-
subjective state contained an element of surprise, unpredictability and represented a 
non-linear jump. This description parallels neatly the qualities used to describe 
humour, suggesting its potential as powerful therapeutic intervention. Indeed, 
Buttny‟s (2001) use of CA on therapy tapes confirms its use in the therapeutic task of 
„reframing‟.  
 
Further purported benefits that fit with its clarification function include humour‟s role 
in making content vivid and memorable (Ellis, 1984).  Martin's (1991) description of 
the social–cognitive construction of therapeutic change emphasizes the importance 
of memory variables in successful therapy. Retention of new insights in clients' 
memory of therapy is essential in generating and sustaining client change. Humour‟s 
vividness and promotion of greater recall of information, demonstrated in published 
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studies from a communication perspective (Goldstein, 1976; Gruner, 1967), ensures 
that as much as possible of what is discussed is remembered beyond the session.  
 
Enforcement  
Haugeland‟s (1988) essay interprets philosopher Heidegger‟s views as categorising 
people as essentially conformist, compelled to correct those who deviate from their 
perceived social norms. Wolf‟s (2002) article from a social behaviour perspective 
focused on the relationship between humour and normativity. To be rational, he 
argued, a person must be both obedient and protective of their norms by 
discouraging deviance and reinforcing adherence. Graham et al. (1992) review the 
literature around the function of humour. They share Wolf‟s (2002) view that humour 
allows a person to construct and enforce norms delicately by softening criticism while 
maintaining some degree of identification with the recipient. Within therapy, these 
norms of how people think, behave and feel are frequently addressed and 
challenged. Humour may offer a gentle or mitigated means by which to encourage a 
client to both become aware of their own internalised norms, the opportunity to 
consider others norms and promote change.  
 
However, norms are inevitably influenced by socio-demographic characteristics. 
Given the social power dimension emerging from humour research, it is important to 
briefly consider issues of gender, humour and its function of enforcement. Men have 
long been described in the literature as more likely to engage in conversational 
humour (Middleton & Moland, 1959), a difference evident from when humour is first 
developmentally emerging (Castell & Goldstein, 1976). Levine (1976), in analysing 
stand-up comic scripts, found a big difference in the amount of self-deprecating 
humour used by comedians (12%) and comediennes (63%).  Self-deprecation can be 
seen in this light as reflecting that a person does not feel above the rules of society, 
but excessive use can indicate how a person submissively constructs their social 
status in the world (Foot, 1997). This could be seen as a way in which people self-
enforce perceived norms in subtle ways. Within therapy this is an important point to 
understand client use, as self-deprecating humour could indicate the expression and 
reinforcement of low self-esteem and self-criticism. This point around assessing 
receptivity to clinician humour is echoed in Sultanoff‟s (1994) article in the Journal of 
Nursing Jocularity, a magazine seeking to promote the use of humour in healthcare. 
Sultanoff (1994) argues that if the client uses humour in a self-deprecating way or 
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uses excessive sarcasm, it is important to address this directly and ask how the client 
sees the role of humour in their lives. 
 
This enforcing function is a potentially useful tool for therapists to employ. 
Questioning and changing a person‟s perspective can be a threatening experience, 
potentially leading to defensiveness. In talking about family therapy, Liddle and 
colleagues (1988) hoped that when people are listening and laughing, they may be 
promoted to listen with less resistance. Humour is conceptualised by some to permit 
a person to say things that would be considered unacceptable if stated seriously 
(Buttny, 2001), as “a way of mentioning the unmentionable” (Clift, 1999; p544). 
Buttny‟s (2001) CA research highlights the role of humour in the therapeutic task of 
reframing and demonstrates the importance of the identification function. His analysis 
found that humour allowed the therapist to stay aligned with a person whilst 
discussing alternative perspectives that otherwise might be alienating. There may be 
some utility in humour to negotiate such potentially difficult conversations. In 
facilitating these interactions, the core condition of unconditional positive regard may 
be maintained and conveyed through humour.  
 
In contrast to the point above around humour‟s role in permitting discussion of taboo 
subjects, Kubie (1971) shared his opinion that humour may have the opposite effect. 
He made a case to his psychiatry colleagues that a jocular approach may be 
interpreted as a way of indicating a subject is taboo and off-limits in psychotherapy. 
In Kuhlman‟s (1984) book reviewing the short-term and long term impact of humour 
in therapy, humour was argued to be a way of creating psychological distance 
between clients and their problems. Depending on therapeutic orientation and 
method of employment, this could be conceived as a helpful method to facilitate 
clients to discuss problems whilst diluting a full emotional re-experience, or an 
unhelpful diversion from processing the issues if a client is struggling emotionally on 
a particular point. Humour can therefore potentially be invoked to enforce either the 
therapist‟s or client‟s own rules around the degree of emotion talk or emotion 
tolerance to which they are comfortable (Kuhlman, 1984; Saper, 1987). In terms of a 
diversionary tactic, some go as far as to say that any use of humour by clients is a 
„pathological‟ characteristic, preventing clients from seeing themselves seriously, or 
an inappropriate defence against emotion that should be eliminated (Marcus, 1990).  
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Differentiation 
As a final function, Meyer (2000) argued that humour serves to differentiate. Humour 
is frequently employed to “contrast themselves with their opponents, their views with 
an opponent‟s views, their own social group with others, and so on” (Meyer, 2000, p. 
321).  This may help clients talk about disagreements in their personal relationships. 
Those who argue for humour‟s „destructive potential‟ in therapy (Kubie, 1971), focus 
on this function emerging within the therapeutic relationship. Its potential to threaten 
the therapeutic relationship has been hypothesised to include thinly masked hostility, 
diverting or foreclosing „true‟ thoughts and feelings (such as anxiety, anger or 
judgement), hurting or offending the client, intensifying resistance, or confusing the 
client about the therapist‟s intent (Kubie, 1971).  
 
An obvious scenario related to differentiation where humour may be inappropriate 
would be when humour is employed to denigrate, humiliate, deprecate or undermine 
self-esteem, intelligence or well-being of the client (Pierce, 1994; Saper, 1987). 
Another concern is that humour may seem flippant and convey that the therapist 
does not take the client‟s problems seriously, or that humour may be used 
„narcissistically‟ to show off their own wit (Kubie, 1971; Martin, 2007). Differentiation 
and fragmentation of the therapeutic relationship may result from the functions of 
humour to elevate the therapist‟s position or demote the client‟s. Due to its duality 
and ambiguous nature, there is an inherent risk of the humour being misinterpreted 
by clients (Franzini, 2001). This uncertainty or misunderstanding could divide the 
dyad, particularly if the client or therapist is prone to orient to messages of rejection. 
 
Similarly, empirical research into group psychotherapy found that over 75% of the 
humour used by group members was negatively targeted toward people and only 7% 
was positive (Peterson & Pollio, 1982). When negative humour was directed to a 
group member, the therapeutic effectiveness of the group was consequently rated as 
lower and it appeared a means of diverting the conversation. If directed to a person 
outside of the group, it was rated as more therapeutically effective, appearing as a 
method of support to promote group well-being. The target and type of humour 
therefore can influence the cohesion or discord within therapy.  
 
Tension reduction 
Robinson & Smith-Lovin (2001) argue that the stress-reducing benefits of humour are 
widely recognized in the literature (e.g., Dienstbier 1995; Lefcourt & Martin 1986; 
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Martin & Lefcourt 1983; Schacter & Wheeler 1962; White & Winzelberg 1992). 
Empirical findings suggest there is a complicated, and often controversial, 
relationship between humor and stress (Kuiper & Martin 1998; White & Winzelberg 
1992). However, research shows that people interpret humorous stimuli as more 
funny and produce more humorous comments when aroused (Bales & Slater, 1955; 
Cantor, Bryant & Zillman 1974; Prerost & Brewer 1977). Sacks (1974) described 
these departures from the main focus of conversation as side sequences. Given that 
therapy can trigger intense emotional arousal in clients, this function of humour has 
been raised in bolstering arguments for its use in therapy (Golan & Jaffe, 2007). 
 
The function of not using humour 
The above section described the function of humour in therapy, revealing potential 
benefits and costs to the therapeutic relationship. Clearly, the use of humour needs 
to be carefully considered as it has the potential to be interpreted by clients as 
insensitive, uncaring or excessively self-absorbed (Franzini, 2001). Given these 
caveats, it is necessary for a therapist to reflect on the intention and impact of the 
humour they employ (Martin, 2007). It may at this point be useful to consider 
explicitly the merit in refraining from using humour. The use of humour has been 
disapproved of in the literature by some because therapy is viewed as not only „hard 
work‟ (Kuhlman, 1984), but a grim and sober affair (Franzini, 2001).  Ellis (1977a) 
offered a counter argument regarding this issue: that therapists view themselves in 
the same way they view their work, as both important and serious. Whilst his 
comments are largely facetious, he is making (possibly inadvertently) a valid point 
regarding congruence.  
 
Offered to guide research in the field, Kuhlman‟s (1987) model of therapeutic change 
takes the form of an equation. This model places the choice to engage in humour as 
the result of client and therapist characteristics and experience, their relationship and 
environmental or contextual factors. Offering no simple answers, it provides a 
framework on which to reason through the use of humour. As outlined before, 
humour may be described as a disposition, as well as stimulus and response. 
Kuhlman‟s (1987) model highlights the importance of client and therapist disposition. 
If a therapist‟s or client‟s disposition is not oriented to the use of humour, then, in 
order for this therapeutic condition to be met, the amount and type of humour used 
would need to be carefully negotiated between the therapy dyad. A therapist whose 
outlook does not lend itself to such a way of interacting would be ill-advised to adopt 
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such an approach in therapy. Likewise, if a client‟s personal style is not likely to 
respond well to a humorous approach, the therapy will need to be congruent with 
this.   
 
The response to humour is as important a consideration as the choice to engage in 
humour itself. There are times when not responding to a client‟s humour can be 
detrimental to the therapeutic process, contributing to termination of the therapeutic 
relationship. For example, Gonick (2004), an American columnist, reported on her 
struggles with suicidal thoughts and the process of therapy. She described her 
therapist as attempting to stifle laughter in order to “look properly shrinkish” (Gonick, 
2004, p20). The client‟s goal then appeared to be rousing laughter from the therapist. 
Whilst sharing humour can be a means of unification, not being able or willing to 
share such efforts could serve to undermine the relationship.  
 
The relationship between humour and laughter 
In the previous sections, the various functions that humour may perform in therapy 
were outlined. It is important to consider separately the subject of laughter. Laughter 
and humour do not share a perfect linear relationship (Attardo, 2003). There are 
instances of dead pan or dry humour that, although funny, do not elicit a laugh, and 
equally, laughter that does not have humorous origins. In this section, this 
relationship will be further explored. 
 
There are numerous words to describe laughter, from a titter to a roar. Foot (1997) 
differentiates between the various functions and categories of laughter. Laughter 
conveys that we find something funny, but also others less related to humour. 
Laughter expresses friendship, masks misunderstanding, hides feelings, excuses 
past actions, apologises for future ones, expresses relief, mocks a person or 
expresses exhilaration or mastery.  These functions are important to understand 
given that Marci et al. (2004) found that laughter occurred every three minutes in 
their tapes of therapy.  
 
Provine (2000) describes gender differences in laughter where women were found to 
be almost twice as likely to laugh at a man‟s joke (71%) than vice versa (39%). 
Laughter in organisations was found by a study using socio-linguistic methodology to 
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be an expression of politeness, and a behaviour that communicates and enacts 
power relationships (Morand, 1996).  The role of laughter and smiling in regulation of 
status in hierarchical relationships has been suggested in other natural observation 
research (Mehu & Dunbar, 2008). Therefore, issues of status and power influence a 
person‟s likelihood to laugh but, in turn, their laughter is influential in shaping their 
access to power and claim to status. Given the power imbalances in the therapeutic 
relationship, polite laughter as a response to a therapist comment may be more 
expected than vice versa. Laughter could also be seen as a means by which clients 
can reclaim power.  
 
Laughter has also attracted the attention of attachment researchers. Sander & 
Scheich (2005) discuss laughter as attachment behaviour, with research focusing 
particularly on bonding parent-child dyads (Bowlby, 1969; Schore, 2003). Laughter 
between a baby and its primary care-giver ordinarily becomes a coordinated shared 
experience (Nelson, 2008), correlating with later communication and secure 
attachment patterns (Beebe, 2003). Other psychoanalytically oriented writers talk 
about how laughter in therapy influences an attachment relationship between client 
and therapist (Siebold, 2006), in contrast to the often insecure attachments in other 
areas of a client‟s life (Nelson, 2008). Nelson (2008) argues that the emergence of 
sharing laughter in a therapy session can be viewed as attachment behaviour, 
powerful in strengthening or weakening the therapeutic relationship, given its impact 
to engender intimacy (Jefferson, Sacks & Schegloff, 1978) or alienate (Woolf, 2002).  
 
However, after decades of studying laughter both experimentally and naturalistically, 
Provine (2000) concluded that laughter has little to do with humour. From a 
behavioural neuroscience perspective, he argued that laughter is an instinctual 
survival tool of social animals, rather than an intellectual response to wit. “It‟s not 
about getting the joke”, Tierney (2007, p. 1) wrote when discussing Provine‟s 
research in the New York Times, “it‟s about getting along”. However, Attardo (2003), 
in critiquing Provine‟s (2000) position, reminds readers of the Journal of Pragmatics 
that humour and laughter remain “obviously related” (p. 1288). He also points out 
discrepancies in Provine‟s work. Attardo (2003), whose humour theory relies largely 
on incongruity, draws attention to a “cavalier” (p. 1288) statement by Provine (2003, 
p. 15) that “our success at incongruity detection is celebrated through laughter”. 
Provine (2000) contradicts himself by stating that „„most laughter is not a response to 
jokes or other formal attempts at humor‟‟ (p. 42). Attardo (2003) clarifies that 
 106 
incongruity theories would not tie directly humour and laughter, that laughter is not 
routinely the response to humour, and that humour is not the only stimulus for 
laughter. This means that the task of humour identification is a complex one (Attardo, 
2003). 
 
Whilst many researchers consider themselves to be exploring humour, it may well be 
that their focus is largely laughter based. For this reason, the focus needs to be 
explicitly directed at humour and caution must be exercised for the possibility of 
being lured down the path of laughter. Attardo (2003) points to pioneering research in 
diverse fields that have developed more complex means of humour identification, 
including other contextual and linguistic identifiers (such as Holmes & Marra, 2002). 
This important issue will be returned to in the methodology section.  
 
CA’s contribution to humour in psychotherapy research  
As mentioned before, therapeutic communication is a particular type of conversation 
with its own unique patterns of talk and CA is a methodology only recently being 
applied to this setting. In order to consider CA‟s findings on the use of humour in 
psychotherapy, it may first be useful to review briefly some of the work that has 
emerged generally in the field of psychotherapy. This will provide a foundation on 
which to locate some of the research around humour in this setting that is of specific 
interest.  
 
The first study to examine psychotherapy as a particular type of interaction was by 
Davis (1986), who looked at formulation. Sacks (1992), the founder of this 
methodology, applied pure CA to psychotherapy, recounting his observations of 
group therapy in lectures.  Bercelli et al. (2008) have identified distribution of turn 
types and order in therapy, revealing a uniform asymmetric pattern:  
1. Therapists can ask questions about clients‟ personal events at any „transition 
relevant place‟ in the session, and ask many questions.  
2. Clients do not usually ask questions except repair-initiation questions. 
3. Apart from questions, therapists mainly make statements about client events, 
grounded in the previous client‟s talk (formulations or reinterpretations).  
4. Clients regularly respond to these statements (in minimal or non-minimal 
ways). 
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According to Bercelli et al. (2008), therapeutic talk generally follows two main 
courses of action: inquiry (series of question/answer sequences to gather information 
about events), and elaboration (series of reinterpretations and client responses to 
them, by offering their views and hearing responses to them). Therapists can 
generate new topics whereas clients generally do not, but rather shift topics gradually 
through extensions of their responses as far as the therapist allows.   
 
Whilst available research into the area is still quite scarce, CA has offered interesting 
insights into a range of important areas of interest in therapy, such as cohesion in 
group psychotherapy (Lepper, 2006), making links in psychoanalytic therapy 
(Perakyla, 2004), collaboration (Lepper & Mergenthaler, 2007a), cycles of significant 
interaction (Lepper & Mergenthaler, 2007b), turn-taking (Bercelli et al., 2008) and 
impasses in systemic therapy (Couture, 2006).  Other CA ideas and observations 
generated about therapy will be discussed as they become relevant through the 
analysis.  
 
With specific regards to humour, a literature search (see Appendix 1) found twelve 
articles using search terms of “conversation analysis”, “humour OR humor” and 
“therapy”.  Ten were discarded (see appendix 1 for reasons). 
  
Gale & Newfield (1992) used CA to identify the “paralinguistic features of talk as well 
as the structural sequencing of the various turn takings in the conversation” (p. 154). 
They extracted themes of therapist strategies, dynamics and agendas. One of nine 
therapist strategies identified was the use of humour to switch from a problem-
focused to a solution-focused theme. The therapist used exaggeration of a potentially 
problematic comment by one client and in doing so, they argue, disrupted the 
conversation, allowing him to shift the focus back to his own agenda (Gale & 
Newfield, 1992). In the exemplar they use, the therapist is described as having 
“effectively averted a possible problem and directed the talk towards a more positive 
conversation” (Gale & Newfield, 1992, p163). This study offers some insight into the 
function of humour in therapy, but this emerged as part of the wider area of interest 
around identifying therapist strategies. This therefore does not consider client use of 
humour or therapist use of humour that would not be considered a therapeutic 
strategy or related to an agenda.  
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In directly addressing the topic of humour in therapy, Buttny (2001) argued that 
coding just therapist utterances is inadequate given that humour is constructed 
between two people. Buttny (2001) analysed a transcript of therapy with a couple 
using CA, which he argued allowed him to “get at how humour works in therapy” and 
“what discursive reality it attempts to construct” (p306). He suggested that humour is 
valuable in one of therapy‟s principle activities, re-framing, and owes a proportion of 
its success to its ability to adopt a playful approach. He argued humour disarms client 
resistance and creates a space in which to explore contrasting explanations.  
 
Buttny‟s (2001, 2004) research looked at humorous devices, sequential 
environments for movement into humour and responses to humour. He found that 
the vast majority of instances were therapist initiated, and appeared to be designed 
for various therapeutic moves. Devices included hyperbole, metaphors, hypothetical 
quotes, repetition, facetiousness, irony, non-lingual vocalisations, and prosodic 
features. In his analysis, he notes that a humorous approach was adopted: following 
repeated attempts to explain a therapeutic interpretation; when disagreement arose; 
in pursuit of a response being withheld; and in being professionally cautious. He 
examines examples of when humour is intentional and unintentional, but also 
explores how successful humour was, concluding that it is an “interactional 
accomplishment” (Buttny, 2001, p312). He discussed a duality behind the humour, in 
that there is simultaneously light-heartedness but also serious implications, and 
described how this duality creates a conflict in how to respond depending on whether 
orienting toward one or other. One of his concluding remarks included how humour 
“functions as a lubricant to grease the conflicting edges of therapeutic contact” (p. 
322), rather than as a break from therapeutic activity.  
 
Rationale 
Gale & Newfield‟s (1992) research looked at humour as one of nine strategies used 
by the therapist to pursue his solution-focused agenda, whereas Buttny‟s (2001) 
research focused directly on the use of humour in therapy. His conclusions are based 
on the unique difficulties of two specific clients in couple therapy in America 
conducted by one particular therapist at one particular stage of therapy in one 
particular session using one particular brand of therapy. 
 
The research proposed here examines the content and process of therapy in 
different contexts, further exploring the use of humour in therapy by both clients and 
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therapists, and considering its role in the therapeutic process (Viney, 1983).   In 
contrast to previous research, humour will be of interest whether it is attributable to 
the client or therapist, as learning about therapeutic potential is as important as the 
way in which clients orient themselves to therapeutic agendas.  
 
 
Aims and research questions 
There were a number of aims when first embarking on this research project: 
  
1) The first aim was to weigh up the different perspectives and competing 
arguments regarding the use of humour available in the literature. This 
objective was achieved through the literature review above. 
2) The main aim of the research was to explore the use of humour employed in 
therapy. This will be done in a number of ways. The linguistic devices 
employed in humour attempts will be examined in order to consider the 
underlying mechanics. The sequential environments in which humour 
appears and reactions to humour will be analysed to consider the function it 
may be playing within each context. 
 
Based on these aims, the following research questions have been formulated: 
1. What resources do participants draw upon to move from the serious into 
humour? 
2. In what sequential environments does humour occur? 
3. What does humour project or make relevant as a response from recipients? 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
In the preface it was mentioned that CA research frequently deviates from 
conventional written structure (ten Have, 2007). Other CA research (e.g., Gale & 
Newfield, 1992) provides a loose template for a Methodology section. Given that the 
choice of data analysis determines the mode of data, the rationale for the selection of 
a research method will first be discussed, before describing the data selected, and 
then finally narrowing down the scope further by describing the process of selecting 
excerpts, conducting the analysis, reliability and validity, and ethical considerations.    
 
Choosing a methodology 
This section will describe the process by which the methodology was selected. 
Initially, Coding and Content Analysis were considered as potential analytic methods. 
However, after some consideration, they were deemed to fall short of sufficiently 
capturing the intricacies of talk-in-interaction (Beach, 1990; Buttny, 2004). Three 
other methods were subsequently considered: Phenomenology (Sokolowski, 2000), 
Discourse Analysis (DA) (Gee, 2005) and Grounded Theory (Dey, 1999).   However, 
having considered Starks & Trinidad's (2007) comparison of these three approaches, 
Phenomenology was ruled out for its focus on the lived experience of participants, 
and Grounded Theory was disqualified for its focus on social structures and 
processes. DA, with its interest in the negotiation and construction of knowledge, 
meaning, identity and social goods was more seriously considered as a potential 
approach for this study. However, taking note of Wooffitt's (2006) comparison of DA 
and CA, DA was eventually also ruled out. DA, interested in the relationship between 
language and the construction of knowledge, seemed a less refined tool for the 
research task compared to CA's focus on the conversation itself and the social 
actions that utterances perform (Wooffitt, 2006). 
 
Over the past 20 years, CA is increasingly being applied to organisations to explore 
how each profession's social goals are being achieved through conversation 
(Atkinson & Heritage, 1984; Boden & Zimmerman, 1993). This social constructionist 
approach examines naturalistic accounts, embedded in conversational sequences 
(Potter & Wetherall, 1999) or talk-in-interaction (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984). 
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Data 
 
Figueroa & Lopez (1991) note a lack of attention to the methodological processes by 
which data are gathered. Burr (2004) argues that if something insightful is to be said 
about the way an account was constructed then its context, its history, and intended 
audience must be explicit. 
 
Two data collection methods were considered: requesting therapists and clients to 
record their sessions or harvesting existing recordings. The former would involve 
seeking out therapy dyads and requesting consent prior to new recordings being 
made, whilst the latter would focus on pre-existing recordings from previous research 
or clinical reasons. It was thought that in securing consent for such recordings to be 
made, the data would cease to be naturally occurring, violating one of the conditions 
for CA research. Awareness of the research interest would likely impact conduct; 
therefore it was decided to secure pre-existing recordings.  
 
In canvassing a range of sources, a potential pool of data was identified through a 
research project conducted by the Programme Director at UH comparing Cognitive 
and Personal Construct Psychotherapy (PCP) (Winter & Watson, 1999). Ethical 
approval was secured (appendix 2) through extending the ethical consent for the 
original study. Research governance and sponsorship was secured through the 
University of Hertfordshire (appendix 3). The project proposal met NHS R&D 
Governance criteria (appendix 4).  
 
The pool of data consisted of 53 audiotapes of the fifth sessions of PCP (24) and 
Cognitive (29) therapy. Initially two tapes were randomly selected, but having only 
four examples of the use of humour seemed insufficient. Two more were then 
selected. Only three were used in the analysis due to concerns over recording quality 
of one tape (see Table 1 for description). 
  
Dyad Religion Ethnicity Occupation Age Presenting problem 
A Hindu Asian Professional 40s Depression 
B Jewish White Professional 30s 
Depression, relationship 
problems 
C Jewish White House wife 30s Depression, anxiety 
 
Table 1: Client characteristics 
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Identifying excerpts for analysis 
Both Sacks (1984) and Hutchby & Wooffitt (2008) opt for results being data-driven, 
and state that analysis should neither be biased by pre-existing ideas nor theoretical 
assumptions. However, in order to aim the sights of the analysis, the target will need 
to be readily identified and operationalised. Humour does not lend itself easily to 
definition (Hatch, 1993), and tends to be readily demonstrated rather than described. 
This task of defining humour has generally been side-stepped by researchers in the 
field, who tended to rely on a common-sense or intuitive method in its identification 
(Emerson, 1969; Vinton, 1989). In previous research, little time was spent on criteria 
for identifying it, or it was uncritically identified through the presence of laughter 
(Buttny, 2001; Bonaiuto, Castellana & Pierro, 2003).  
 
Given Provine‟s (2000) research which associates laughter with a range of 
precursors, not necessarily humorous, laughter remains an unavoidably 
unsatisfactory indicator of humour. Whilst briefly acknowledging the possible 
mismatch between a speaker‟s intention and a listener‟s orientation to a comment as 
humour, Buttny (2004) resigns himself to accept the „obviousness‟ of some 
utterances, using “a commonsense category in which at least one person displays it 
or orients to it in some way” (p78). Bonaiuto et al. (2003), drawing on both the 
theoretical base of CA and imposition of practical constraints, relied on laughter as a 
marker to identify and chart the sequential arrangement of humorous content in 
conversation. Jefferson (1979; 1985), a significant exponent of CA, claims that 
laughter is the sign par excellence of the humorous character of an utterance. Mulkay 
(1988) argues that rather than being merely a response to humorous discourse, 
laughter can provide the social cue that encourages humorous discourse. The 
laughter invitation made by the humorist is argued to signify the comedic quality of 
the anticipated comment whilst laughter following a comment is thought to seal “the 
laughable nature of the utterance” (Glenn, 1989, p. 128).  
 
Hatch (1993) outlines some of the difficulty in using laughter as a criterion to locate 
humour, including laughter at non-humourous stimuli. Whilst applauded by some for 
making explicit her critical stance, the result remains the same in her research. 
Therefore, a more complex means of identification is required to address the issues 
of sensitivity (not classifying an utterance as humour when it is) and specificity 
(classifying an utterance as humour when it is not).  
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In ensuring the criteria for identifying excerpts are sensitive enough to capture all 
examples of humour in the tapes, criteria will include „laughter particles‟ of the 
speaker of the utterance, even if it is not met with laughter. Holmes & Marra (2002) 
have been heralded by Attardo (2003) for using more linguistically focused 
methodology to study humour and have developed more complex criteria to identify 
humour. Humorous utterances were defined as those which are “identified by the 
analyst, on the basis of paralinguistic, prosodic, and discoursal clues, as intended by 
the speaker(s) to be amusing and perceived to be amusing by at least some 
participants” (Holmes and Marra, 2002, p. 1693). They specify further a wide range of 
contextual and linguistic clues that may be relevant to the identification of humour, 
including speaker‟s tone of voice and the audience‟s auditory and discoursal 
responses. Moreover, they include laughter, and, where video recording is available, 
facial expression, including smiles, which is unfortunately not available in the audio-
recordings of this research.   
 
Having spread the net widely to ensure all possible instances are captured, there 
must be a specification process to sort through the catch in order to discard 
examples that are not humorous. The Semantic-Script Theory of humour (SSTH: 
Raskin, 1979; 1985), a popular and well researched theory in the study of humour, 
may offer further definition that has been adopted by linguistically-oriented research 
to ensure each candidate is classifiable as humour. Attardo (2003) argued that this 
theory “established that all humour involves a semantic-pragmatic process (although 
some humor involves a phonological/morphological/syntactic aspect as well, i.e., 
verbal humor)” (p. 1287).  It is not appropriate to describe this complex theory (see 
Norrick, 2003; Raskin, 1985) in detail here. However, it is worth highlighting that “the 
SSTH included a semantic opposition between the scripts… activated by a (fragment 
of a) text and a violation of the maxims of the principle of cooperation” (Attardo, 2003, 
p.1287). Grice (1989) explains that the principle of cooperation involves four maxims: 
quantity (speakers give enough and not too much information), quality (they are 
genuine and sincere, speaking „truth‟ or facts), relation (utterances are relative to the 
context of the speech) and manner (speakers are direct and straightforward, and try 
to present meaning clearly and concisely, avoiding ambiguity). For the purpose of 
analysis, the utterance will be qualified as humour if there is „a sudden movement 
between, or unexpected combination of, distinct interpretive frames‟ (Mulkay, 1988; 
26) and if the utterance violates maxims of the principle of cooperation. This is hoped 
to guide detection specifically toward humour.  
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Conducting the analysis 
Original tapes were copied onto CD. Using the criteria outlined above, tapes were 
listened to and incidents of humour were noted and screened for eligibility to be 
included. Given the time consuming nature of transcription, ten Have (2007) urges 
Conversation Analysts to only transcribe episodes that are relevant to the specific 
research interest. Pomerantz & Fehr (1997) identified ways of initiating and 
developing the analytic process by grounding each analysis in the identification of a 
sequence: 
 
For the start of the sequence, locate the turn in which one of the 
participants initiated an action and/or topic that was taken up and 
responded to by co-participants. For the end of the sequence, follow 
through the interaction until you locate the place in which the participants 
are no longer responding to the prior action and/or topic. 
Pomerantz & Fehr (1997, p.71) 
 
Sequences deemed as sufficient for analysis were identified and dictated both the 
content to be transcribed and analysed. ten Have (2007) recognises the difficulty 
posed in identifying a sequence, particularly since new sequences can be triggered 
by subtle and hinted initiatives rather than marked ones. This is further complicated 
by the frequency that sequences can „trail off‟ rather than reach conclusion (ten 
Have, 2007). ten Have (2007) argues that these difficulties “should not discourage 
efforts to try and locate sequences” but mark some “interestingly deviant cases”.  
Therefore, rather than selecting a time period or number of lines prior to the humour, 
sequences were the unit identified to guide transcription and analysis. For example, if 
humour emerged in an anecdotal account, the social action that the account played 
within the prior conversation was traced back to the point that it was initiated; if the 
humour emerged in a sequence that reflected persuasion then the beginning of the 
act of persuasion was considered an appropriate place to start. The tapes were 
listened to and transcripts were read by the supervisor of this research to confirm the 
sufficiency of the quality and quantity of transcription.  
 
The importance of the transcription process has been stressed (Heritage, 1984; 
Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974). Using the computer program „Audacity‟ to assist 
in accurately measuring silences and pauses, transcription was completed according 
to the conventions outlined in Hutchby & Wooffitt (2008) (see appendix 5 for 
transcription symbols). Gale & Newfield (1992) describe the process of CA as 
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discovery-oriented, and as with their research, no hypotheses were generated in this 
study prior to analysis.  
 
Two instances where laughter was heard were discarded from the analysis. One 
example was transcribed (dyad C, line 190, appendix 6) but was not analyzable due 
to a combination of overlapping talk and recording quality. The other omitted example 
was not transcribed due to the talk being of insufficient audibility and emerged as the 
therapist communicated with an unknown interactant who interrupted the session 
(dyad A).  Fourteen instances of laughter in seven segments of transcript were heard 
sufficiently and included in the analysis (see Table 2).  
 
Segment Therapy 
dyad 
Orientation Therapist Client 
Therapist 
initiated 
humour 
Client 
initiated 
humour 
1 A Cognitive Male Male 0 1 
2 
B PCP Male Female 
0 
0 
1 
6 3 0 1 
4 0 4 
5 
C Cognitive Female Female 
0 
6 
1 
1 6 1 0 
7 5 0 
 
Table 2: Description of  date and participants 
 
The remaining portion of this section will describe the analytic procedure. The 
process of analysis began in transcription (see appendix 6 for transcripts). In their 
chapter on analysis, Hutchby & Wooffitt (2008) talk about the importance of 
considering both conversational devices and participants’ orientations to devices, or 
“what interactional business is being mediated or accomplished through the use of a 
sequential pattern or device” (p98). The analysis will be guided by Buttny‟s work 
(2001; 2004), which operationalised and presented CA in this specific area of 
interest. He first analysed resources used for humour (devices), then sequential 
environments for movement into humour (the contexts in which humour is used), and 
finally responses to humour (how participants orient to humour and the impact on the 
resulting dialogue). See diagram 1.  
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Diagram 1: Analytic procedure 
 
The analysis examined each of these grouped aspects separately for each instance 
of humour.  
 
This analysis was further guided by the researcher‟s understanding of CA, which has 
been influenced predominantly by the work of Drew (2003), Hutchby & Wooffitt 
(2008), and ten Have (2007). The three central features or analytic concepts that 
form the foundation of CA (conversational sequencing, turn-taking and 
conversational repair) and concepts developed specifically in the therapeutic setting 
heavily influenced the analytic process. These will be described below. For further 
clarification of the terminology used, a glossary of terms is provided in appendix 7. 
 
The first central feature of CA is the idea that conversation conforms to types of 
conversational sequencing. Adjacency pairs refer to a class of utterances that form 
pairs, for example “How are you?” is the first-pair part to the second-pair part of 
“Fine, thanks”. Whilst the term adjacency implies proximity, other utterances can be 
inserted (insertion sequence) between them, such as “Why do you ask?”  Often 
second-pair parts have preferred responses. Non-response to a first-pair part is a 
noticeable violation of conversational rules.  
 
Second, CA is interested in the organisation of turn-taking, and has identified the 
structural characteristics or „the speech exchange system‟ with which people 
exchange talk, “the system of conventions regulating the exchange of turns and the 
management of speaker roles among participants” (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008, p. 49). 
Turns were considered by Sacks et al. (1974) as highly organised and consisting of 
Turn Constructions Units (TCUs), broadly corresponding to categories of sentences, 
clauses and words. Around these TCUs are Transition Relevance Places (TRP) 
where a listener can take up their turn to talk. Projection refers to the listener‟s 
 
2. Sequential          3. Responses 
environments         
 
1. 
Resources 
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attempt to anticipate when the TCU will close and a TRP will fall, ensuring the 
uninterrupted flow of talk. Interruptions and overlapping talk for CA represent 
interesting areas where the management of talk requires repair, the third important 
concept. 
 
Conversational repair includes remedying mismanagement of turn-taking and 
correction. This latter form of repair, which is the “substantive fault in the content of 
what was said” (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008, p. 57), requires the suspension of on-
going turns. Interesting work has been generated around who initiates repair and 
who completes the repair, creating four different categories of sequences (self/other-
initiated self/other-repair) (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008).  
 
Within CA of therapy, specialised types and levels of conversational categories have 
been defined and researched. In the analysis, the surface speech acts will not be 
distinguished from the therapeutic acts as defined by Labov & Fanshel (1977), whilst 
the importance of this distinction is recognised. Vehvilainen et al. (2008) distinguish 
levels of organisation by comparing them to a chess game: a conversational action 
as moving a piece, local sequence as the move‟s contribution to the tactic and 
therapeutic function as the move‟s contribution to the overall strategy. It is therefore 
important to acknowledge how an utterance can simultaneously be described as one 
of many different actions (White, 1979). However, this multiplicity will not preoccupy 
this research, but rather offer reassurance that actions can be correctly identified in 
an open-ended plurality of ways (Anscombe, 1959).  
 
Finally, it is also important to clarify and disambiguate some terms, which will be 
used according to definitions by Bercelli et al. (2008) and Vehvilainen et al. (2008). 
„Extension‟ describes a syntactic continuation of the other‟s comment, through 
finishing or continuing the other‟s turn, often pursuing the therapeutic agenda. 
„Formulation‟ is a re-saying of the perspective expressed by the client, often used to 
emphasise or extract the psychologically meaningful aspects of the client‟s turn. 
„Reinterpretation‟ is grounded in what the client has said, but expressed from the 
therapist‟s own perspective and its meaning is transformed to something different. 
 
Validity and reliability 
Validity and reliability as understood in reference to their orientation towards a 
verifiable truth are thought to be inappropriate for judging the quality of research from 
a social constructionist framework (Burr, 2004). Although there are no criteria that are 
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universally accepted (Burr, 2004), the importance of legitimatising analyses is 
recognised by researchers in this field. 
 
Taylor (2001) suggests a number of ways to enhance coherence and rigour of 
research. Adopting a quantitative stance, he argues that one can ensure consistency 
by calculating indices of agreement between raters in coding textual material. 
Providing in-depth descriptions about steps in analytic procedure can highlight the 
route with which a researcher has arrived at some of their ideas. Member checking, 
he adds, allows participants to feed back how well a researcher‟s explanation fits with 
their experience. Wood & Kroger (2000) have also suggested criteria for 
trustworthiness and soundness, and urge researchers to include an audit trail to 
allow the reader to follow progress from text to interpretation.  
 
The issues of validity and reliability have been considered for this research and an 
audit trail for independent audit was maintained during the analysis.  Reflexivity and 
member checking is less of a concern for CA than some other forms of qualitative 
analysis (Burr, 1999). However, Sherrard (1991) criticises researchers for not 
adopting a reflexive stance and building into research a platform from which 
participants can comment on their own accounts. Moreover, given the age of the 
recordings, this useful step was considered to be pragmatically complex and 
methodologically unnecessary. It is acknowledged that there is a danger in this 
research of closing the text to alternative readings other than that of the researcher 
(Parker & Burman, 1993). Therefore, research supervisors were involved in reliability 
checks. One of the important features of CA is that the data on which the claims are 
being made is available within the text for readers to verify for themselves. Therefore, 
the accuracy of claims can be continuously evaluated in reference to the 
conversational „proof‟ presented each time the research is read.   
  
Ethical considerations 
Ethical approval was obtained for the original research (Winter & Watson, 1999) and 
extended to cover this research, which was granted by the Barnet, Enfield and 
Haringey Ethics Committee (see Appendix 2). As the study was exploring process 
and outcome of a variety of therapeutic approaches, and was still active despite the 
data collection phase being complete, this research was tacked on to the pre-existing 
ethical approval. The committee agreed that it would be neither practical nor clinically 
appropriate to contact the therapy dyads, since they had given their consent for their 
tapes to be analyzed.  
 119 
 
ten Have (2007) outlined the importance of consent to be recorded, to be used for 
research purposes and for the content of the data to be published. The consent 
forms used in the original study covered these areas sufficiently to allow this pool of 
data to be used. ten Have (2007) also outlined the ethical issue around people‟s 
common-sense association between “a detailed consideration of people‟s actions 
and an unpleasant exposure, or critical assessment, of those actions” (ten Have, 
2007, p. 79). One strategy that can be used to minimize this is anonymity. Names 
and other identifying information have been changed in the transcripts in order to 
protect participant confidentiality (ten Have, 2007). 
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Chapter 5: Results and discussion  
 
 
Overview 
The analysis will be integrated with the discussion to help the reader make links 
between the findings and their significance and existing literature. This section will 
begin by describing the pattern of humour from the tapes and compare this with other 
findings in the literature. In the main, however, this section will be devoted to 
identifying the devices or mechanisms that were used to create humour, the 
sequential environments in which humour was used and the responses to the use of 
humour. A summary of the main findings relating to the function of humour will be 
outlined at the beginning of this section.  
 
Patterns of humour use 
The majority of CA research focusing on institutional interaction is most interested in 
the professional and their actions (Vehvilainen et al., 2008). In contrast, the current 
research is interested in the construction of talk of both participants and found that 
much of the humour was initiated by clients. 
 
Buttny (2001, 2004) suggested that the majority of humour was initiated by the 
therapist, stating that this asymmetry may reflect the client‟s orientation to the 
therapist as expert by refraining from disrupting the largely serious activity of therapy 
(Buttny, 1990). Given that most CA research in institutions focuses on the talk and 
conversational strategy of the professional, the current research offers a useful 
insight into both professional and client use of humour. Given the differing patterns of 
humour initiation (see Methodology section), it seems that humour use may be 
dependent on individual differences, and reflect differences in how each individual of 
each dyad views each therapeutic encounter.  
 
The stage of therapy may also influence the differences between the findings. 
Buttny‟s (2001, 2004) research was an analysis of a one-session consultation, whilst 
data in this project was from the fifth session of a course of twelve. It could be that in 
previous sessions each dyad had subtly negotiated the appropriateness and 
desirability of using humour in therapy, each negotiation emerging with different 
outcomes. In the process of undertaking this research project, many interesting 
discussions emerged. One important outcome of these discussions was a point 
raised around therapist congruence, indicating the influence of individual differences. 
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Whether humour is used within therapy can therefore be seen as the outcome of a 
negotiation between those individual differences and how each client‟s and 
therapist‟s view therapy, within the context of each particular therapy event.  
 
Having discussed the frequency and sources of humour use, this section will now 
analyse each instance of humour and the functions it may be performing within each 
context.   
 
Functions of humour use 
The analytic procedure focused on identifying the devices or mechanisms that were 
used to create humour, the sequential environments in which humour was used and 
the responses to the use of humour. In order to make the analysis of the current 
project‟s data more accessible to the reader, these aspects will be integrated by 
being more grounded in the transcript sequences. The reader is requested to hold 
the format above (see diagram 1) in mind as the analyses are discussed. The 
analysis will be integrated into the discussion to further aid the reader to make links 
between the findings and their significance and the available literature. This section 
will refer regularly to Meyer‟s (2000) continuum of humour‟s four functions outlined in 
the Introduction.  
 
The analyses of instances of humour will first examine humour‟s role of differentiation 
in unresolved resistance. Next it will consider how humour can function to unify the 
therapy dyad in overcoming resistance through empathy and reframing. In the 
section on conveying disagreement, humour functions to differentiate a client‟s 
viewpoint from that of a third party. The subsequent section will then consider 
humour‟s role of enforcement as the dyads grapple with and negotiate the process of 
change. Its function in the context of uncertainty will explore its potential for 
clarification.  As these sections unfold, pertinent areas in psychotherapeutic research 
such as resistance and empathy will be discussed in more detail whilst its relevance 
to the therapeutic relationship will be an ongoing concern.  
 
Unresolved resistance 
The concept „therapeutic resistance‟ has its origins in psychodynamic thinking 
(Freud, 1904), but is also employed in other modalities (Wachtel, 1982). As 
mentioned in the Introduction, the therapeutic relationship is facilitated by therapist 
flexibility, and in the following example of resistance, it seems that the disagreement 
continues as a result of the rigidity with which the dyad cling to their different 
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positions.  In a discursive analysis of the therapeutic relationship, Roy-Chowdhury 
(2006) points to un-repaired and unresolved trouble sources emerging again and 
again in the conversation, which act to subvert therapeutic aims.  In another example 
in this research described in the “Overcoming resistance” section, this rigidity is 
diffused by employing the flexibility and unifying potential inherent in humour. 
However, in this following example, both therapist and client become embroiled in a 
battle of persuasion and resistance, and the client uses humour‟s differentiation 
function to encapsulate their diverging viewpoints. As described at the start of this 
section, the sequential environments, devices and responses to humour will be 
described separately through reporting and discussing the analysis.  
 
Sequential environment: resistance 
As the sequence emerges in the following excerpts, the build up of resistance and 
persuasion before the client resorts to humour will be described. In excerpt 1a, the 
therapist begins by asking a question (lines 1 and 4), which over the course of the 
conversation is better understood as a suggestion. However, the client responds with 
the dispreferred answer, which later can be understood as a decline or rejection of 
the therapist‟s suggestion.  
 
Excerpt 1a 
1. Th: Would it be any different to you if you  
2.   (1.2) 
3. Cl: Spoke into [a () 
4. Th:        [SPOke these things into  [a: (.) tape recorder= 
5. Cl:      [and listen  
6. Th: =Yeh 
7.   (.6) 
8. Cl: .hh I doubt it very much because (2.1) strong feeling (1.7) 
9.   wid erm (2.8) it‟s the interaction with the other person which is  
10.   err=         
11. Th: = right = 
12. Cl: =very (1.0) calming  
13.   (1.1) 
14. Cl: .hh I‟ve never tried actually t::o speak int[o a tape recorder  
15. Th:            [ right  
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The client anticipates what the therapist is about to ask and demonstrates to the 
therapist that he understands through conversational projection by taking up potential 
turn taking opportunities (line 3). The therapist indicates that he has not completed 
his turn and intends to complete it, demonstrated through the deliberate and strong 
counter-interruption (line 4) where he reclaims his turn. The client initially responds to 
it simply as a question or inquiry, giving the dispreferred response, evident in the 
dispreference markers (Pomerantz, 1984). These include a pause before he 
responds and constructing his response so that the disagreement is as weak as 
possible, diluting a firm unambiguous decline to a strong doubt. The rise in tone of 
“because” (line 8) immediately indicates he will present an account or justification for 
why he might disagree. Having shown his intention, he then takes time before 
carefully constructing and selecting how he will present his reasoning. However, the 
noticeable absence of the therapist taking up the next turn (line 13) results in the 
client‟s next turn being oriented towards repair. He re-constructs his second-pair part 
in a way that suggests a re-interpretation of the therapist‟s first-pair part more as 
advice or suggestion of intervention, by indicating he had not tried it in the past.  
 
The therapist goes on to build his argument supporting his suggestion and 
encouraging the preferred response. He does this by presenting two alternative 
strategies and dismissing them (lines 16 to 33). He leaves enough potential turn 
taking transition relevant places (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008) through pauses and 
voiced pauses (“erm”) to successfully invite the client to co-construct these 
dismissals.  
 
Excerpt 1b 
16. Th: I‟m just bearing in mind what you said about your wife (0.6) 
17. Th: and daugh[ter ] that you .hh that there‟s (0.6) 
18. Cl:       [yes] 
19. Th: >an obstacle there< to you [hh ] freely  
20. Cl:            [yes] 
21.   (0.8) 
22. Th: er:::m= 
23. Cl: =talking to [them 
24. Th:        [talking to them 
25. Cl: Yes there is an obstacle [( ) 
26. Th:        [and there‟s ALSO there seems to be  
27.   an obstacle (0.2) in your mind to talking to yourself that it‟s the  
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28.   first [sign of- you were going to say  
29. Cl:        [yes              
30. Th: madness 
31. Cl: Ye:::s 
32. Th: presumably 
33. Cl: Yes 
 
Having dismissed the plausibility of the two alternatives, the therapist then heightens 
the persuasion for his intervention (lines 35-40). In lines 42-43, he then uses the 
dismissals of one option to increase the desirability of his original suggestion. He 
ends his turn with a question designed to persuade by dismissing one option and 
supporting the adoption of his suggestion that is designed to elicit an affirmative 
response, given their previous conversation.  
 
Excerpt 1c 
34.  (1.3) 
35. Th: m-maybe having a- (.) tape recorder that  
36.   you (0.2) talk int::o (0.9) and record the thoughts >doesn‟t  
37.   matter whether you play them back or not< but maybe the th-  
38.   slightly <differe:nt> (0.8) >interpretation< (0.3) that you 
39.   place on that (0.3) that you:::‟re (0.4) >recording your thoughts<  
40.   >that you‟re (.) expressing them and recording them .hhh 
41. Cl:  ((cough)) 
42. Th: and that you‟re- you know (0.8) is that more socially  
43.   acceptable (1.2) „n talking to oneself um from what you‟ve said 
44. Cl:  Hmm 
45. Th: that maybe that‟s tru:e 
 
This encourages the client to respond affirmatively to the question in the last section 
of the therapist‟s turn, which also included persuasion for the suggestion the client 
had previously declined. The client‟s response at this stage is to respond firmly and 
affirmatively (preferred response to question; line 46) and he reluctantly (given the 
pauses, voiced pauses and quietness of his response in lines 47-51) begins to 
accept the other clause in the therapist‟s prior turn.  
 
Excerpt 1d 
46. Cl: ye:s I think you‟re ri:ght it would be more socially acceptable 
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47.   (0.5) 
48.   but e::rm  
49.   (0.9)  
50.   * I don‟t know whether I can- (um I will try it) *  
51.   (1.1)  
52.   IT SEEMS you know that the:::re must 
53.   be e:::::::rr an element of sympathy from the person themselves 
54.   (0.9) er::::::r I err for example >wouldn‟t speak to anybody who  
55.   was unsympathetic to my troubles< 
56. Th: Rig::ht 
 
This acceptance appears unconvincing and more like submission, given the 
quietness and croakiness of his agreement (line 50), barely audible on the recording. 
However, this agreement emerges as a pseudo-agreement as the client returns to 
bolstering his counter-argument or resistance, which is only superficially responded 
to or acknowledged in the therapist‟s subsequent turn (line 56). In response to this 
absence, the client continues the task of building and strengthening his counter-
argument and also his resistance, through humour (line 57-58) below: 
 
Excerpt 1e 
57. Cl: Aa:::ghh whether a tape recorder can (0.6) re(hh)act in this way  
58.   I don‟t know actually wheth[er ah erm () 
 
The client is then disagreeing with or explicitly resisting the therapist in a mitigating 
way by inserting laughter tokens and using sarcasm (Bercelliet al., 2008; MacMartin, 
2008). However, CA would view resistance in therapy as pathologising clients (Hoyt, 
2002) and produced by both participants. Everything happening in treatment is 
viewed as an interactive event, commonly created by both client and therapist 
(Streeck, 2008). In this example, it is evident that resistance results from both the 
client resisting the therapist‟s advice, and the therapist resisting the client‟s 
declination.   
 
Mechanism: anthropomorphic personification 
In this example the client uses humour to summarise the dissonance between the 
therapist‟s suggestion and his concerns around its utility. After a pause, he selects a 
particular verb incongruent for use with an inanimate object, and emphasises this 
incongruence through humour shown by inserting the „laughter particles‟ into this 
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verb “react” (line 57). Laughter, however subtle, in this research was found to be a 
useful conversational tool for the client to demonstrate humorously the incongruence 
between the perspectives of therapist and himself. The humour emerges as the client 
imbues an inanimate object with animate properties, which has in this research been 
termed „anthropomorphic personification‟. This improbable description captures the 
incompatibility of these competing arguments, and serves to differentiate their 
positions (Meyer, 2000). In humour that is thought to serve the function of 
differentiation, the derision is focused at the violation or unusualness of the 
opponent‟s viewpoint (Meyer, 2000). In this case, the sarcasm around the 
sympathetic response of the tape recorder points to the violation of logic of the 
therapist.  
 
Presenting first the humorous premise of a sympathetic tape recorder reaction allows 
the client to delay presenting his own views on this or dismissing them. However, 
rather than rejecting this idea, he instead uses an epistemic marker saying “I don‟t 
know actually” (line 58). His amusement at the clause before this perhaps negates 
his need to clarify his viewpoint, and instead softens his overall dismissal by not 
stating it. This approach invites the therapist to join with him through laughter in 
shared amusement at such a premise, softening his rejection of the idea with 
humour.  
 
Response: change of persuasive strategy  
The therapist does not audibly respond to the humour and turns down the client‟s 
invitation to laugh. Rather, the client, who appears to intend to continue his turn, is 
interrupted by the therapist‟s firm and pressing intention to speak using a loud in-
breath and speaking loudly (lines 59-60) to regain the floor.   
 
Excerpt 1f 
57. Cl: Aa:::ghh whether a tape recorder can (0.6) re(hh)act in this way  
58.   I don‟t know actually wheth[er ah erm () 
59. Th:           [.HHHH 
60. Th: >WHAT OTHER<? (0.9) outlets are there for yo:u (0.9) to:::::o  
61.   er- explore to talk to someb[ody when you- >when you< feel=  
62. Cl:             [.hhhh   
63. Th:  =par(.)ticularly restless 
64. Cl: .tch .hhhhhhh When I‟m re:stle:ss I think e:rr I try  
65.   >very hard to DO something< (0.5) 
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66.   th[at I don‟t mind doing at least you know like=  
67. Th:    [ yes  
68. Cl: =tidying up some paperwork o::r (1.1) er:::::r  washing up or err 
69.   or ea::ting something I often eat something as to () 
70. Th: Right  
71.   (2.7)  
72. Th: Ok[a::::::::::::::::y.] 
73. Cl:      [But err          ] I‟ll try with the tape recorder   
74.  (6.2)  
75.   I don‟t think (0.8) ne:::::rr (0.8)  
76.   > don‟t think it would work because-er < (1.1) I think w::: 
77.   I‟m asking for sympathy or understanding when I‟m (0.8)  
78.   [when >I want to< ta:lk] 
79. Th: [ okay        ] 
80.   (1.7)  
81. Th:  Fine  
82.   (1.2)  
 
The therapist‟s question, designed to elicit further alternatives, narrows the preferable 
responses to those related to talking, shown by his emphasis on the word “talk” (line 
61). The client‟s response highlights alternatives that do not involve talking, and he 
acknowledges his deviation from the therapist‟s invited responses with an emphasis 
on the word “DO” (line 65). The therapist‟s minimal ambiguous responses (line 70 & 
72) are discourse markers that indicate boundaries in topics of conversation. This 
once more prompts the client to repair the conversational disruption by ending his 
turn, and by unenthusiastically and reluctantly submitting to his demand (line 73). 
However, the long silence of over 6 seconds in line 74 indicates perhaps the tension 
and difficulty in the conversation that the disagreement has generated. However, 
despite his submission, he continues to softly repeat his counter-argument (lines 75-
78), continuing the pattern of resistance and persuasion (in subsequent talk not 
reproduced here).  
 
Summary 
In this research, humour emerges in the sequential environment of persuasion and 
resistance. This research shows the role of humour in resistance to be about 
capturing neatly the counter-argument by humorously framing the opposing 
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viewpoints in a way that emphasizes their incompatibility.  This was achieved in a 
mitigating way by inserting laughter tokens and using sarcasm (Bercelli et al., 2008; 
MacMartin, 2008). This research echoes Buttny‟s (2001, 2004) finding of humour‟s 
role in disarming resistance, albeit not overly successful in this instance, and 
demonstrates that clients also use humour to capture the incompatibility of 
perspectives.  
 
However, this sequence indicates that resistance emerges as an interactional 
phenomenon where the client‟s resistance of the therapist‟s intervention is met with 
the therapist‟s resistance of his reasoning and decline. It is this unresolved and un-
repaired trouble source that is repeatedly played out in their talk and threatening the 
therapeutic relationship. CA would consider resistance as produced by both 
participants. Everything happening in the therapy room, including the therapeutic 
relationship, is viewed as an event interactively and commonly created by client and 
therapist (Streeck, 2008). Roy-Chowdhury (2006) points out that persuasive 
strategies vary between disciplines, and that “for the psychotherapist, the persuasion 
must make sense within the therapee‟s life world” (p. 169), rather than rely on 
category entitlements such as in medical consultations (Hak & Boer, 1995). Clearly in 
this example, the persuasion did not make sense.  
 
Meyer‟s (2000) continuum would see this instance of humour as a means of 
differentiating viewpoints. Boland & Hoffman (1983) consider humour as allowing 
communicators a way of:  
 
...transcending recurring arguments or patterns because messages with 
humour can get people to laugh at contradictions as a way of accepting 
their existence… instead of frantically, futilely or tragically seeking to 
correct or eliminate them.             (Meyer, 2000, p. 329)  
 
In the above example, it seems that the therapist‟s reluctance to join the client in the 
humorous former position left him in the latter. With these points in mind, there 
seems to be a clear role for humour from both the client and the therapist in dealing 
with disruption that could be described as resistance in the therapy conversation. In 
using humour to try to accept their differences, both parties can protect the 
therapeutic relationship when it may be at its most delicate.  
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Disarming resistance with empathy and reframing 
In the previous segment of therapy talk, resistance emerged as a sequential 
environment in which humour emerged. Resistance sets the scene once more as the 
problematic and challenging conversational landscape, littered with humorous 
comments. In the sequence below, humour is used repeatedly by the therapist to 
overcome resistance. Contrary to the rigidity of the previous example, this resistance 
was dealt with more flexibly by the therapist by using empathic and re-interpretative 
comments that relied on humour as a vehicle for its delivery. This section will draw 
heavily on but not repeat the section related to empathy in the Therapeutic 
Relationship part of the introduction in analysing the conversational sequence itself. 
In this section, the sequential environment of resistance is disarmed by the humorous 
device of expressing empathy through its ability to unite the dyad, in order to 
challenge the client whilst preserving the therapeutic relationship. 
 
Sequential environment: resistance  
In the following sequence, the client is resisting the therapist‟s attempt to move the 
client from problem saturated talk to considering solutions, particularly in returning to 
a previously suggested intervention. This agenda is met with considerable resistance 
from the client and humour is used frequently by the therapist in this sequence. 
Given the frequency of humorous utterances in a short space of time, the sequential 
environment, mechanisms and responses around these five instances of humour will 
be discussed as the sequence unfolds.  
 
Consistent with Gale & Newfield‟s (1992) finding, the sequence features repeated 
use of humour set in the sequential environment of client resistance to move from 
problem-saturated talk and to use a previously suggested solution. The therapist 
asks a question (lines 1-2) to help the client think about alternative ways of tackling 
her problems in an attempt to elicit the answer from the client (lines 1-2). Line 3‟s in-
breath indicates the client‟s intention to respond. However, after a pause, the client 
responds with “I DUNNO” (line 5), a response well known as an indicator of 
unwillingness or inability to answer a question, and functioning to close down 
unwanted lines of questioning (Hutchby, 2002; MacMartin, 2008).  
 
Excerpt 2a: Dyad C 
1. Th:  IS THERE ANY  
2.   OTHER way you? you could go about that? 
3. Cl:  .hhh 
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4.   (6.0) 
5. Cl:  I DUNNO I just said to him look you can see he 
6.   doesn‟t want it or-err you know say to Stephen do you wan‟ „im  
7.   (to) get off yo::u and he‟ll go yeah. ( ) 
8.   (2.1) 
9. Cl:  But it takes a long time to get them apar:::t.  
10. Th:  Hmm 
11. Cl: And then (.) I get (.) kicked for it (.) I get [(.)           told] off for? =  
12. Th:             [so it? I mean]  
13. Th:  I mean I I (                     minefield         )  
14.   sort of? huh .hhhh huh [.hhhhhh  
15. Cl:                  [yeah 
16. Th:  you know  
17. Cl:  YEAH he was like that as a BABY 
18. Th:  WRESTLES you [(to the ground etcetera it‟s all a bit 
19. Cl:  (               )          [NUR::::sery! 
20. Cl: That‟s right! 
21. Th:  All a- All a bit too much. No. I? I‟m? I wonder first of all whether  
22.   erm (0.3) you as a general ru::le (0.5) err even its quite?- err 
23.   especially if its for quite short periods  
24.   <WHERE YOU SEE THEM> um you sa::y  
25.   that they‟re at it non-stop and I KNOW what you mean! 
26.   $Because >I get a bit of that as< we:ll!$ HAH HAH!  
 
The therapist tries to elicit the favoured response from the client, but the client resists 
this by returning to describing her current tactic. The therapist explains the 
intervention, and her re-interpretation is shown through expressing tentatively her 
idea of praising good behaviour. There are a range of markers indicative of a re-
interpretation, such an epistemic marker (“I wonder” line 21), figures of speech (“as a 
general rule”) and voiced pauses (err, erm, um). She starts to introduce the idea of 
praising the positive, but interrupts herself in order to challenge the idea that their 
challenging behaviour is “non-stop”. In an attempt to reduce the likelihood of her 
disagreeing to any part of her turn, she moves into an empathic self-disclosure and 
normalising statement (Leudar, Antaki & Barnes, 2006) in lines 25-26.  The humour 
forms part of her conversational strategy to prevent any further avoidable 
misalignment.  
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Mechanism: Empathic self-disclosure 
The mechanism behind the humour here lies in the sudden unexpected alignment of 
viewpoints and shared experience. This is conversationally achieved through a 
formulation statement featuring elements of self-disclosure and normalization, taking 
the client‟s experience from problematic to more universal. This linguistic platform of 
self-disclosure and normalization launches both humour and the therapeutic act of 
„sharing empathy‟ (Batchelor, 1988). In twice using the first person reference (lines 
25-26), she is constructing experiences as shared (Halonen, 2008). This statement 
appears to change the therapist‟s position or identity from expert to parent.  
 
Incongruity theory suggests that people laugh at what surprises them, is unexpected, 
or is odd in a nonthreatening way (Berger, 1976; Deckers & Divine, 1981; McGhee, 
1979). Here, an accepted pattern of therapist anonymity is violated. In the sudden 
alignment of their situations, this non-threatening but slightly unconventional parallel 
brings with it the ingredients required to create humour.  
 
Response: Re-interpretation 
The use of humorous empathy appears to allow the therapist to strategically move 
into a challenge or re-interpretation. In this case after using it to normalise the 
experience of frustration at her children‟s behaviour, the therapist moves in to 
challenging the notion that the behaviour is “non-stop”, mentioned prior to the use of 
humour. By creating the experience as shared, she aligns with the client and builds 
credibility for her intervention through experience.  
  
Excerpt 2b: Dyad C 
1. Th: $Because >I get a bit of that as< we:ll!$ HAH HAH!  
2. Cl:  Yeah. 
3. Th:  .HH um? But it ISN‟T non-stop. There must be occa::sions  
4.   >even relatively short ones< where they are NOT at it (0.4) 
5.   <And I think you should tr:::y and hone in on tho:::se>.  
6.   And actually HEAVily reinforce occasions where they are  
7.   co-operating  
8.   (0.7) 
9. Cl:  Hmmmm 
10. Th:  Okay even if its good for- and in fact you shouldn‟t wait.  
11.   Because if you wait that extra fi::ve minutes  
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12.   >for that five minutes all hell would have broken loose 
13.   and you would have lost< $the opportu::nity$  
 
This expression of shared experience then allows the therapist to continue the 
persuasion for her intervention of praising good behaviour, which has previously 
been dismissed or resisted by the client.  
 
Following the excerpt outlined above, the subsequent talk features the client 
continuing to resist the therapist‟s idea of positive reinforcement (“IT JUST MEANS 
you can‟t turn your back!”; section not reproduced here). The therapist continues to 
promote her idea and uses humour as she moves on, by minimising the opportunities 
for the client to interrupt, to talking about dealing with unwanted behaviour (excerpt 
2c-ii, line 5-6). This represents a return to the problem and to the example the client 
discussed earlier (excerpt 2c-i). It is at this point that she moves into humour by 
formulating the opposing features of Andrew‟s behaviour (excerpt 2c-ii, line 7-8) 
which seems to function as a way of showing that she has been listening and 
understanding her difficulties (excerpt 2c-i from previous talk).   
 
Excerpt 2c-i: Dyad C 
1. Cl:  SO if he‟s lying on top of Ste::::phen- he thinks he‟s being nice-  
2.   he‟s KISSing him and he‟s holding him so- and Stephen‟s 
3.   screa::::ming >in pain most of the time<  
4.   .hh I said Andrew? HE DOESN‟T WANT IT!  
5.   >You know< <he‟s cry::ing> (0.9) He doesn‟t SEE that. 
6.   <He just sees what he::e wants to do to him.>  
7.   (1.9) 
8.   And it err it always ends up in a fight! 
 
Excerpt 2c-ii: Dyad C 
1. Th:  =and again >as I said< err constantly reinforcing? >Times  
2.   when they are doing what they should do appropriately.<  
3.   >in some way and constantly um having to remind yourself 
4.   they‟ve been quite good< I must go in and sa:::y something 
5.   > And then you‟ve actually got to find a way of dealing with  
6.   (something in) the situation -< well FOR EXAMPLE if you find 
7.   him you know <umm err> sort of err kind of kissing and  
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8.   tortu(hh)ri(hh)ng Ste(hh)phen at the same ti::me= 
9. Cl:  =Yeah= 
10. Th:  =and when you say? I‟m suspecting he knows what he‟s 
11.   doing when he‟s doing that. I suspect he does know what he‟s 
12.   doing  .hh 
13. Cl:  Yea:::h! 
 
Mechanism: empathic metaphor 
The therapist uses the information that the client offered earlier (excerpt 2c-i) and 
formulates it back, extending it slightly by hinting towards a re-interpretation. The 
metaphor “tortu(hh)ri(hh)ng” forms one part that indicates a re-interpretation 
regarding awareness of harm caused in contrast to line 5 (excerpt 2c-i) where the 
client assumes Andrew‟s ignorance. The insertion of laughter particles in the 
metaphorical term indicate the exaggerated hyperbolic use of the term, not meant to 
be taken literally.  The mechanism that transforms this comment (lines 7-8) into 
humour is around the dichotomy in selection of verbs encapsulated in the child 
“kissing and torturing” his brother simultaneously. This is partly achieved through the 
use of metaphorical exaggeration, taking his behaviour to the extreme to emphasise 
the dichotomy. 
 
Ferrara (1994), in her analysis of therapeutic talk, identified the construction of 
metaphors as one of a number of discourse strategies in psychotherapy. Bercelli et 
al. (2008) argue that metaphor and hyperbole are features in psychotherapist re-
interpretation that can be skilfully used in therapeutic ways. This mechanism of 
hyperbole or metaphorical exaggeration has been found in previous research to be a 
source of humour in therapy and a means of re-framing (Buttny, 2004). Humour 
shares many similarities with metaphor, such as their duality and the bringing 
together of two concepts (for a more complex discussion of this relationship, see 
Kyratzis, 2003).  
 
Response: Re-interpretation 
Humour represents a tool the therapist uses to move into re-interpretation. In the 
above excerpt, the formulation of the client‟s prior talk and subtle move into re-
interpretation using humour allows her to disarm the client‟s defences (Liddle et al., 
1988). She then moves into subsequent therapeutic action (Antaki, Barnes & Leudar, 
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2008) by presenting more plainly her re-interpretation of events (lines 10-12).  This 
statement seems key to moving into therapeutic action (Antaki et al. 2008). 
 
This humorous re-interpretation elicits a minimal agreement from the client (line 9). 
Similar to the findings of Bercelli et al. (2008), the minimal agreement in response to 
the re-interpretation is pursued further to ensure the genuineness and extent of 
agreement. This is pursued by disambiguating from metaphor and repeating the re-
interpretation (lines 10-12) until the agreement is repeated and more emphatic (line 
13). Other features that indicate the metaphor‟s role as hinting toward a 
reinterpretation include the speculative markers in line 6 (“FOR EXAMPLE”), and 
epistemic markers in line 10 (“I‟m suspecting”), repeated in line 11 (“I suspect”).  
 
This metaphorical exaggeration is crucial in the creation of humour. The formulating 
features of the statement are crucial to demonstrating empathy through summarising 
concisely the psychologically significant parts of what the client has said. The 
therapist here is formulating back information that the client disclosed earlier in the 
session (excerpt 2c-i) to show that she is listening and has understood. This 
statement helps to validate the client‟s experience which repeatedly has been 
impeding the therapist‟s attempts to promote her intervention. By attempting to 
persuade the client to reward the children when they are „being good‟, it appears to 
prompt the client to reaffirm the „badness‟ of their behaviour. As mentioned above, 
empathy is conversationally achieved. In order for a statement to be considered as 
empathic, the accuracy of this statement must be confirmed by the client. In this 
example, the accuracy of formulation is indicated through the client‟s minimal 
confirmation (line 9).  
 
Having used humour to validate the client‟s experience through conveying empathy 
and securing confirmation it was received as such, the therapist then moves back 
into promoting the original intervention. The client‟s resistance to answering this 
question causes the therapist to persist in her comments (line 19). In the continuing 
conversationally problematic environment of resistance, she then extends the play-
frame further by using humour twice more (line 18 and 25) in relatively rapid 
succession. 
 
Excerpt 2d: Dyad 
14. Th:  Um BUT YOU KNOW. Is there any other way  
15.   that you could approach that from the way you do:::o  
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16.   which is to to to get in the aggravation like you do do::o 
17.   you get kicked and and and an an sort of 
18.   <*ge::t off your brother!*> all that kind of stuff 
19.   Is there any other way you can deal with it?  
20.   In a more positive manner.  
21.   (2.5) 
 
The client‟s resistance was addressed by the therapist using humour in the form of 
impersonation (line 18) and re-interpretation (line 25).  
 
Mechanism: Impersonation  
Impersonation in the data demonstrates again how humour can be used to convey 
empathy. By re-enacting a scene from the way that the client currently approached 
her children‟s behavioural difficulties and the reaction she gets, this impersonation 
reflects an attempt to formulate what the client has been saying.  
 
This formulation and expression of empathy serves to further validate the client‟s 
experience and helps the therapist to return to promoting the client to think about 
other possibilities and encourage her to re-interpret the situation herself. In line 19, 
the therapist asks this as a closed question, encouraging her to respond affirmatively. 
However, in lines 22-23, the client‟s resistance to generating alternatives is shown 
once more through a pause, dispreference markers and hedges (words and phrases 
which soften or weaken the force of a statement), indicative of a dispreferred answer. 
She then misaligns with the question by responding with “because”, which typically 
answers a “why” question, for example “why do you respond the way you do?” In 
doing so the client justifies and defends her own behaviour.  
 
Excerpt 2e: 
22. Cl:  Well I mean it‟s just? Because Ste::phen‟s got  
23.   such a piercing scream. It‟s like you just wan‟ it to stop!  
24.   Ev- >you know< every time something‟s happening  
25. Th:  Its ve(hh)ry useful <that scream> i(hh)sn‟t i(hh)t!   
26.   [HAH HAH. 
27. Cl:  [Ewweurgh! He‟d scream all the time!  
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Mechanism: Re-interpretation 
It is at this point that the therapist moves in with humour again, using her response to 
re-interpret the scream (line 25). The humour appears to lie in the contrasting 
adjectives used to describe the scream. The client‟s turn (line 23) emphasises the 
quality of the scream (“piercing”) and mentions the impact that it has on her (“It‟s like 
you just wan‟ it to stop!”). The therapist then offers a re-interpretation (Bercelli et al., 
2008) of what the client has said, extending it by conveying the functionality of the 
scream. This seems to be achieved by emphasising the first syllable in “useful” (line 
25), which challenges the client to think about how her response to its volume and 
tone may benefit the child. Inserting laughter particles into her tag question (“i(hh)sn‟t 
i(hh)t!”), the therapist solicits an agreement (Bercelli et al., 2008).    
 
Response: (Eventual) alignment 
The therapist‟s humorous re-interpretative statement and the client‟s response seem 
to indicate some misalignment, in that the client responds to the frustrating nature of 
the scream (line 27 “Ewweurgh! He‟d scream all the time!”).  
 
Excerpt 2f: Dyad C 
25. Th:  Its ve(hh)ry useful <that scream> i(hh)sn‟t i(hh)t!   
26.   [HAH HAH. ] 
27. Cl:  [Ewweurgh!] He‟d scream all the time! And the thing is you don‟t 
28.   even have to be in the same roo:::m and you automatically shout 
29.   <Andrew! Get off!> because it (0.9) its like you can see what‟s 
30.   happening throu- through a brick wall!  
31. Th:  Hmmm 
32. Cl:  Some times admittedly i- its not Andrew and  
33.   he says ooh I didn‟t do anything 
 
However, her comments starting in line 27 (“And the thing is…”) seem to begin to re-
align with the therapist‟s reinterpretation of the function of the scream and the impact 
it has on her behaviour, in that it has become so automatic and routine that she has 
made a mistake in allocating blame. In this example, whilst initially misaligning to the 
serious function of the humorous comment, the client re-aligns to its serious function.  
 
Summary 
In this research, resistance has emerged as a sequential environment for the 
emergence of humour once more. In this example, the therapist uses humour to 
 137 
express empathy. This is achieved by formulating back aspects of the client‟s talk, 
and using self-disclosure, metaphorical exaggeration and impersonation. In 
expressing empathy through humour during a sequence of resistance, the therapist 
is unifying herself with the client when there is a clear conversational divide. In 
formulating back client talk, the use of metaphor can capture and exaggerate 
inconsistencies and hint towards a re-interpretation. Humour has also been observed 
to help deliver re-interpretative utterances. The use of humour can give rise to 
empathy, which can then help the therapist to move into re-interpretation. 
Alternatively, the humour can represent the vehicle of re-interpretation itself.  
 
Some of the humour examples fit well with the cognitive category of empathy 
(Bachelor, 1988; Duan & Hill, 1996) described above, such as the impersonation, 
which demonstrates that humour can be a useful tool to convey empathy 
conversationally. One example of humour contains some self-disclosing „sharing 
empathy‟ (Batchelor, 1988), revealing the therapist‟s position as a mother and her 
children as sometimes disruptive in order to convey her understanding and an 
empathic connection.  
 
Meyer‟s (2000) classification of humour‟s functionality would place the empathic 
features of the therapist‟s use of humour firmly within the identification category. The 
utterances that contain aspects of re-interpretation would fit well with the clarification 
function. He argues that 
 
...through the identification and clarification functions, or the relaxing 
elements of humor, parties can lower defences and be more open to seeing 
the new perspectives required to appreciate humor. Viewing new 
perspectives and laughing together at them can enhance communicators‟ 
identification with each other and move communication to a “comic frame” 
away from a rigid “tragic frame”. 
(Meyer, 2000, p.329) 
 
These two functions of humour render it a useful tool to dismantle resistance within 
the session, and the flexibility inherent in humour creates different opportunities 
within this therapy talk compared to the rigidity of the previous one.  
 
Elaboration on a disagreement with another 
As described in the „Unresolved Resistance‟ section, the nature of two opposing 
viewpoints in a disagreement in therapy lends itself well to the duality on which much 
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humour is reliant. In the first example, humour neatly framed the incompatibility of the 
therapist‟s and client‟s viewpoints. In the following section, the analysis will focus on 
how clients use humour in a similar way to describe disagreements outside of the 
therapy room.  
 
Sequential environment: Autobiographical account 
In the following two sequences, humour emerges as the clients elaborate on 
disagreements with other people. Given their many similarities, these segments will 
be described in parallel. In the first example, elaboration is offered at the request of 
the therapist, when he questions a particular term the client uses (line 3-5). Being 
requested to elaborate on the term, she moves into an extended autobiographical 
sequence (line 6) that acts as an illustration.  As this account progresses, the point 
that she wants to repeat and elaborate on is regarding the unfriendliness of her 
mother. 
 
Excerpt 3a: Dyad B 
1.      Cl:  (1.2) >but it still?< hh-.hh it HU:::RTS me::e (1.0) a little 
2.   to have to do this to my pa::rents because I am clo:se to them 
3. Th: (1.9) Hmmm (3.0) When you sa:y DOI- (0.7) how could you DO  
4.   this to your parents- when you say DO this to them wha-wha-  
5.   what do you actually mea::n? 
6. Cl: Break away from them (0.7) Actually (how) I upset my  
7.   mo:ther yesterda::y it was (1.7) she said to me my MY little 
8.  brothers girlfriend met my parents for the first time and she  
9.   wasn‟t at all what we expected (0.9) a::nd  
10.   >so I said to my mother< well <what do you think of  
11.   he::r (0.7) he::::r-e:::::::r> and „e said well? she was a bit  
12.   disappoi::nted >AND then she said to me< that DEBOrah 
13.   had actually said to my brother Pe::te (0.6) tha:::t (0.3) she 
14.   thought my mother hadn‟t be::en (.) very friendl::::y (0.7) 
15.   >my mo‟her said she didn‟t know wha‟ she was talking  
16.   about< I said well it has be:en said befo:re that you 
17.   haven‟t be:::en friendly (0.4) and she rea:::lly took offence! 
18.   (0.6) >she said< she got off the phone- >she said< Philli::::p 
19.   to my father  plea:::::::se tell Raffiella: (1.2) tha(gh)t (0.7) 
20.   its not tru:::::::::e (0.5) and she r- she wouldn‟t talk to me::e! 
21.   (1.2) and I said t- I said to my father put my- >put mummy  
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22.   back on the< phone.- so she came back on the phone. she s-  
23.   and I said to her I CAN‟T >BELIEVE< you took it so  
24.   PERsonally you made a comment to me::e (0.3)  
25.   I came back with? (0.6) Yes. (.) you know its been said befo:re 
26.   sometimes that you haven‟t been ve‟y friendl:y 
27.   an‟ you taken it PERsonally she said wull (0.2) you give me  
28.   a list of pe:ople YOU think (0.8) tha(gh)t (0.3) YOU tell me 
29.   exac- you?- >she said<  you give me a list of people .h who  
30.   yo:u think I haven‟t been very friendly with. (.) AND I DI::D!!! (0.5) 
31.   AN‟ SH(hh)E DIDN‟T LI::KE IT!!  
 
To build the argument that her mother is unfriendly, she: recounts a recent situation 
illustrating another person‟s agreement (lines 12-14); offers a zero-person agreement 
statement with neutral perspective markers (“it has be:en said befo:re that you 
haven‟t be:::en friendly”; Halonen, 2008); confronts her mother with her conduct 
during the telephone call itself (lines 17-24); repeats the zero-person statement (lines 
25-26); and following her mother‟s pressure to shift from zero-person to specific 
people, describes offering a list of people in agreement. Building her case through 
the evidence can be compared to purposefully building tension in anticipation of a 
punch-line in a joke for the express purpose of releasing tension by relieving the 
incongruity (Maase, Fink & Kaplowitz, 1984). The client‟s hesitation and re-phrasing 
of how she would like to present the part just prior to this punch-line (lines 27-30) 
shows the importance attached to delivery, or perhaps is evidence of her own 
excitement at recounting how she had „won‟ the argument.   
 
This sequential environment of elaborating on a disagreement with a third party is the 
same context for the emergence of humour in the next example. Following a question 
from the therapist inviting the client to elaborate on the therapist‟s abstraction, the 
client offers an autobiographical example to illustrate her complaint and the 
disagreement with her mother.  
 
Excerpt 4a: Dyad C 
1. Th: In this kind of situation where (0.3) where you were *very ill* 
2.    and go off to your mother- is that something that you don‟t think   
3.    they‟re resentful about or understand that <(that‟s really what  
4.    you want to do)? Or do you () get yourself () ?=  
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5.    Cl: =WELL (1.0) I mean I get these sinus infections  
6.    so many times and I‟m usually ok.  
7.    But I‟ve never had this high temperature (0.6)  
8.    AND QUITE FRANKLY I thought I was- (0.3)  
9.    >IN AND OUT OF<? conscious- that I was very?  
10.    I felt very very stra::nge (0.4)  
11.    so I just ra[ng and said- 
12.   Th:       [well you would do with a? Its not like you‟re a child 
13.    with a high temperature although ( ) very ea:::sy. 
14.    Cl:  Yea:::::h. And I‟ve NEVER I never have temperatures 
15.    It was just under one hundred and fou::r. (0.7) so I-  
16.     >I sorta rang my mum when I got in and said I didn‟t feel well 
17.    so my dad said take your temperature and ring me BACK<  
18.    (0.3) so when I went to ring „im back  
19.    (then I was HUN::::G up) for an HOU::::R 
20.    >and I was getting worse and worse eventually I got in and I  
21.    said what it was < THING IS WITH MY MUM:M (1.7) 
22.    $VERY STRAN:::GE$ she‟d say to um take your temperature 
23.    >and I‟ll tell „er what it< i::s and she says >Don‟t be so stupid.< 
24.    (0.7) she NEVER BELIE::::VES ME. (1.0) 
25.    She‟s always got this thing abou::t saying >don‟t be so stupid< 
26.    and you have to like? explain:::n yourself for her (0.8) 
27.    very strang[e                        sh-] she‟s always=  
28.     Th:          [ that must be very annoying ] 
29.     Cl: =like that with m::e!.  (1.1) If they- if if she thinks I‟m not  
30.    t-s-saying something that‟s ri::ght O::R?  
31.    if they think they‟re ri::ght  
32.    they always say >don‟t be so stupid< 
33.    and I‟ll say >alright then?< (0.4) an‟ you know  
34.    I s::s- $I s(hh)aid to her$ I‟ve got this really high temperature  
35.    she goes >don‟t be so stupid<  
36.    and I said alright then I haven‟t 
37.  YOU KNOW! s- They never BELIEVE ME!  
 
Similar to the previous example, the client builds evidence in her account, this time 
by elaborating on the context, severity and atypical nature of her illness. There are 
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many repetitions of the various components (“don‟t be so stupid” lines 23, 25, 32; 
“they never believe me” line 24; “alright then” line 33) that form the humorous 
segment itself (line 34-37), almost as if building the account in order to distil an 
eloquent humorous delivery. It is interesting how the subject of the suggestion to 
measure her temperature changes. Originally indicated as her father (line 17), to 
hypothetically her mother (“she‟d say to um take your temperature” line 22), the 
client‟s account constructs her as doing what she is told and then being disbelieved. 
Finally, this piece of information is omitted as the introduction of humour utilises only 
the components in the account necessary to frame the ludicrous nature of the 
situation as perceived by the client.  
 
Mechanism: Incongruence between viewpoints  
Eliciting a client‟s autobiographical account or narrative (Perakyla et al., 2008) is a 
common activity in therapy. In recounting disagreement and disbelief through 
extended sequences such as storytelling, humour in this research emerges in the 
incongruence and contrast between the client‟s own view against another‟s. This can 
be through the client recounting her own response of unexpected (on the other‟s 
part) disagreement or misalignment: 
 
Excerpt 3b: Dyad B 
29.     Cl:  exac- you?- >she said<  you give me a list of people .h who  
30.   yo:u think I haven‟t been very friendly with. (.) AND I DI::D!!! (0.5) 
31.   AN‟ SH(hh)E DIDN‟T LI::KE IT!!  
 
or of incongruous (on the client‟s part) agreement or alignment:  
 
Excerpt 4b: Dyad C 
34.      Cl:  $I s(hh)aid to her$ I‟ve got this really high temperature  
35.   she goes >don‟t be so stupid<     
36.    and I said alright then I haven‟t 
37.    YOU KNOW! s- They never BELIEVE ME!  
 
In excerpt 4b, this pseudo-agreement (line 36) represents apparent agreement but, 
given the previous content of the client‟s talk, the sarcastic nature of her response 
can be assumed. From the current analysis, humour is used in recounting 
misalignments outside of therapy, emerging through capturing the opposing 
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viewpoints. Through the differentiation function, both are constructing their talk to 
emphasise the violation or unusualness of the opponent‟s viewpoint (Meyer, 2000). 
 
Mechanism: Repetition 
These misalignments outside therapy provide fruitful grounds on which to cultivate 
further crops of humorous comments. The central features of what was constructed 
as humorous remain the same but are extended in different ways. Excerpt 3b above 
reveals a misalignment between the client and her mother and this theme is 
repeated, extended and elaborated through embedded repetition in excerpt 3c (lines 
53 and 57-58): 
 
Excerpt 3c: Dyad B – several lines of prior talk omitted 
50. Cl:  those people that (0.8) ermm she::e has  
51.   fallen out with. I know (1.0) and when I‟m with them >I‟m 
52.   very conscious of the fact that< (0.4) they don‟t (0.3) like my 
53.   mother (.) f[or some r(hhhhh)eason=              
54. Th:          [hmm         
55. Th =hmmm 
56. Cl: or::::r I was (offending) them so I have to tread ve‟y gently  
57.   And it makes me want to be even more friendly  
58.   with $these people$. .hhh (1.2) 
 
The client elaborates on this disagreement by firstly using sarcasm in repeating her 
opinion on how other‟s view her mother negatively, showing the humorous intent of 
her comment by inserting laughter particles in “f[or some r(hhhhh)eason”. She 
continues this elaboration by secondly widening this gulf of disagreement between 
her mother and herself by aligning herself with people who share her viewpoint, and 
the facetiousness of this statement is shown in her „smile voice‟.  
 
Responses: Eliciting emotion 
Following from excerpt 3b above, the client continues to emphatically elaborate on 
the evidence in support of her mother‟s unfriendliness.  
 
Excerpt 3d: Dyad B 
31. Cl: AN‟ SH(hh)E DIDN‟T LI::KE IT!!  
32. Th:  hmm[m 
33. Cl:          [I gave her FIVE or six-na::::mes of pe:::ople (1.0) 
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34. Th: hm[m 
35. Cl:      [And she couldn‟t accept it!- I said well ma::ybe it something  
36.   that yo::::u do which isn‟t ve‟y friendly which offends pe:ople.  
37.   (0.5) .hh I said look at this i- .hhh I said LOOK!! (.) 
38.   You‟ve NOW taken offence. at what I‟ve said to yo:::u. 
39.   Look how PERsonally you‟ve TAken it! (0.2)  
40.   >YOU won‟t even ta::lk to me! You can‟t even talk to  
41.   me sensibly no::w.  (0.7) She really took offe::nce!= 
42. Th: =hmmm (2.0) hmm (0.6) and does she do that quite a bi:::t? 
43. Cl:  (0.8) She obviously does. (1.2)     [she takes things very=  
44. Th:            Hmm[m 
45. Cl: =personally. (1.4) 
46. Th: And how?- what affect >do you think< that has on yo:::::::u.- 
47.   How does that make you fee::l? when she does that.  
48. Cl:  (11.1) >Well I-< (0.9) ugh  (3.0) <I don‟t (0.1) ever> se:::e 
49.   her doing it. Bu::t its uncomfortable for me::e. (1.8) to  
50.   have to:::::o (1.8) those people that (0.8) ermm she::e has  
 
The therapist moves in with a formulating question (line 42). This allows him to show 
he has understood and to close that pattern of talk (Heritage & Watson, 1979; Antaki, 
2008), and draw out the relevant parts to move into therapeutic action (Antaki, 
Barnes & Leudar, 2005). He moves to encourage her to explicitly express the 
emotions underneath (line 46-47) (Rae, 2008).    
 
In the other sequence, the client uses humour (lines 34-36), to which the therapist 
does not respond audibly. The client emphatically repeats her point in generalised 
terms (“They never BELIEVE ME!” line 37; “they never sort of believe you first time” 
line 41). The therapist appears to offer her acknowledge tokens (line 44) to show she 
is listening and interested and declines at this point to direct the conversation. This 
may be due to picking up the discrepancy between the specific nature of the client‟s 
account and the generalised statements used, hinting that the story itself may be one 
example or representative of a wider issue. The use of silence here represents a 
useful action (or inaction) to invite the client to elaborate.      
 
Excerpt 4c: Dyad C 
34. Cl: $I s(hh)aid to her$ I‟ve got this really high temperature  
35.   she goes >don‟t be so stupid<  
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36.   and I said alright then I haven‟t 
37.   YOU KNOW! s- They never BELIEVE ME!  
38.   And you have to sort of say well I ha::::ve 
39.   And >d‟you want to come and look at it< 
40.   before they say oh? alright then.  
41.   (1.3) 
42.   I don‟t know what it is they never sort of believe you first time   
43.   ( )  
44. Th: Yeah.  
45.   (1.5)  
46. Cl:  Yeah. I remember years ago that (comes a time)  
47.   we‟ve always lived in town houses  
48.   (1.8) 
49.   and they‟ve always always made me wear slippers. 
50.   And I‟ve always said if I wear slippers I‟ll fall down the stairs.  
51.   And I used to fall down the stairs all the time.  
52.   Couple of times I‟d really hurt myself. 
53.   And they had these really (0.8) ornate banisters up ( ) 
54.   And if you got your arm stuck >in it or something< and you fa::ll 
55.   and you‟re like hanging.  
56.   (0.9) 
57.   Loa:::::ds of times I‟d be left there and like about half an hou:r 
58.   saying- I thought I‟d broken my leg a couple of times 
59.   and they NEVER COME TO never came to me you know 
60.    (1.4)  
61.   really weird   
62.   (1.2) 
63. Th: ( dussat make you angry )  
64.   (3.0) 
65. Cl:  Ye:::ah  
66.   (1.1)  
67.    I suppose so  
68. Th:  Hmmmm. 
 
From elaborating extensively with the use of humour one example to illustrate her 
point, the client then moves into another autobiographical account (line 46 onwards). 
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This shows similar themes of feeling that her point of view was overlooked (line 13-
14), that serious harm could come to her (lines 51-52; 58) and that her needs and 
harm were disregarded (lines 57 and 59). In line 59 whilst describing a story in the 
past, the client shifts from past tense to present tense (“they NEVER COME TO 
never came to me you know”), and corrects herself back into past tense, to fit with 
her autobiographical account from her past. There are interesting changes in 
prosodic features; that which is spoken in present tense is louder and higher in pitch, 
before she reduces her pitch and volume as she returns to speaking of the past. 
Interestingly the client uses the term “really weird” (line 61) previously in her account 
to express her disbelief at her parents‟ actions. This somewhat vague and emotion-
neutral comment spoken quietly is picked up by the therapist. The therapist directs 
the client to make explicit the evident emotion in her account, by asking a direct 
question (“( dussat make you angry )”), in the same volume as the client ends her 
account with in line 61.  
 
Summary 
Within this section the use of humour has been described in the context of 
elaborating on disagreements with another. The sequential environment of 
elaboration on a disagreement has been created through autobiographical accounts 
where the evidence to support their viewpoint had been presented. Within these 
accounts, there was noticeable repetition of their point and the constituent parts of 
the humorous utterance before humour itself was employed. The mechanisms within 
this context relied on sarcasm and the succinct presentation of the incongruity of 
viewpoints. It was compiled from repeated previous parts of non-humorous speech 
related to the incongruity and support for their viewpoint, and extended through 
repetition of humour in the client‟s subsequent speech. Responses to the use of 
humour in this context followed similar directions in that the humour itself was not 
responded to by the therapist, and this non-response invited the client to continue to 
offer further elaboration. This elaboration was either closed down by a formulating 
question from the therapist, or concluded without intervention from the therapist. 
Interestingly, in both examples the therapists invited the clients to express the 
emotion that underlay their accounts. 
 
Linking back to the last section and its focus on empathy, it seems that humour can 
function to describe implicitly emotional material. In both of these examples, the 
therapist moves in with questioning to invite the client to explicitly describe their 
emotions. This questioning to uncover evident, but disguised affect seems to be an 
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important stage of the process of establishing empathy with the client (Barrett-
Lennard, 1981; Wynn & Wynn, 2006). Their questions function to name client 
feelings explicitly to ensure accurate resonation. Questions which suggest probable 
emotional states within them communicate an empathic connection, having 
deciphered the emotion heavily hinted at but obscured through the use of humour.  
 
Change 
The previous examples of humour relied on the contrast of opinion between two 
different people: client and therapist, or third party. This section will look at the role of 
humour in simultaneously holding two competing perspectives achieved through 
therapeutic change.  
 
Much therapeutic success is reliant on clients being guided to achieving new 
perspectives or insights into their personal lives. Through the process of change, a 
person can find themselves in a complex position of holding simultaneously the 
familiar, but unhelpful previous perspective and the novel, but slightly foreign new 
insight. The following two examples explore the use of humour in this difficult 
transition. In the first example the client uses humour to impose and enforce her new 
perspective onto her old patterns of behaviour. The client‟s use of humour hints at, 
but disguises, the emotional impact of these patterns. In the second example the 
client is beginning to change her behaviour, but emotionally struggles with this 
change. The therapist uses humour to reframe to diffuse the emotion in order to 
further enforce her new approach.  
 
Sequential environment: Incongruence between previous and current perspective 
Therapists regularly present clients with new perspectives when considering their 
problems. Clients have a range of responses open to them, from rejection to various 
levels of acceptance. One active form of acceptance is extended agreement, which 
can be conveyed though the use of autobiographical material as evidence to support 
the therapist‟s reinterpretation. In the following excerpt, the client talks about a PCP 
(Kelley, 1991) concept, discussed presumably in a prior session. She provides 
autobiographical information that fits with the re-interpretative framework that the 
therapist was offering. 
 
Excerpt 5a: Dyad B 
1.  Cl: And I‟ve actually <d‟you know> I‟ve actually done this (0.6) 
2.   as an experiment  
 147 
3.   Th:  You did look at the matrix did you?  
4.   Cl: E:::rr (1.4) No I‟ve acted out the matrix dependency matrix. 
5.     I:::‟ve (1.3) seen what happens when you pursu:e  
6.     or (0.4) when you start to respond but Alberto >has now<    
7.     (0.3) withdra::wn and is now has now basic(h)ally  
8.     (h)esca(h)ped in my opinion  
9.   Th:  Mmm 
10.   Cl: whereas with somebody I‟ve met recently (0.6)  
11.     <I‟m not giving everything> 
12.   Th: Ri:[ght? 
13.   Cl:     [I‟m holding ba:ck and he is pursuing  
14.   Th: Ah ri::ght 
 
The therapist‟s question regarding whether she had looked at “the dependency 
matrix” appears to be a mild misalignment.  From this point, it becomes evident that 
the term “dependency matrix” takes on two meanings, as an object and a concept. In 
the former, the therapist asks if the client had looked at the object (line 3), to which 
the client responds with a dispreferred second-part pair (line 4), with dispreference 
markers (Pomerantz, 1984) of hedges and pauses. She then repairs the 
misunderstanding and clarifies how the dependency matrix had influenced her. She 
achieves this by manipulating the verb that was used. The therapist‟s “look at” object 
(line 3) becomes the client‟s “acted out” concept (line 4), in that, she explains, she 
used the ideas to understand her relationships with others. Having dealt with the 
direct question, she then addresses the dependency matrix as a re-interpretation, 
using an extended agreement connecting the concept with her experience (line 4-8).   
 
Mechanism: Metaphor  
As mentioned before, metaphors can be used to conjure up images within their 
descriptions. The use of metaphorical language seems to be used by the client to re-
interpret relationships following the introduction of “the dependency matrix”. In the 
current research, the client illustrates this with the use of humorous metaphor, in her 
choice or selection of the particular term “escape” (lines 8 and 18). Mulkay (1988) 
described laughter as being both a response to humorous discourse, but also 
providing the social cue that announces and encourages it. The intention to use 
humour seems to be announced in line 7 by the client as she inserts laughter 
particles into the preceding word “basic(h)ally”.   
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The client starts this segment by selecting her role as pursuing (line 5) initially, 
whereby she is the subject of an active verb associated with chasing. This is closely 
followed by an alternative passive description of her responding (line 6), dependent 
on the activity of the other. She first replies to the latter descriptive account by 
describing Alberto‟s withdrawal in relation to her responding to his interest, and then 
moves on to the former by describing Alberto‟s escape in relation to her pursuit. With 
the word choices she has made, she is conjuring up similar but conflicting scenarios. 
In one she uses language that conveys a more neutral sequence of approach-
avoidance. In the other her language is more emotive, reflective of a chase, and 
indicative of the influence of her own role. The humour lies in her re-categorising his 
“escape” in terms congruent with returning to the original description of the pursuit. 
This description creates a more dramatic, desperate, emotive picture.  
 
Furthermore, the connotations of him having escaped indicate he has been lost 
completely, rather than stepped back possibly to return. But the choice of words, the 
use of humour and the insertion of laughter disguise the emotional impact of this 
perceived outcome.  
 
Response: Lexical substitution 
Formulation is another response to client humour. The client continues to elaborate 
on how the re-interpretation had shaped her understanding of events. The therapist 
then targets the emotive terms she uses to describe the pacing of relationships that 
formed the basis for the humour, and offers a lexical substitution (line 20; Rae, 2008). 
Substituting words is a tool used to reveal explicitly the emotion underneath 
(Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks, 1977). The therapist takes a neutral term “pacing” 
(line 20) to replace her array of terms. Lexical substitution functions to accomplish 
three things: to demonstrate that the therapist is monitoring talk very closely, that he 
is making sense of the client‟s talk, and to propose that the client should express 
feelings in a more explicit unvarnished way (Rae, 2008; Vehvilainen et al., 2008). 
 
Excerpt 5b: Dyad B 
15.  Cl:  A::::nd (2.0) >I know it (sounds as though James) will have< to:::  
16.     (0.6) respo:nd (0.8) but I don‟t want to respond t‟ him in 
17.     such a way that (0.9) he feels that there is dependency 
18.     and that he‟s going to >a:lso: feel the need to esca:pe< 
19.     or (0.4) disengage 
20.   Th:  So your pacing‟s (a bit do you find when you meet a new 
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21.     person) 
22.   Cl:  I am (pacing) 
23.     (1.4) 
24.   Th: How does that fee::el 
25.   Cl: O::h I‟m not (.) I don‟t (1.4) I enjoy it sometimes and  
26.     other times I wish I didn‟t have to >do it<.  
27.     because it- it‟s a form of a ga:::me.   
 
In this instance, by using a neutral term (line 20) and seeking agreement (line 22), 
the therapist then moves into drawing out a response that explicitly conveys the 
emotional impact (line 24).  
 
The role of humour in eliciting explicit emotion talk has been indicated in the previous 
section, as humorous utterances of the client can be laced with implicit but disguised 
feeling through selection of descriptive and metaphoric words. Lexical substitution is 
a strategy to isolate events from emotion, in order to explicitly and specifically 
address underlying emotion. This use of humour represents a useful time when 
therapists can invite the client to make explicit their underlying hinted affective state, 
in order to promote an emotional connection with the client. 
 
Sequential environment: Incongruence between action and emotional reaction  
In the second example the situation in which humour emerges involves a client‟s 
description of behavioural change at the therapist‟s suggestion, which incurs strong 
emotions that threaten to disrupt the conversation.  
 
In the following excerpt, the therapist is offering a re-interpretation and suggests an 
intervention, encouraging the client to be more flexible in her own rules (lines 1-8). 
Before her turn is finished the client offers agreement tokens, then repeated 
agreement (line 9, 11, 13, 15). The therapist then requests a more extended 
agreement (line 16) to which the client offers an autobiographical account:  
  
Excerpt 6a: Dyad C 
1. Th: I‟m saying to you? (th)at you‟ve got to be mo::re flexible  
2.   (.) in? (.) some? (.) >of your own rules if you like<  
3.   how „bout- how you (.) go abou::t it. (.) >for example< 
4.   .hh umm although its desirable to d- to do all sorts of things 
5.   without having .hh umm (0.1) Ste:::phen .hh around (.) 
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6.   it might be better for you to be doing wo::rk  
7.   >related things in the morning<  
8.   and [just kinda get on::n with it? 
9. Cl:        [Mmmm               yea:::h I HA::ve bee::n    
10. Th: in the afternoon:::n= 
11. Cl:  =yeah 
12. Th:  You‟ve been doing tha::t in fact 
13. Cl: Yea::h 
14. Th: Go:::::::d. 
15. Cl: Yeah 
16. Th:  >how‟s „at been.<  
17. Cl: EVEN HOU::SEHOL‟ THINGS that I used to Da:sh around  
18.   and try „n do i(t) all while „e wasn‟t there (2.2)  
19.   un then::n not have time to do anythin(g) else   
20.   so I::: lea:::ve it I tend to leave it now  
21.   COZ I was a:::ngry coz >I spent all day yesterday 
22.   coz I hadn‟t been in the house [I was cleanin the house=  
23. Th:       [yes  
24. Cl: =[I did their room 
25. Th:   [yes:::s 
26.   (2.2) 
27. Cl: >Took them< upstairs to get undressed and  
28.   >by the time I come up< they‟d sorta made their whole bedroom  
29.   into a pi:::rate ship you know out of e::verything and anything  
30.   n‟ it really BUGS me (1.8) an‟ u:::::::sually I would „av  
31.   (0.5) ss- (0.6) gone ma:::d an‟ done it all  
32.   before they got into bed  
33.   >coz I can‟t bear a< thing ou::::t [you know when its bed time 
34. Th:         [ ri::::ght  
35. Cl:  =everything has to be [.hhhh in place  
36. Th:    [uuuuh! why can‟ they s- why can‟t= 
37.   they sleep in a pirate ship!= 
 
The client‟s account is an extended agreement to the intervention. However, her 
response emphasises the emotional consequences she has encountered in changing 
her behaviour (“COZ I was a:::ngry” line 21; “n‟ it really BUGS me” line 30; “I can‟t 
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bear a< thing ou::::t” line 33). Interestingly she uses language in a subtle way to 
differentiate between feeling angry and acting angry (“an‟ u:::::::sually I would „av 
(0.5) ss- (0.6) gone ma:::d an‟ done it all). Having emphasised her anger at the 
untidiness, a disagreement in viewpoint between the therapist and client emerges in 
terms of the importance of her own rules of tidiness. The therapist responds to this 
anger, and perhaps her urge to tidy up, with humour to offer a mitigated challenge 
(line 36-37). The client‟s assertion that she leaves tidying now (line 20) seems 
overlooked by the therapist at this point in this conversation through the emphasis 
the client places on her annoyance at their mess.  There is a simultaneous cohesion 
as the client adheres to the behavioural aspect of the intervention whilst 
disagreement in the cognitive and emotional dimensions of clear rule violation and 
emotional consequence.  
 
Mechanism: Metaphor 
This instance is another example of humour created through metaphorical language 
as the therapist reinterprets the situation by seeing the situation from the children‟s 
viewpoint, employing a metaphor to shape her question (lines 36-37). MacMartin 
(2008) points out the pre-suppositional quality of questions, such as leading 
questions used by barristers. The therapist‟s question of “why can‟t they sleep in a 
pirate ship!” brings with it the presupposition that it is not mess but re-categorizes it 
as a pirate ship. This statement also indicates her position that she cannot think of a 
reason against it. This side steps the issue of the mess which appears to be the 
cause of the client‟s irritation. In presenting the situation from a child-like perspective, 
the client is able to see the humorous side of the events (use of „smile voice‟ line 44).  
 
The therapist here (line 36-37) uses a challenge to convey a misalignment, but the 
use of humour, whilst conveying the previous turns as unexpected or misplaced 
(Vehvilainen, 2008), ensures a less confrontational and more playful challenge. This 
fits with Buttny‟s (2002; 2004) conclusion that humour allows people to stay aligned 
whilst discussing diverging viewpoints. This divergence seems a useful context in 
which therapeutic work can occur, but the use of humour allows the therapeutic 
relationship to remain unscathed. This humour could be viewed as Meyer‟s (2000) 
differentiation function. But there seems to be an element of enforcing the 
behaviourally adopted intervention, bolstering its acceptance through cognitive 
challenging to impact her evident emotional response.  
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Response: Empathy and praise 
As the talk continues, the client initially resumes what she was saying before the 
therapist interrupted with humour (“=SO I‟VE left it”), and then immediately responds 
to the serious side with a direct and emphatic disagreement (“NO:::::::O.”), congruent 
with the emotions she had expressed suggesting her negative viewpoint on the 
situation.  
 
Excerpt 6b 
36. Th:       [uuuuh! why can‟ they s- why can‟t= 
37.   they sleep in a pirate ship!= 
38. Cl: =SO I‟VE left it. NO:::::::O. I‟ve just- you know- they put like a-  
39.   put a- they got a hoo:::ver with a-  
40.   with a blanket tied on it for a ma::::st un- 
41. Th:  HU::::::H HU:::::H HU:::::H HU:::::H. 
42.   (0.5) 
43. Cl:  >everything-< I know!=  
44.   =$But it annoys me when you‟ve spent all da:::::::y doing it$= 
45. Th:  UH Huh! 
46.   (2.3) 
47. Cl:  Its different if they‟d done it all day  
48.   and then you clear it up and go to bed  
49.   but its because I‟d cleared up all day  
50.   and then they made a mess when they come in  (0.8) 
51.   Its always the wrong way rou::::::nd. 
52.   [I‟VE just le::::ft it ] they‟ve shut the door 
53. Th: [I suppose           ]  
54. Th:  Ok well I think tha::t‟s pretty goo::::d! um tha::t >you know< 
55.   I can tell you‟re annoyed [and I] think that‟s understandable 
56. Cl:           [yeah] 
57. Th:  but to actually lea:::ve it and  
58.   let them get on with it for the moment= 
 
As the client intends to continue with this approach (“I‟ve just-“) she interrupts herself 
to respond to the humour itself as she begins to recount and elaborate on the 
humorous scene. Her softened, quieter tone indicates a shift in itself (“ you know- 
they put like a- ”) and the content that follows indicates her willingness to share this 
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humorous viewpoint (line 38-40, 43). Such an elaboration and agreement with this 
perspective (“I know!”) could be indicative of her changing viewpoint. In elaborating 
the scene, the client is extending the play-frame and showing she is able to see the 
funny side. Here, the therapist is able to separate their views in a way that fosters the 
protection of the therapeutic relationship and enforces the intervention.   
 
The client returns to the cause of her irritation whilst moving out of humour by using a 
“smile voice” (line 44), and backs this up by justifying her feelings (lines 47-51). The 
therapist begins to address this issue at the moment there is overlapping talk (lines 
52 & 53). The client clarifies the point that whilst she was frustrated, she followed the 
intervention regardless, taking further steps to repair the conversation. The therapist 
then responds with a mixture of praise (line 54) and empathy by acknowledging and 
validating her frustration (“I can tell you‟re annoyed [and I] think that‟s 
understandable”). 
 
Summary 
In both these examples humour emerged as clients find themselves in the transition 
between old and new perspectives. In negotiating these changes, there were mild 
misalignments in both examples where the dyads were orienting to the new territory 
in slightly different ways to the therapist. Humour emerges as a way for the client to 
find a language to encapsulate the incongruency between these divergent 
perspectives. It also represents a gentle way for the therapist to enforce further 
change, adjusting cognitions and emotions to complement behaviour. Progressing 
through such change can evoke strong emotions. These emotions can be hinted at 
but disguised by the client‟s use of humour. Humour can be utilised by therapists to 
challenge underlying cognitions that drive their emotional response in a mitigated 
way that protects the therapeutic relationship, allowing the client to join the therapist 
through laughter. 
  
Some argue that at the heart of the experience of therapy lies paradox (Gibney, 
1996). It is within the unsolvable riddle of paradox that Jungians (von Franz, 1970) 
amongst others (Gibney, 1996) locate the origins of psychological and spiritual 
growth. Humour is a means by which clients may be able to reflect their experience 
of such growth. It would be important for therapists to be vigilant for such expressions 
of change, in order to capitalise on them.   
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Misalignment and uncertainty 
The previous examples of humour emerged in the context of two opposing 
perspectives: disagreement in sessions (resistance) or disagreement recounted in 
sessions (conveying disagreement) or simultaneously holding two internally held 
perspectives through the process of therapeutic change. Through the analysis of 
data, a couple of instances of humour emerged from a break in the flow of 
conversation, in that turn-taking patterns had broken down, not through opposing 
perspectives but due to confusion and ambiguity about perspectives.  
 
In the sequential environment of uncertainty, the following two examples will look at 
the context of misalignment first through not eliciting an expected empathic response 
and second through confusion around the direction in therapy. Both humorous 
utterances encapsulated an element of unexpectedness. 
 
Sequential environment: Misalignment through not eliciting empathy 
In excerpt 7a, the client is describing her worries that her loneliness will continue long 
into the future. Here, it seems that the client, who perhaps is not feeling fully attended 
to, may be expecting some kind of response. In the absence of such a response, she 
may be attempting to elicit an affirmation and validating response from the therapist.  
 
Excerpt 7a: Dyad B 
1.   Cl:  I don‟t know- I‟m very worried about it (.) I‟m going grey 
2.   (0.8)  
3.   >I suddenly keep on noticing grey< hai::rs  
4.   (0.3)  
5.   John 
6.   (1.7)  
7.   and it bo:thers me 
8. Th:  Does it?= 
9. Cl:  =as if I‟m getting o::ld very old  
10.   (0.9)  
11.   and I‟m going to- because I  
12.   (0.6)  
13.   I meet so many people and can‟t make up my mi:nd  
14.   (0.5)  
15.   I‟m worried that I‟ll always be on my o:wn   
16.   (1.1)  
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17.   it will be  (0.9) will be TERRible to st- 
18.   to do what I‟m doing exactly what I‟m doing for another  
19.   (0.6)  
20.   thirty years   
21.   (1.5)  
22.   or maybe I‟ll di:e I don‟t know=  
23. Th: =Do you think [that‟s where we (.)    
24. Cl:      [hh hh-hh         .hhhh    
25. Th: come back to the [(.) sorta- 
26. Cl:                      [hh hh hh hh hh .hh 
 
By mentioning the therapist‟s name in line 5, followed by a long pause, the client 
appears to attempt to repair the conversational disruption by inviting him to respond. 
However, his response in line 8 to her concerns invites her to continue elaborating. 
Whilst her following comments are littered with pauses, none are long enough (1.0 
seconds; Jefferson, 1988) to suggest a further invitation to the therapist, until the 
moment before her humorous comment where a gap of 1.5 seconds is left unfilled.  
 
Mechanism: Exaggeration 
The time in which she is left „hanging‟ ironically leads her to morbid ‟gallows humour‟ 
(Freud, 1905). And similar to Freud‟s ideas (1905), this dark form of humour may well 
afford her a coping mechanism to protect her from the painful emotions that she is 
implying. The client uses hyperbole to catastrophize further the bleakness she 
perceives in her future. The quiet voice, pauses and repetition in the client‟s speech 
indicate an emotive tone, and having made some pretty negative predictions, she 
exaggerates the negativity to such an extent that she finds the humour in it. This links 
well with the tension-reduction function proposed in Robinson & Smith-Lovin (2001). 
The literature on humour indicates the emotional displacement function of humour, 
which would fit with this example, whereby a build up of uncomfortable emotion may 
be displaced through laughter (Lippett, 1995b; Provine, 2000).  
 
Response: Re-interpretation 
The therapist‟s response to this client‟s use of humour was not to attend to the 
humour itself but to head straight back into the therapeutic work.  
 
Excerpt 7b: Dyad B 
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22.   Cl:  or maybe I‟ll di:e I don‟t know=  
23.   Th: =Do you think [that‟s where we (.)    
24.       Cl:      [hh hh-hh         .hhhh    
25.       Th: come back to the [(.) sorta- 
26.       Cl:                      [hh hh hh hh hh .hh 
27.   (1.6) 
28.       Th: >do you think that comes back to the  
29.   sort of pattern you talk about<  
30.   do you remember the term slot rattling 
31.       Cl: Ye:ah 
32.       Th:  .HHH that= 
33.       Cl: =that‟s throwing yourself into other options isn‟t it 
34.       Th: Well, i- i- i- its on the one ha::nd (0.5) is the >sort of<  
35.   the e- the parental expectations and (0.7) the  
36.   >sort of< confo::rming a::nd (0.4) and then there‟s  
37.   th- the part of yo::u that wants to:: >that gets to a point<  
38.   where you feel claustrophobic and wants to (0.5) reb- 
39.   rebe- and get ou:t of tha::t 
40.       Cl:  >I don‟t know how to do it< tho:ugh!=  
 
The client‟s humour is overlooked, partly because the therapist had already used the 
client‟s previous comments to move into a re-interpretation (lines 23, 25, 28). It 
seems that he was taking up his turn just as the humour was being delivered (line 
23). He is likely to have been waiting to take up his turn and intended to offer his re-
interpretation before the comment was made. As he moves into the re-interpretation 
her laughter interrupts him, and at the end of line 23 he makes a little room for it, 
continuing his turn in line 25. He makes excess space for her to continue to respond 
with laughter to the humour (line 25-6) with a safety pause (line 27) before starting 
once more.  
 
Having discussed humour‟s role in empathy and emotion expression, humour also 
seems to be able to play a role as a response to the absence of resonation or 
withholding of empathy expression. The client seems to move into humour in the 
absence of any affirmation or validation from the therapist, almost as a method of 
eliciting empathy.  
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Sequential environment: Misalignment between problem-talk and change 
Following the discussion about the client‟s mother‟s unfriendliness (transcript 
continues from where this ended thus 3e), another misalignment occurs. Following 
the therapist‟s request to elaborate on her phrase “do it to them”, a lengthy 
autobiographical account emerges to elaborate (see “Elaboration on disagreement 
with another” section). Following this lengthy elaboration, the therapist then uses a 
question to shape the client‟s next turn to move her out of general complaint 
regarding her mother towards change. He seems to be reorienting her to a more 
therapeutic focus in order to promote therapeutic change (lines 70-72).  
 
Excerpt 3e: Dyad B 
59.  And it makes me want to be even more friendly  
60.   with $these people$. .hhh  
61.   (1.2) 
62. Th:  mm-b[u-  
63. Cl:            [BUT THEN!!! >I mean< did she::e? The way she got on  
64.   the phone. She put my father on the phone to talk to me:::e.  
65.   (1.4) It was agai::n like she wasn‟t treating me:e like  
66.   an equa:l adult.[                 Sh]e was reprimanding me.  
67.       Th:     [Hmmm right ] 
68. Th: ye:s.  
69.   (0.7)  
70.   .hhhhhhhhh (0.5) And is that a situation:::::n (0.8)  
71.   >just to reitera:te< that mm- is that a situation you want to  
72.   mo:ve beyo::nd?= 
73. Cl: =MMM.  
74. Th: Ri::ght.  
75. Cl:   yeah!  I don‟t know what to do.  
76. Th: hmm  
77.  (5.9)  
78. Cl: Sure this tape is working? .hhhhh 
79. Th: Its going round I think= 
80. Cl: = >yes it is working<   
81.   (0.4)  
82.   HI SU::E!!!  
83.   (0.5)  
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84. Th: [so (it) is 
85. Cl: [        .hh HH-hh-hh! .hh hu::h .hhhh .hhhh .hhhh hhhhh. (1.0) 
86.   tsch-yes I er- so John I er- I I just don‟t know why we are eve:n   
87.   what direction we‟re going in? 
 
Again the shift from problem-focused to solution-focused talk emerges as a context 
for humour (Gale & Newfield, 1992). Responding to this conversational shift, the 
client tells the therapist that she doesn‟t know what to do (line 75). The lengthy pause 
of 5.9 seconds indicates that again the conversation seems to be disrupted. In this 
excerpt it is not the shift in problem to solution focus, but the resulting break down in 
turn taking or conversational misalignment that appears to be the context.  Given the 
surrounding talk, this misalignment may be related to the client‟s statement in line 75, 
which may have represented not a statement but a request for advice from the 
therapist. Whilst she appears to have a well-rehearsed way of talking about the 
problem, as the conversation shifts to change or solutions, her loquaciousness turns 
to reticence as her fluency dries up. The conversational silence of 5.9 seconds is an 
extensive time in the domain of talk. Perhaps it was her discomfort with this silence 
that led her to fill it with a sudden topic shift.  
 
The client changes the subject dramatically and directs her attention to the tape 
recorder. She addresses her attention to Sue, the person who has requested the 
session be taped. Evidence to support her uncertainty and confusion is shown in her 
response following the disruption (lines 85-87). This fits with ten Have‟s (2007) 
observation of the common experience of heightened unease or anxiety through 
being recorded.  
 
Mechanism: Directing conversation to absent parties  
The misalignment with the therapist and the disruption to the conversation may have 
prompted the client to search for another focus for her attention, and notices the tape 
recorder. She uses this as an opportunity to change the topic of the conversation and 
the humour emerges from her orienting to, and addressing the non-present 
researcher who requested that the session be recorded. In doing so, the 
incongruence of addressing an absent person creates humour which aligns her to 
this absent third person at a time when the therapeutic dyad is in misalignment. Her 
humour appears to align her with the researcher, indicating Meyer‟s (2000) 
identification function. In doing so, she further differentiates herself from the therapist 
beyond the division creating from the disruptions to the flow of conversation.   
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Response: Repair 
The distractive use of humour to move away from the conversational disruption 
further disrupts the dialogue.  However, the subtle misalignment prior to the 
humorous topic shift was made more explicit by such a dramatic break in the 
conversation. This then allowed the client to explicitly request the therapist to perform 
some kind of conversational repair in order to align them both once more.   
 
The client follows her humorous comment with laughter and uses the disruption to 
the conversation to repair both the humorous aside and the ambiguity and 
misalignment prior to the humour. In excerpt 3f, the same re-interpretation is offered 
as was offered in 7b above considerably earlier.  
 
Excerpt 3f: Dyad B 
80.       Cl: = >yes it is working<  (0.4) HI SU::E!!! (0.5)  
81. Th: [so (it) is 
82. Cl: [        .hh HH-hh-hh! .hh hu::h .hhhh .hhhh .hhhh hhhhh. (1.0) 
83.   tsch-yes I er- so John I er- I I just don‟t know why we are eve:n   
84.   what direction we‟re going in? 
85. Th:  *Hm   
86.   (0.7) 
87. Cl:  I don‟t know   
88.   (1.2) 
89. Th: I MEAN it ju- it just seems from my poin:t of vie::::w  
90.   in the sense of? s‟t of (.) just from m-m  the perspective that  
91.   I‟m looking at. (0.9) that? (0.6) in terms of? (.) looking at a  
92.   la::::rger perspective. (0.4) .hhhh (0.5) that (0.4)  
93.   >I mean< if you ima::gine (0.4) a situation that (0.8) on the one  
94.   hand you‟ve got the >parental expectations< wi- the various  
95.   pressures which. (0.7) which w- we‟ve ta:lked abou:t 
96.   and keep manifestin::g . .hhhh On the other han::d (0.4) there‟s  
97.   the there‟s the >potential< (0.4) if you li::ke? (0.8) errrm  
98.   SLOT-rattling rebellion against tha::t… 
 
This comment on process instigated by the client prompts the therapist to respond 
with his original re-interpretation once more (lines 89-98). It seems the disruption in 
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the conversation and rapid invitation to repair from the client has moved him into re-
interpretation abruptly. This suddenness impacts the structure of his response by it 
featuring a large number of pauses, use of epistemic markers to the therapist‟s 
perspective (“I MEAN”, “from my point of view”, “from the perspective I‟m looking at”), 
neutral perspective markers (“in terms of”, “in the sense of”, “looking at the larger 
perspective”), evidential or speculative markers (“it just seems”), figures of speech 
(“on the one hand”) before getting to his re-interpretation (line 94).  
 
Summary 
Through analysis of the data humour emerged from a client‟s indication of therapist 
misalignment and her uncertainty of the moment-to-moment direction in therapy. 
Humour may well serve as an early indicator of feelings of ambiguity and uncertainty 
in clients in the same way that research has identified humour as an indicator of 
ambiguity and paradox in organisations (Hatch, 1993).  The use of humour could 
alert the therapist to this kind of misalignment. A therapist may then locate the source 
of the misalignment in order to preserve the therapeutic relationship which may be 
threatened by excess uncertainty. The existence of competing contradictions within 
therapy provides circumstances ripe for experiencing uncertainty. Humour with its 
double meanings and duality represents a perfect vehicle for displaying and 
capturing such contradictions (Meyer, 2000). Furthermore, it can be used to 
differentiate further from the therapist when they are experiencing the relationship as 
beginning to rupture.  
 
The experience of therapy at times generates feelings of uncertainty for the therapist. 
Downing (2000) argues that “a collaborative therapist must demonstrate enormous 
flexibility, tolerance of uncertainty and humility” (p. 222).  This “demands an 
emotional maturity of a practitioner who is capable of sitting with uncertainty, resisting 
the premature solution and helping the family to bear the tensions involved” (p.105). 
Meyer (2000) argues that the four functions of humour represent illuminating 
methods for communicators to deal with contradictions rather than feeling oppressed 
or trapped by them. Humour may help both therapists and clients to stay with the 
uncertainty rather than prematurely resolve it.  
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Overall Summary of Results and Discussion 
In this research, humour is used by both client and therapist in the sequential 
environment of persuasion and resistance. In the section on Unresolved Resistance, 
the role of humour in resistance lay in harnessing its differentiation function by 
capturing the counter-argument. This was achieved by humorously framing the 
opposing viewpoints in a way that emphasizes the incompatibility.  This research 
echoes Buttny‟s (2001, 2004) finding of humour‟s role in disarming resistance, and 
demonstrates that this humorous strategy is also employed by clients to capture the 
incompatibility of perspectives. This analysis supported the idea that resistance may 
be best conceptualised as an interactional phenomenon where the client‟s resistance 
of the therapist‟s intervention was met with the therapist‟s resistance of his reasoning 
and decline.  
 
In the section on Overcoming Resistance, the therapist used humour to express 
empathy by formulating back aspects of the client‟s talk. This was achieved through 
self-disclosure, metaphorical exaggeration and impersonation. In expressing 
empathy through humour during a sequence of resistance, the therapist was unifying 
herself with the client when there was a clear conversational divide. In formulating 
back client talk, the use of metaphor captured and exaggerated inconsistencies and 
hinted towards a re-interpretation. Humour was also observed to help deliver re-
interpretative utterances. The use of humour can give rise to expression of empathy 
which can then help the therapist to move into re-interpretation or the re-
interpretation can be the vehicle of re-interpretation itself.  
 
The use of humour also emerged in the sequential environment of Elaboration on a 
disagreement, which was created through autobiographical accounts. The 
mechanisms within this context relied on sarcasm and the succinct presentation of 
the incongruity of viewpoints. Humorous utterances were compiled from repeated 
previous parts of non-humorous speech related to the incongruity, supporting their 
viewpoint. Humour was extended through repetition by the client in the subsequent 
speech. Responses to the use of humour in this context followed similar directions in 
that the humour itself was not responded to by the therapist. This non-response 
invited the client to continue to offer further elaboration. This elaboration was either 
closed down by a formulating question from the therapist, or concluded without 
intervention from the therapist. In both examples the therapists invited the clients to 
explicitly express the emotion that underlay their accounts.  
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In the section on Uncertainty, humour emerged as clients found themselves in the 
transition between old and new perspectives. In negotiating these changes, there 
were mild misalignments in both examples where the dyads were orienting to the 
new territory in slightly different ways to the therapist. Humour emerged as a way for 
the client to find a language to encapsulate the incongruity between these divergent 
perspectives, and a gentle way for the therapist to enforce further change, adjusting 
cognitions and emotions to fit with new behaviour. As clients progress through such 
change, strong emotions can be evoked. These emotions can be hinted at but 
disguised by the client‟s use of humour. Humour was utilised by therapists to 
challenge underlying cognitions that drive their emotional response in a mitigated 
way that protects the therapeutic relationship, allowing the client to join the therapist 
through laughter.  
 
In the section of Uncertainty and Misalignment, humour emerged from a client‟s 
indication of therapist misalignment and her uncertainty of the moment-to-moment 
direction in therapy. Humour may well serve as an early indicator of feelings of 
ambiguity and uncertainty in clients in the same way that research has identified 
humour as an indicator of ambiguity and paradox in organisations (Hatch, 1993).  
The use of humour served to de-rail the already disrupted conversation to a greater 
degree, in order for either the therapist to repair the disruption, or the client to invite 
the therapist to repair the original disruption. It seems humour may have disrupted 
the conversation, but in a way that exaggerated the pre-existing misalignment 
enough to allow repair to be initiated.  
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Chapter 6: Clinical Implications 
 
General 
This research indicates the usefulness for therapists to attend to the conversational 
interaction played out within the dyad. CA is a method that highlights the intricacies 
of talk and the social action that may be performed. Focus on content alone may 
result in valuable information being missed. It is probable that many clinicians have 
an awareness of this level of talk, and for many this awareness may be implicit.  
Increased consideration of the process features of therapy during training may be 
useful to help clinicians develop an explicit understanding of this level of 
communication and what the client may be telling them indirectly.  
 
Unresolved resistance  
This research indicates that humour may offer clinicians and clients alike the 
opportunity to laugh at contradictions as a way of accepting their existence in order 
to overcome the interactional pattern of resistance.  When the pattern of resistance 
predominates and grinds the therapy session to a metaphoric halt, humour may be a 
means by which to capture the disagreement, in order to „agree to disagree‟. In using 
humour to try to accept their differences, both parties can protect the therapeutic 
relationship when it may be at its most delicate.  
 
Overcoming resistance 
In this study humour emerged as a way of lowering defences to facilitate clients to 
see new perspectives, reducing rigidity to foster a more flexible way of construing the 
world. Therapists may consider using humour to implement new ideas or 
interventions and to break down client reluctance to adopt them. It may also be 
adopted as a means of delivering empathy, for example through impersonation, 
metaphor and self-disclosure. This method of demonstrating empathy would then 
provide a useful step into re-interpretation.  The two functions of identification and 
clarification of humour render it a useful tool to create flexibility to dismantle 
resistance within the session.  
 
Differentiating viewpoints from third party 
Linking with the last section and its focus on empathy, the findings indicate that 
therapists may wish to consider some instances of client humour for its potential to 
indicate emotional material. The use of humour may prompt them to consider inviting 
the client to make this emotional experience explicit. This questioning to uncover 
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evident, but disguised affect seems to be an important stage of the process of 
establishing empathy with the client (Barrett-Lennard, 1981; Wynn & Wynn, 2006). 
Questioning the humorously presented account could function to name client 
feelings explicitly to ensure accurate resonation. Questions which suggest probable 
emotional states within them communicate an empathic connection, having 
deciphered the emotion heavily hinted at but obscured through the use of humour.  
 
Change  
Some locate change and spiritual growth within the unsolvable riddle of paradox 
(Gibney, 1996). In this research, humour is a means by which clients may be able to 
reflect their experience of such growth. It would be important for therapists to be 
vigilant for such expressions of change, in order to capitalise on them.  Equally 
important would be for therapists to consider the use of humour to help guide the 
client in the direction of therapeutic change.  
 
Uncertainty  
Having identified in this research the emergence of humour in response to 
uncertainty, therapists may wish to be vigilant to the emergence of humour as a 
possible indicator of misalignment or uncertainty in the client. In being aware of such 
misalignment, the therapist may then locate the source in order to preserve the 
therapeutic relationship which may be threatened by excessive uncertainty. The 
existence of competing contradictions within therapy provides circumstances ripe for 
experiencing uncertainty. Humour with its double meanings and duality represents a 
perfect vehicle for displaying and capturing such contradictions (Meyer, 2000). 
Furthermore it can be used to differentiate further from the therapist when they are 
experiencing the relationship as beginning to rupture.  
 
The experience of therapy at times generates feelings of uncertainty for the therapist. 
Downing (2000) argues that “a collaborative therapist must demonstrate enormous 
flexibility, tolerance of uncertainty and humility” (p. 222).  This “demands an 
emotional maturity of a practitioner who is capable of sitting with uncertainty, resisting 
the premature solution and helping the family to bear the tensions involved” (p.105). 
Since Meyer (2000) argues that the four functions of humour represent illuminating 
methods for communicators to deal with contradictions rather than feeling oppressed 
or trapped by them, humour may help both therapists and clients to stay with the 
uncertainty rather than prematurely resolve it. 
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Chapter 7: Methodological strengths and limitations of the study 
There are strengths to using CA as a methodology, most of which have been 
described in the Introduction and Method section in relation to shifting paradigms of 
research and evidence. It may be unnecessary to repeat them here but might be 
more important to reflect on why they should be presented so early. The points made 
in these sections were linked to what could be conceptualised as a revolution in 
psychotherapeutic research of which CA could play a significant part.  CA being 
currently such a minority and specialist methodological movement may have 
prompted pre-emptive justification. My experience of how proponents talk of CA 
suggests the significance that is placed on it, but also the sense that it is overlooked, 
misunderstood or dismissed by other perspectives. However, given that humour and 
therapy are both conversationally achieved, and humour is a complex linguistic 
device, CA represents the most appropriate method for its study. 
 
There are a number of limitations as a result of the choice of methodology. The 
research is not able to link the objective observations of how humour is used to 
outcomes or experience of interaction, such as ratings of therapeutic success or 
satisfaction. Furthermore, this research does not provide a generalisable or 
comprehensive account of how humour is used in therapy, but rather a 
comprehensive account of the humour used according to our criteria for humour 
detection in the three tapes that were analysed. Another limitation of CA is that it can 
only make comments on the intention of the interactants based on their talk, without 
triangulating methodologies to gain an insight into each individual‟s intention. 
 
Segerdahl (1998) has raised a number of criticisms about CA, likening its approach 
to “over-hearing strangers on a train” (p. 287) to reflect the multiple possibilities that 
could be hypothesised in the absence of familiarity with contextual information. He 
goes on to say that using CA on a transcript tells us no more about a conversation 
than the pixels of a photograph may tell us of the scene it portrays, dismissing this 
level of analysis as irrelevant. He criticises the method as speculation after intense 
scrutiny. He points out the neglect of both the trivial (inconsequential) and complex 
(contextual and socio-cultural) aspects of talk, considering the findings to be a 
product of the research tool and method used. He adds that the method claims to 
yield findings that are read from the data, but he considers the method to be 
inherently interpretative. He argues that these interpretations are then the unit of 
analysis rather than the conversation itself from which the interpretation originated. 
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Another concern lies around how CA reflects a process by which social norms are 
overemphasised and discussed as fundamental. It is hard to not be convinced by his 
argument around the reifying iterative circularity inherent in CA illustrated through his 
comment that “the notion of displaying what is going on presupposes that something 
is in fact going on” (Segerdahl, 1998, p. 311).  
 
He makes a good case and having completed this piece of work, some of the 
concerns that he raised are understandable. However, the questions this research 
was attempting to answer were CA ones specifically linked to the use of humour. In 
doing so, the research is drawn to a relevant focus through this application, rather 
than inferring patterns regarding what Segerdahl (1998) may consider the 
irrelevancies of random talk. Many of these philosophical points are no longer 
important if the purpose of the analysis is to focus on situations that people find 
troublesome (Segerdahl, 1999). Using the tools of CA, ideas around the construction 
of humour and speculations around some of the functions that it may have played 
within these moments of therapy have been generated. In having such a specific way 
of applying the skills and techniques meaningfully to this focus, it is reassuring that 
the serious pitfalls outlined above are less of a contentious issue. The research has 
been unavoidably interpretative but with a social constructionist perspective, any 
potential sources of bias have been made as explicit as possible. Transcripts have 
been included in the appendix for the reader to scrutinise themselves, and they are 
invited to draw their own interpretations.  
 
The credibility of this CA analysis may be vouched for partly through the experience 
gained through attending a CA workshop/conference, discussions with CA experts 
and extensive reading of examples of CA research and guides. Furthermore, the 
conclusions that have been made have been discussed and agreed with two 
supervisors and are consistent with available research in relevant fields of research. 
Being familiar with both CA as a research method and practice issues within 
psychotherapy, the researcher‟s experience matches appropriately the demands of 
conducting this type of research.  Being mindful of the different types and levels of 
conversational categories (Labov & Fanshel, 1977; Vehvilainen et al., 2008) 
discussed in the Method section, this research, being constructed by a Trainee 
Clinical Psychologist rather than a Professor of Communication and Rhetorical 
Studies has gravitated towards the therapeutic acts level of abstraction. This reflects 
a source of bias and paradigmatic inclination that could be seen as slanted, 
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prejudiced and blinkered, or conversely informative, revealing and advantageous, or 
simultaneously both.  
 
There are limitations linked to the choice of data. The age of the data made it difficult 
and inappropriate to contact dyads, as their memory of the session would likely be 
compromised over time. The rationale for making the recordings may have had an 
impact on the way in which the dyad interacted and so recordings made as part of 
routine clinical practice may yield different results. Whilst choice of audio rather than 
videotapes was due to practicalities such as availability, one limitation of this work 
would be that it prevented access to visual cues such as gaze direction (Goodwin, 
1981) or hand gesture (Schegloff, 1984). However, methodologically, CA‟s explicit 
focus on the organization of talk-in-interaction means that such cues are not studied 
as they would in interactional kinesthetics (Kendon, 1990). Audio does not capture 
everything that occurred in an interaction (Hutchby & Wooffit, 2008) but rather is 
thought of as a “good enough record of what happened” (Sacks, 1984, p. 26).   
 
One other factor that ought to be taken into account is gender difference in joining 
laughter (Jefferson, 2004). Although there is much debate around the potential for 
stereotyping, Jefferson (2004) described how a woman is more likely to join in with a 
man‟s laughter than vice versa. Given that the therapist was male in two out of three 
dyads, this tendency may be a product of the gender mix of the sample. That the 
most laughter emerged from the all female dyad may be relevant here.  
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Chapter 8: Suggestions for further research 
It would have been useful to have analysed more therapy sessions, as the 
observations are based on only three sessions. Further research could use a larger 
number of tapes. This would enable the generation of larger collections from which to 
identify repeated patterns and uncover more ways in which humour can be used 
within therapy.  It was difficult in this research to make sense of the talk without 
observation of eye contact, gesture and facial expression, particularly smiling. 
Analysing video-tapes with interactional kinesthetics (Kendon, 1990) could help to 
understand more fully the conversational exchange (including non-verbal cues) in 
which humour is created.   
 
One interesting observation through comparing this research with Buttny‟s (2004) 
was the differences found in the use and initiation of humour in therapy. Potential 
reasons for this have been hypothesized in the Patterns for Humour Use section. 
Further research would be useful to clarify how humour is negotiated over time and 
by gender, through subtle conversational encouragement and discouragement. 
Conversation analyses of the use of humour through a course of therapy would help 
to clarify one problem, whilst changing assumptions around the use of humour over a 
course of therapy could be usefully assessed using self-report methods alongside an 
analysis of the talk itself. More quantitative methods may uncover gender differences 
in humour initiation and laughter response. Member checking would illuminate the 
intention of each individual and would be a useful adjunct to future research. 
However, this would represent triangulation as it would fall outside of the remit of CA 
itself, since the talk is the evidence.  
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Chapter 9: Final self-reflections 
Reflections have been shared as they arose as this research was written. Rather 
than repeat them here, more personal reflections on the impact that undertaking this 
research has had will be explored here. Embarking on this project has been a 
tremendous challenge. Intellectually, being immersed in an unfamiliar methodology 
has been an interesting process of discovery that has been generally self-directed 
and solitary, but simultaneously has led to networking with some of the most 
prominent names in the field. This has been both daunting and exciting. Clinically, 
the process of learning more about CA has helped my clinical work through 
becoming more thoughtful about the social action that client talk and my own might 
serve. Shifting my attention from content of talk to incorporate process has helped 
my practice as a Clinical Psychologist by helping me to identify the unspoken aspects 
within therapy, often hinted at through subtleties of talk illuminated by the CA 
approach. I have learnt a tremendous amount through this research about the gulf 
between theory and practice in therapy, and CA literature has helped to fill in the gap 
and link the two. It has also been invaluable in addressing the dilemma between the 
reputation of therapy as a serious business and the pressure towards congruence 
and remaining faithful to my own personal style, espoused by Rogers (1961a). I feel 
reassured that using humour is acceptable within therapy but furthermore, 
understanding the complexities, I can be more reflective and selective in its use in 
the future. 
 
Personally, I have observed and reflected on the role that humour plays in my life 
through the functionality that this form of delivery can offer within conversation, 
particularly the role it plays in my close relationships. I have discovered just how 
important it is both in terms of interpersonal interaction but also as part of how I 
perceive myself and construe my identity, regarding the importance I place on 
humour rather than how funny I see myself. In undertaking this research, it has been 
interesting and in some cases pivotal to find out whether others share this view of 
me.  
 
This research feels very personal to me, both in terms of the subject area and also 
how attached I feel to the process and the product itself. This is likely to have had an 
effect on the way the thesis was written and my experience of the process of its 
completion.  
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Appendix 1: Literature search 
 
Reasons for discarding articles from the literature search: an article reviewing 
qualitative methodologies (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2008),  no or minimal passing 
reference to humour  (Kurri & Wahlstrom, 2005; Kozart, 2002; McCabe, Leudar & 
Antaki, 2004), not analyses of therapy: focus groups (Gough, 2004) or interviews 
(Holloway & Jefferson, 2005), interactions involved brain-damaged and 
communicatively-impaired clients and were not analyses of psychotherapy (Speech 
& Language Therapy (Simmons-Mackie & Damico, 2009; Walsh & Leahy, 2009) and 
Nursing (Gordon, Ellis-Hill & Ashburn, 2009)). One of the remaining three 
(Friedlander, Wildman, Heatherington, & Skowron, 1994) was reporting the findings 
of one of the final two (Gale & Newfield, 1992).  
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Appendix 2: Ethical approval email 
 
-----Original Message----- 
From: Winter David 
Sent: 17 July 2008 10:52 
To: 's.k.jeffrey@herts.ac.uk' 
Subject: FW: ethics query 
 
 
As promised. 
 
David 
 
-----Original Message----- 
From: OKane, Alison [mailto:Alison.OKane@rnoh.nhs.uk] 
Sent: 16 June 2008 14:38 
To: Yuksel Bulend (RVL) Barnet & Chase Farm Hospitals NHS Trust; 
Winter David 
Subject: FW: ethics query 
 
 
 
Dear Bulend/David 
 
 
 
A quick reply (below)  (No action required) 
 
 
 
Alison O'Kane 
Administrator, 
Barnet Enfield & Haringey REC 
R&D Office 
RNOH NHS Trust 
Brockley Hill, 
Stanmore 
HA7 4LP 
Tel: 020 8909 5318 
Fax: 020 8385 7151 
 
 _____ 
 
From: Tanja Wigley [mailto:tanja.wigley@nres.npsa.nhs.uk] 
Sent: 16 June 2008 14:37 
To: OKane, Alison 
Subject: RE: ethics query 
 
Dear Alison 
 
I agree, this can go through as a minor amendment - change/addition 
to the research team. 
 
Best wishes, 
 
Tanja 
 
Tanja Wigley 
Senior Research Ethics Service Manager for North Central London 
Tel: 07766 602 971 
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Sent: 16 June 2008 14:22 
To: Tanja Wigley 
Subject: FW: ethics query 
 
Dear Tanja 
 
Would you be kind enough to look at the exchange of messages below 
and give me your thoughts?  My feeling is that it is a minor 
amendment (a change/addition to the research team)?  For your 
information, Professor David Winter is a Clinical Psychologist and 
member of our committee. 
 
I look forward to hearing from you 
 
Thanks 
 
Alison 
 
Alison O'Kane 
Administrator, 
Barnet Enfield & Haringey REC 
R&D Office 
RNOH NHS Trust 
Brockley Hill, 
Stanmore 
HA7 4LP 
Tel: 020 8909 5318 
Fax: 020 8385 7151 
 
  _____ 
 
From: Winter David [mailto:David.Winter@beh-mht.nhs.uk] 
Sent: 16 June 2008 13:56 
To: Yuksel Bulend (RVL) Barnet & Chase Farm Hospitals NHS Trust 
Cc: OKane, Alison 
Subject: RE: ethics query 
 
Thank you for such a prompt response, Bulend. Of course I am happy 
for Alison to ask the NRES coordinator. 
 
Regards, 
 
David 
 
-----Original Message----- 
From: Yuksel, Bulend [mailto:Bulend.Yuksel@bcf.nhs.uk] 
Sent: 16 June 2008 13:26 
To: Winter David 
Cc: Okane Alison 
Subject: RE: ethics query 
 
Dear David 
 
In my view I do not see any problem with the new member of the 
research team - under your supervision - listening or analysing the 
existing tapes. Similar studies, definitely in my research areas, has 
been done and published in the past. However, the goal posts are 
constantly moving in "Ethics" world. Would you mind if Alison asks 
the NRES coordinator their opinion as well. Then we will be more 
clear. 
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Dear Alison 
 
Would it be possible to ask the NRES coordinator - the newly 
appointed lady, whether we can go ahead with David's study without 
delay? 
 
Thanks 
 
Bulend 
 
  _____ 
 
 
From: Winter David [mailto:David.Winter@beh-mht.nhs.uk] 
Sent: 16 June 2008 13:11 
To: Yuksel, Bulend 
Subject: ethics query 
 
Dear Bulend, 
 
Approximately 15 years ago, I commenced a comparative process and 
outcome study of personal construct, cognitive, and psychodynamic 
therapy together with a PhD student, Sue Watson. This study, which 
was approved by the former Barnet LREC, generated a considerable 
amount of data, as is generally the case in research on psychological 
therapies, and resulted in various publications. As new methods of 
analysis are being developed for some of the measures collected, 
these are being applied to the data by my colleagues and myself, and 
so the study is still active although data collection ceased several 
years ago. Amongst the data collected were audiotapes of some of the 
therapy sessions, which have been transcribed and which we intended 
to wipe when the analyses were completed. This has not yet been done 
as some of the methods of analysis that were being developed require 
the researcher to listen to the tapes rather than read the 
transcripts. I now have a student who wishes to apply one of these 
methods of analysis to the tapes for her DClinPsy thesis, and who 
would therefore join the research team for the study if this were 
possible. However, I would appreciate your opinion on whether this 
can be covered by the original ethical approval for the study as it 
would probably neither be possible nor clinically appropriate to 
contact the research participants (who had originally 
consented for the tapes to be listened to by members of the study 
team) to ask for their consent to a new member of the team listening 
to the tapes. 
 
I am afraid that I cannot give you the reference number for the study 
at present as I have just moved office and all of my files are packed 
in boxes. However, should you need it, I will let you have this as 
soon as possible. 
 
Regards, 
 
David 
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Appendix 3: University research governance information  
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Appendix 4: Research & Development approval 
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Appendix 5: Transcription symbols 
The transcription glossary is based on the system developed by Gail 
Jefferson (1984, 2005) which is used in the majority of conversation analytic 
publications and described in more detail in Hutchby & Woofitt (2008) and ten 
Have (2008).  Below the transcription conventions and symbols are described 
in detail: 
 
In the left margin are the line numbers, the speaker and other information for 
reference in the rest of the text: 
 
Excerpt x  all excerpts are identified by number for reference in the rest of  
the text 
 
28.   lines are numbered so that they easily can be referred to in the 
29.     rest of the text  
 
30.  Cl: The identity of the speaker is shown next to the line number 
31.  Th: It is anonymised and abbreviated and paired with a colon  
32. Cl?: If the identity is unclear it is shown with a question mark 
 
33.  Cl:   The use of a sideways arrow in the margin points to specific   
34.         parts of an extract discussed in the text.   
 
(1.5) The number in brackets indicates a time gap in tenths of a 
second. 
(.)  A dot enclosed in a bracket indicates a pause of less that 0.2s or 
a “micropause”  
=  Equal signs indicates latching, in that talk is latched onto prior 
talk without any audible gap or lapses in between. For example: 
 
1.  Su: So you think getting smarties might help= 
2.  Tr: =yeah, it would make all the difference  
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It is also used to indicate the continuation of a turn in talk across 
intervening lines of transcript, for example 
 
3.  Su: But I don‟t think you [understand the principle] behind= 
4.  Tr:     [but I worked really hard ] 
5.   Su: =the smarties concept 
 
[  ]  Square brackets between adjacent lines of concurrent speech 
   indicate the onset and end of a period of overlapping talk 
 
.hh A dot before an h indicates speaker in-breath. The more h‟s the 
longer the in-breath 
 
hh An h indicates an out-breath. The more h‟s the longer the out-
breath. Used to transcribe laughter. 
 
sma(h)rties  The insertion of an h or in-breath within a word indicates the 
presence of laughter “particles” or laughter “bubbling” within it   
 
((eats smarties)) Description enclosed in double brackets indicates a non-
verbal activity that is difficult to write phonetically. May enclose 
transcriber‟s comments on contextual or other factors.   
 
smar- A dash indicates the sharp cut-off of the prior word or sound 
 
sma:::rties Colons indicate that the speaker has stretched the preceding 
sound or letter. The more colons the more elongated the 
syllable.  
 
smarties! The exclamation mark is used to indicate an emphatic or 
animated tone  
 
( ) Empty parentheses indicate the presence of an unclear 
fragment on the tape 
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(smarties) The words within a single bracket indicate the transcribers best 
guess at an unclear utterance 
 
smarties. A full stop indicates a stopping fall in tone. It does not 
necessarily indicate the grammatical end of a sentence.  
 
smarties, A comma indicates a continuing intonation. 
 
smarties? A question mark indicates a rising inflection. It does not 
necessarily indicate a question. 
 
*smarties* An asterisk indicates a croaky pronunciation 
 
smarties Pointed arrows indicate a marked rising or falling intonational  
smarties  shift. They are placed immediately before the onset of a shift 
 
smarties Underline fragments indicate speaker emphasis. 
 
SMARTIES Words in capitals mark a section of speech noticeably louder 
than that surrounding it 
 
smarties  Degree signs are used to indicate that the talk they encompass 
is noticeably quieter than the surrounding talk. 
 
smar(t)ies A (t) in brackets indicates a guttural pronunciation. 
 
>smarties<  Inward chevrons indicate that the talk delivered at  
fast pace. 
 
<smarties> Outward chevrons indicate that the encompassed talk was 
produced noticeably slower than the surrounding talk. 
 
$smarties$  Pound signs mark words that are pronounced in „smile voice‟. 
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Appendix 6: Transcript 
 
Transcript 
 
Side ways arrow symbol ( ) will be used to indicate where the researcher has 
detected the use of humour.  
 
Dyad A:  
 
Time: 41.56 
1. Th: Would it be any different to you if you  
2.   (1.2) 
3. Cl: Spoke into [a () 
4. Th:         [SPOke these things into [a: (.) tape recorder= 
5. Cl:           [and listen  
6. Th: =Yeh 
7.   (0.6) 
8. Cl: .hh I doubt it very much because (2.1) strong feeling (1.7) 
9.   wid erm (2.8) it‟s the interaction with the other person which is  
10.   err=         
11. Th: = right = 
12. Cl: =very (1.0) calming (1.1) 
13. Cl: .hh I‟ve never tried actually t::o speak int[o a tape recorder  
14. Th:        [ right  
15. Th: I‟m just bearing in mind what you said about your wife (0.6) 
16. Th: and daugh[ter ] that you .hh that there‟s (0.6) 
17. Cl:        [yes] 
18. Th: >an obstacle there< to you [hh ] freely  
19. Cl:     [yes] 
20.   (0.8) 
21. Th: er:::m= 
22. Cl: =talking to [them 
23. Th:         [talking to them 
24. Cl: Yes there is an obstacle [( ) 
25. Th:           [and there‟s ALSO there seems to be  
26.   an obstacle (0.2) in your mind to talking to yourself that it‟s the  
27.   first [sign of- you were going to say  
28. Cl:        [yes              
29. Th: madness 
30. Cl: Ye:::s 
31. Th: presumably 
32. Cl: Yes 
33.   (1.3) 
34. Th: m-maybe having a- (.) tape recorder that  
35.   you (0.2) talk int::o (0.9) and record the thoughts >doesn‟t  
36.   matter whether you play them back or not< but maybe the th-  
37.   slightly <differe:nt> (0.8) >interpretation< (0.3) that you 
38.   place on that (0.3) that you:::‟re (0.4) >recording your thoughts<  
39.   >that you‟re (.) expressing them and recording them .hhh 
40. Cl:  ((cough)) 
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41. Th: and that you‟re- you know (0.8) is that more socially  
42.   acceptable (1.2) „n talking to oneself um from what you‟ve said 
43. Cl:  Hmm 
44. Th: that maybe that‟s tru:e 
45. Cl: ye:s I think you‟re ri:ght it would be more socially acceptable 
46.   (0.5) but e::rm (0.9) * I don‟t know whether I can-  
47.   (um I will try it) * (1.1) IT SEEMS you know that the:::re must 
48.   be e:::::::rr an element of sympathy from the person themselves 
49.   (0.9) er::::::r I err for example >wouldn‟t speak to anybody who  
50.   was unsympathetic to my troubles< 
51. Th: Rig::ht 
52. Cl: Aa:::ghh whether a tape recorder can (0.6) re(hh)act in this way  
53.   I don‟t know actually wheth[er ah erm () 
54. Th:     [.HHHH 
55. Th: >WHAT OTHER<? (0.9) outlets are there for yo:u (0.9) to:::::o  
56.   er- explore to talk to someb[ody when you- >when you< feel=  
57. Cl:      [.hhhh   
58. Th:  =par(.)ticularly restless 
59. Cl: .tch .hhhhhhh When I‟m re:stle:ss I think e:rr I try  
60.   >very hard to DO something< (0.5) 
61.   th[at I don‟t mind doing at least you know like=  
62. Th:    [ yes  
63. Cl: =tidying up some paperwork o::r (1.1) er:::::r  washing up or err 
64.   or ea::ting something I often eat something as to () 
65. Th: Right  
66.   (2.7)  
67. Th: Ok[a::::::::::::::::y.] 
68. Cl:      [But err          ] I‟ll try with the tape recorder   
69.   (6.2)  
70.   I don‟t think (0.8) ne:::::rr (0.8)  
71.   > don‟t think it would work because-er < (1.1) I think w::: 
72.   I‟m asking for sympathy or understanding when I‟m (0.8)  
73.   [when >I want to< ta:lk] 
74. Th: [ okay        ] 
75.   (1.7)  
76. Th:  Fine  
77.   (1.2)  
78. Th:  I::f (.) >that‟s not available< (0.8) if you feel unable to:::  
79.   >talk to your wife<  
80. Cl: hmm[m    
81. Th:          [and certainly you don‟t feel able to talk to your daughter  
82.   from what you‟ve said   
83. Cl: No::::o 
84. Th: Would it be better to::: (1.0) talk to a tape recorder (0.2) talk to  
85.   yourself or do nothi:ng 
86.   (6.1) 
87. Cl: I never tried a tape recorder but I could try 
88. Th: Right ok. 
89. Cl: But talkin[g to myself I       ] have trie:::d  
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90. Th:                [.HHH ((coughs))] 
91.   (1.4) 
92. Cl:  And I::: I don‟t like doing it because it is e::rr (.)  
93.   really I have to be very very upset about something  
94.   to talk to myself [          (]) *but I do actually sometimes*  
95. Th:           [Ri::ght] 
96.   (6.0) 
97. Th:  Well yo:::u >you seem to be saying that< yo:::u‟ll >give it a go< 
98.   (0.8) 
99. Cl: Tape recorde::r. Yes. Yes. I tink I could give it a [go  
100. Th:         [It‟s an  
101.   experiment that‟s:: wor::th trying out 
102.   (1.6) 
103. Cl:   Ye::s it is worth trying I spo::se . 
104.   (13.9) 
105. Th:  Is there anything else that you can think of…  
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Dyad B:  
 
Time: 00.37 
 
1. Th: That‟s interesting what you said about the [(speech) 
2. Cl:          [So::::o 
3. Cl: exactly what is mentioned here (0.8) about the  
4.   dependency matrix (1.8) >is that rarely do two partners match   
5.   themselves so well that each supplies all the wants of the  
6.   other.< What‟s mo:re > (is what often happens is) the reciprocal 
7.   dependency break down leaving one person clinging and  
8.    wistful where the other is restless and (impatient) <   
9.    And I‟ve actually <d‟you know> I‟ve actually done this (0.6) 
10.    as an experiment  
11. Th:  You did look at the matrix did you?  
12. Cl: E:::rr (1.4) No I‟ve acted out the matrix dependency matrix. 
13.   I:::‟ve (1.3) seen what happens when you pursu:e  
14.   or (0.4) when you start to respond but Alberto >has now<    
15.   (0.3) withdra::wn and is now has now basic(h)ally  
16.       (h)esca(h)ped in my opinion  
17. Th:  Mmm 
18. Cl: whereas with somebody I‟ve met recently (0.6)  
19.   <I‟m not giving everything> 
20. Th: Ri:[ght? 
21. Cl:      [I‟m holding ba:ck and he is pursuing  
22. Th: Ah ri::ght 
23. Cl:  A::::nd (2.0) >I know it (sounds as though James) will have< to:::  
24.   (0.6) respo:nd (0.8) but I don‟t want to respond t‟ him in 
25.   such a way that (0.9) he feels that there is dependency 
26.   and that he‟s going to >a:lso: feel the need to esca:pe< 
27.   or (0.4) disengage 
28. Th:  So your pacing‟s (a bit do you find when you meet a new 
29.   person) 
30. Cl:  I am (pacing) 
31.   (1.4) 
32. Th: How does that fee::el 
33. Cl: O::h I‟m not (.) I don‟t (1.4) I enjoy it sometimes and  
34.   other times I wish I didn‟t have to >do it<.  
35.   because it- it‟s a form of a ga:::me.   
 
Time 11.02 
 
1. Cl: I ca:n‟t! I really can‟t see it happening. I can‟t see myself being  
2.   married with a family 
3. Th:  Can you say a little more about whe: [() 
4. Cl:             [Why? 
5. Th:  Hmmm 
6. Cl: (1.8) Becau::se I‟ve been (.) offered that (1.5) in a recen- in the 
7.   la:st couple of years (0.8) and I‟ve rejected it because its too 
8.   (0.9) bo:ring its too unspontaneous too (0.9) to::o- or perhaps 
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9.   its- it was >because it was the wrong person< 
10.   If ALBERTo would have wanted tha:t (0.6) I don‟t know how I 
11.   would have erm how I would have reacted  
12. Th:  Hmm 
13. Cl:  (1.88) I don‟t know- I‟m very worried about it (.) I‟m going grey 
14.   (0.8) >I suddenly keep on noticing grey< hai::rs (0.3) John 
15.   (1.7) and it bo:thers me 
16. Th:  Does it?= 
17. Cl:  =as if I‟m getting o::ld very old (0.9) and I‟m going to- 
18.   because I (0.6) I meet so many people and can‟t  
19.   make up my mi:nd (0.5) I‟m worried that I‟ll always be on my  
20.   o:wn  (1.1) it will be  (0.9) will be TERRible to st- 
21.   to do what I‟m doing exactly what I‟m doing for another  
22.         (0.6) thirty years  (1.5) or maybe I‟ll di:e I don‟t know=  
23. Th: =Do you think [that‟s where we (.)    
24. Cl:       [hh hh-hh         .hhhh    
25. Th: come back to the [(.) sorta- 
26. Cl:                    [hh hh hh hh hh .hh 
27. Th: (1.6) >do you think that comes back to the  
28.   sort of pattern you talk about<  
29.   do you remember the term slot rattling 
30. Cl: Ye:ah 
31. Th:  .HHH that= 
32. Cl: =that‟s throwing yourself into other options isn‟t it 
33. Th: Well, i- i- i- its on the one ha::nd (0.5) is the >sort of<  
34.   the e- the parental expectations and (0.7) the  
35.   >sort of< confo::rming a::nd (0.4) and then there‟s  
36.   th- the part of yo::u that wants to:: >that gets to a point<  
37.   where you feel claustrophobic and wants to (0.5) reb- 
38.   rebe- and get ou:t of tha::t 
39. Cl:  >I don‟t know how to do it< tho:ugh!=  
40. Th:  = Ri::ght . (0.9) But then- Do you remember the analogy 
41.   to do with (1.0) the say th- the religious community  
42.   in the last century where (0.5) the younger people were  
43.   rebelling (0.8) by just doing the opposite of what their  
44.   the elders wanted and that was in a sense a (0.8) 
45.   a slot rattle on the same dimension whereas  
46.   maybe part of what we‟ve been talking about  
47.   is trying to find some way forward for you  
48.   that‟s isn- (0.3) isn‟t just a simply a reaction against  
49.   but more finding out (0.7) erm wha- what you want 
50.  Cl:  (2.5) I don‟t know really  (3.0) I don‟t know   
 
 
Time 28.13 
 
1. Cl: I felt really good [about that and I thought  
2. Th:             [.hhhh 
3.  well if I could do that mo::re=  
4. Th: =ye::::es 
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5. Cl: in re- a- app[l::y that (0.4) to my parents= 
6.             [((   slap     ))] 
7.   =>LOOK!< NOW (0.3) I‟M NOT GOING TO D:O THIS 
8.   BECAUSE such an‟ such an‟ such  and its nothing personal 
9.   but I‟ve decided I‟m not going to do it .hh because of this 
10.   reason or because I‟m more independent now  (0.6) 
11.   If I can (1.5) If I can start to do::o that with everybody 
12. Th:  yes 
13. Cl: >then< I can begin to say no::[o nn feel good about it 
14. Th:                                                [yeah-hmmm 
15. Th: Ri:::::ight (0.7) [tap] (0.4) ri::ight and think that‟s an (.) 
16.   an important point .hhhh <AND THAT MAY> BE ER (0.7) 
17.   that that >what you did last night< may have be::en >a brick< 
18.   like a bri:ck might‟nt it in a buildi:ng  
19. Cl: (1.1) O:::::::::h it wer- i-  
20.   Saturday night ye[s      ] (0.6) yes [ yes          ]  
21. Th:          [yeah]                [That‟s right] 
22. Cl:  (0.7) YES (0.3) that‟s right  
23. Th: (partly) significant 
24. Cl:  (1.2) >but it still?< hh-.hh it HU:::RTS me::e (1.0) a little 
25.   to have to do this to my pa::rents because I am clo:se to them 
26. Th: (1.9) Hmmm (3.0) When you sa:y DOI- (0.7) how could you DO  
27.   this to your parents- when you say DO this to them wha-wha-  
28.   what do you actually mea::n? 
29. Cl: Break away from them (0.7) Actually (how) I upset my  
30.   mo:ther yesterda::y it was (1.7) she said to me my MY little 
31.   brothers girlfriend met my parents for the first time and she  
32.   wasn‟t at all what we expected (0.9) a::nd  
33.   >so I said to my mother< well <what do you think of  
34.   he::r (0.7) he::::r-e:::::::r> and „e said well? she was a bit  
35.   disappoi::nted >AND then she said to me< that DEBOrah 
36.   had actually said to my brother Pe::te (0.6) tha:::t (0.3) she 
37.   thought my mother hadn‟t be::en (.) very friendl::::y (0.7) 
38.   >my mo‟her said she didn‟t know wha‟ she was talking  
39.   about< I said well it has be:en said befo:re that you 
40.   haven‟t be:::en friendly (0.4) and she rea:::lly took offence! 
41.   (0.6) >she said< she got off the phone- >she said< Philli::::p 
42.   to my father  plea:::::::se tell Raffiella: (1.2) tha(gh)t (0.7) 
43.   its not tru:::::::::e (0.5) and she r- she wouldn‟t talk to me::e! 
44.   (1.2) and I said t- I said to my father put my- >put mummy  
45.   back on the< phone.- so she came back on the phone. she s-  
46.   and I said to her I CAN‟T >BELIEVE< you took it so  
47.   PERsonally you made a comment to me::e (0.3)  
48.   I came back with? (0.6) Yes. (.) you know its been said befo:re 
49.   sometimes that you haven‟t been ve‟y friendl:y 
50.   an‟ you taken it PERsonally she said wull (0.2) you give me  
51.   a list of pe:ople YOU think (0.8) tha(gh)t (0.3) YOU tell me 
52.   exac- you?- >she said<  you give me a list of people .h who  
53.   yo:u think I haven‟t been very friendly with. (.) AND I DI::D!!! (0.5) 
54.       AN‟ SH(hh)E DIDN‟T LI::KE IT!!  
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55. Th:  hmm[m 
56. Cl:          [I gave her FIVE or six-na::::mes of pe:::ople (1.0) 
57. Th: hm[m 
58. Cl:      [And she couldn‟t accept it!- I said well ma::ybe it something  
59.   that yo::::u do which isn‟t ve‟y friendly which offends pe:ople.  
60.   (0.5) .hh I said look at this i- .hhh I said LOOK!! (.) 
61.   You‟ve NOW taken offence. at what I‟ve said to yo:::u. 
62.   Look how PERsonally you‟ve TAken it! (0.2)  
63.   >YOU won‟t even ta::lk to me! You can‟t even talk to  
64.   me sensibly no::w.  (0.7) She really took offe::nce!= 
65. Th: =hmmm (2.0) hmm (0.6) and does she do that quite a bi:::t? 
66. Cl:  (0.8) She obviously does. (1.2)      [she takes things very=  
67. Th:            Hmm[m 
68. Cl: =personally. (1.4) 
69. Th: And how?- what affect >do you think< that has on yo:::::::u.- 
70.   How does that make you fee::l? when she does that.  
71. Cl:  (11.1) >Well I-< (0.9) ugh  (3.0) <I don‟t (0.1) ever> se:::e 
72.   her doing it. Bu::t its uncomfortable for me::e. (1.8) to  
73.   have to:::::o (1.8) those people that (0.8) ermm she::e has  
74.   fallen out with. I know (1.0) and when I‟m with them >I‟m 
75.   very conscious of the fact that< (0.4) they don‟t (0.3) like my 
76.        mother (.) f[or some r(hhhhh)eason=              
77. Th:           [hmm         
78. Th =hmmm 
79. Cl: or::::r I was (offending) them so I have to tread ve‟y gently  
80.   And it makes me want to be even more friendly   
81.        with $these people$. .hhh  
82.   (1.2) 
83. Th:  mm-b[u-  
84. Cl:            [BUT THEN!!! >I mean< did she::e? The way she got on  
85.   the phone. She put my father on the phone to talk to me:::e.  
86.   (1.4) It was agai::n like she wasn‟t treating me:e like  
87.   an equa:l adult.[                 Sh]e was reprimanding me.  
88. Th:       [Hmmm right ] 
89. Th: ye:s.  
90.   (0.7)  
91.   .hhhhhhhhh (0.5) And is that a situation:::::n (0.8)  
92.   >just to reitera:te< that mm- is that a situation you want to  
93.   mo:ve beyo::nd?= 
94. Cl: =MMM.  
95. Th: Ri::ght.  
96. Cl:   yeah!  I don‟t know what to do.  
97. Th: hmm  
98.  (5.9) 
99. Cl:  Sure this tape is working? .hhhhh 
100. Th: Its going round I think= 
101. Cl:  = >yes it is working<   
102.   (0.4)  
103.   HI SU::E!!!  
104.   (0.5)  
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105. Th: [so (it) is 
106. Cl: [        .hh HH-hh-hh! .hh hu::h .hhhh .hhhh .hhhh hhhhh. (1.0) 
107.   tsch-yes I er- so John I er- I I just don‟t know why we are eve:n   
108.   what direction we‟re going in? 
109. Th:  *Hm  (0.7) 
110. Cl:  I don‟t know  (1.2) 
111. Th: I MEAN it ju- it just seems from my poin:t of vie::::w  
112.   in the sense of? s‟t of (.) just from m-m  the perspective that  
113.   I‟m looking at. (0.9) that? (0.6) in terms of? (.) looking at a  
114.   la::::rger perspective. (0.4) .hhhh (0.5) that (0.4)  
115.   >I mean< if you ima::gine (0.4) a situation that (0.8) on the one  
116.   hand you‟ve got the >parental expectations< wi- the various  
117.   pressures which. (0.7) which w- we‟ve ta:lked abou:t 
118.   and keep manifestin::g . .hhhh On the other han::d (0.4) there‟s  
119.   the there‟s the >potential< (0.4) if you li::ke? (0.8) errrm  
120.   SLOT-rattling rebellion against tha::t… 
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Dyad C:  
 
Time: 6.30 
 
9. Th: In this kind of situation where (0.3) where you were *very ill* 
10.   and go off to your mother- is that something that you don‟t think   
11.   they‟re resentful about or understand that <(that‟s really what  
12.   you want to do)? Or do you () get yourself () ?=  
13. Cl: =WELL (1.0) I mean I get these sinus infections  
14.   so many times and I‟m usually ok.  
15.   But I‟ve never had this high temperature (0.6)  
16.   AND QUITE FRANKLY I thought I was- (0.3)  
17.   >IN AND OUT OF<? conscious- that I was very?  
18.   I felt very very stra::nge (0.4)  
19.   so I just ra[ng and said- 
20. Th:         [well you would do with a? Its not like you‟re a child 
21.   with a high temperature although ( ) very ea:::sy. 
22. Cl:  Yea:::::h. And I‟ve NEVER I never have temperatures 
23.   It was just under one hundred and fou::r. (0.7) so I-  
24.    >I sorta rang my mum when I got in and said I didn‟t feel well 
25.   so my dad said take your temperature and ring me BACK<  
26.   (0.3) so when I went to ring „im back  
27.   (then I was HUN::::G up) for an HOU::::R 
28.   >and I was getting worse and worse eventually I got in and I  
29.   said what it was < THING IS WITH MY MUM:M (1.7) 
30.   $VERY STRAN:::GE$ she‟d say to um take your temperature 
31.   >and I‟ll tell „er what it< i::s and she says >Don‟t be so stupid.< 
32.   (0.7) she NEVER BELIE::::VES ME. (1.0) 
33.   She‟s always got this thing abou::t saying >don‟t be so stupid< 
34.   and you have to like? explain:::n yourself for her (0.8) 
35.   very strang[e                sh-] she‟s always=  
36. Th:           [ that must be very annoying ] 
37. Cl: =like that with m::e!.  (1.1) If they- if if she thinks I‟m not  
38.   t-s-saying something that‟s ri::ght O::R?  
39.   if they think they‟re ri::ght  
40.   they always say >don‟t be so stupid< 
41.   and I‟ll say >alright then?< (0.4) an‟ you know I s::s-  
42.   $I s(hh)aid to her$ I‟ve got this really high temperature  
43.   she goes >don‟t be so stupid<  
44.             and I said alright then I haven‟t 
45.   YOU KNOW! s- They never BELIEVE ME!  
46.   And you have to sort of say well I ha::::ve 
47.   And >d‟you want to come and look at it< 
48.   before they say oh? alright then. (1.3) 
49.   I don‟t know what it is they never sort of believe you first time   
50.   ( )  
51. Th: Yeah. (1.5)  
52. Cl:  Yeah. I remember years ago that (comes a time)  
53.   we‟ve always lived in town houses (1.8) 
54.   and they‟ve always always made me wear slippers. 
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55.   And I‟ve always said if I wear slippers I‟ll fall down the stairs.  
56.   And I used to fall down the stairs all the time.  
57.   Couple of times I‟d really hurt myself. 
58.   And they had these really (0.8) ornate banisters up ( ) 
59.   And if you got your arm stuck >in it or something< and you fa::ll 
60.   and you‟re like hanging. (0.9). 
61.   Loa:::::ds of times I‟d be left there and like about half an hou:r 
62.   saying- I thought I‟d broken my leg a couple of times 
63.   and they NEVER COME TO never came to me you know 
64.  (1.4) really weird  (1.2) 
65. Th: ( dussat make you angry ) (3.0) 
66. Cl:  Ye:::ah (1.1)  I suppose so  
67. Th:  Hmmmm. 
68. Cl:  I don‟t know what made me thou- think of it.  
69.    Its just it always used to happen you know  
70.   it used to take quite a whi::::le for them to? (1.9)  
71.   realise that there was something that actually ( ) 
72. Th: I suppose er? going going back to the part of the problem (0.6) 
73.   with being alone >with a couple of kids to look after<  
74.   this is that there is no one there to support you is there. 
 
Time: 13.59 
 
75. Th:  Yes and I don‟t mean rules as in written ru:les- 
76.   but you know they become rules 
77.   <It‟s the way things A:RE> 
78.   >and they‟re quite rigid and they don‟t change  
79.    and they‟re not flexible< (0.6)  
80.   (Eman) I‟m saying to you? (th)at you‟ve got to be mo::re flexible  
81.   (.) in? (.) some? (.) >of your own rules if you like<  
82.   how „bout- how you (.) go abou::t it. (.) >for example< 
83.   .hh umm although its desirable to d- to do all sorts of things 
84.   without having .hh umm (0.1) Ste:::phen .hh around (.) 
85.   it might be better for you to be doing wo::rk  
86.   >related things in the morning<  
87.   and [just kinda get on::n with it? 
88. Cl:        [Mmmm               yea:::h I HA::ve bee::n     
89. Th: in the afternoon:::n= 
90. Cl:  =yeah 
91. Th:  You‟ve been doing tha::t in fact 
92. Cl: Yea::h 
93. Th: Go:::::::d. 
94. Cl: Yeah 
95. Th:  >how‟s „at been.<  
96. Cl: EVEN HOU::SEHOL‟ THINGS that I used to Da:sh around  
97.   and try „n do i(t) all while „e wasn‟t there (2.2)  
98.   un then::n not have time to so anythin(g) else   
99.   so I::: lea:::ve it I tend to leave it now  
100.   COZ I was a:::ngry coz >I spent all day yesterday 
101.   coz I hadn‟t been in the house [I was cleanin the house=  
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102. Th:           [yes  
103. Cl: =[I did their room 
104. Th:   [yes:::s 
105.   (2.2) 
106. Cl: >Took them< upstairs to get undressed and  
107.   >by the time I come up< they‟d sorta made their whole bedroom  
108.   into a pi:::rate ship you know out of e::verything and anything  
109.   n‟ it really BUGS me (1.8) an‟ u:::::::sually I would „av  
110.   (0.5) ss- (0.6) gone ma:::d an‟ done it all  
111.   before they got into bed  
112.   >coz I can‟t bear a< thing ou::::t [you know when its bed time 
113. Th:             [ ri::::ght  
114. Cl:  =everything has to be [.hhhh in place  
115. Th:       [uuuuh! why can‟ they s- why can‟t= 
116.        they sleep in a pirate ship!= 
117. Cl: =SO I‟VE left it. NO:::::::O. I‟ve just- you know- they put like a-  
118.   put a- they got a hoo:::ver with a-  
119.   with a blanket tied on it for a ma::::st un- 
120. Th:  HU::::::H HU:::::H HU:::::H HU:::::H. 
121.   (0.5) 
122. Cl:  >everything-< I know!=  
123.   =$But it annoys me when you‟ve spent all da:::::::y doing it$= 
124. Th:  UH Huh! 
125.   (2.3) 
126. Cl:  Its different if they‟d done it all day  
127.   and then you clear it up and go to bed  
128.   but its because I‟d cleared up all day  
129.   and then they made a mess when they come in  (0.8) 
130.   Its always the wrong way rou::::::nd. 
131.   [I‟VE just le::::ft it ] they‟ve shut the door 
132. Th: [I suppose           ]  
133. Th:  Ok well I think tha::t‟s pretty goo::::d! um tha::t >you know< 
134.   I can tell you‟re annoyed [and I] think that‟s understandable 
135. Cl:              [yeah] 
136. Th:  but to actually lea:::ve it and  
137.   let them get on with it for the moment= 
138. Cl:  .HH HHHHH! HHHHHHH! (cough) 
139. Th:  (some one of already today ( ) another lot)  
140.   (0.4) I think its very good indee:::::d! 
 
 
Time: 35.12 
 
141. Th:  When you tend to say anything 
142.   (2.5) 
143. Cl: E:::::RM 
144. Th:  what would you respond to (.) if they‟re? fighting or they‟re?- 
145.   you know if it gets to a period of time  
146.   for an amount of time when they‟re [doing whatever ( ) 
147. Cl:            [ WELL I MEAN  
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148. Cl: SOMETIMES even when he doesn‟t think he‟s hurting Andrew 
149.   I mean? Even if he‟s ly:::ing on top of him and cuddling him 
150.   and kissing him really hard which he used to do  
151.   when he was a BAby >to some< (0.9)  
152.   some children at nur:::sery  
153.   and an‟ knock them fly::ing >you know?<= 
154. Th:  =Mm= 
155. Cl:  =he‟s just very heavy ha:::nded 
156. Th: Hmm. 
157. Cl:  SO if he‟s lying on top of Ste::::phen- he thinks he‟s being nice-  
158.   he‟s KISSing him and he‟s holding him so- and Andrew‟s 
159.   screa::::ming >in pain most of the time<  
160.   .hh I said Andrew? HE DOESN‟T WANT IT!  
161.   >You know< <he‟s cry::ing> (0.9) He doesn‟t SEE that. 
162.   <He just sees what he::e wants to do to him.>  
163.   (1.9) 
164.   And it err it always ends up in a fight! 
165. Th:  Hmm! 
166. Cl: And me HAVING TO TAKE Stephen away!  
167.   AND I have to take him to another room 
168.   > and then Andrew gets angry < of course  
169.   and kicks me in the back >or something [you know< 
170. Th:        [IS THERE ANY  
171.   OTHER way you? you could go about that? 
172. Cl:  .hhh 
173.   (6.0) 
174. Cl:  I DUNNO I just said to him look you can see he 
175.   doesn‟t want it or-err you know say to Stephen do you wan‟ „im  
176.   (to) get off yo::u and he‟ll go yeah. ( ) 
177.   (2.1) 
178. Cl:  But it takes a long time to get them apar:::t.  
179. Th:  Hmm 
180. Cl: And then (.) I get (.) kicked for it (.) I get [(.)          told] off for? =  
181. Th:                  [so it?I mean]  
182. Th:  I mean I I (                     minefield         )  
183.   sort of? huh .hhhh huh [.hhhhhh  
184. Cl:                   [yeah 
185. Th:  you know  
186. Cl:  YEAH he was like that as a BABY 
187. Th:  WRESTLES you [(to the ground etcetera it‟s all a bit 
188. Cl:  (               )          [NUR::::sery! 
189. Cl: That‟s right! 
190. Th:  All a- All a bit too much. No. I? I‟m? I wonder first of all whether  
191.   erm (0.3) you as a general ru::le (0.5) err even its quite?- err 
192.   especially if its for quite short periods  
193.   <WHERE YOU SEE THEM> um you sa::y  
194.   that they‟re at it non-stop and I KNOW what you mean! 
195.         $Because >I get a bit of that as< we:ll!$ HAH HAH!  
196. Cl:  Yeah. 
197. Th:  .HH um? But it ISN‟T non-stop. There must be occa::sions  
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198.   >even relatively short ones< where they are NOT at it (0.4) 
199.   <And I think you should tr:::y and hone in on tho:::se>.  
200.   And actually HEAVily reinforce occasions where they are  
201.   co-operating  
202.   (0.7) 
203. Cl:  Hmmmm 
204. Th:  Okay even if its good for- and in fact you shouldn‟t wait.  
205.   Because if you wait that extra fi::ve minutes  
206.   >for that five minutes all hell would have broken loose 
207.        and you would have lost< $the opportu::nity$  
208.   so in fact if you if you >you know< if you sort of  
209.   you are awa:::::re that they‟re doing whatever and they‟re 
210.   co co-operating reasonably ni:::cely not perfectly necessarily 
211.   but you know for them reasonably ni:::cely for fi::ve minutes  
212.   Perhaps you should go i::n and? sa::y something li:::ke  
213.   you know its very nice that you‟re playing nicely together   
214.   OR whatever [(      ) 
215. Cl:              [YEAH I‟ve tried it although I remember you telling  
216.   me that once before and I have tried it 
217. Th:   Whenever. And I would do it OFTEN.  
218. Cl:  Yeah 
219. Th:  You can‟t over- do it coz then I think you should do it OFTEN. 
220.   Whenever. And as I said if you leave it too long  
221.   then then it could degenerate to som::e poi::nt  
222.   so I think[ that is generally something you should=  
223.  Cl:       [ hmm   
224.  Th:  =be really vigilant about at the moment >so that I I think< 
225.   it is it is? such a drag when they are um? non-co-operative. 
226.   And you‟re [telling them 
227. Cl:          [IT JUST MEANS you can‟t turn your back!  
228. Th:  Oh I know! Its its [really quite (scary) 
229. Cl:          [Even if you say oh you‟re really good.  
230.   I mean you‟ve only got to turn your back and it starts. 
231. Th:  I know its really wea:::ring. >But? But?< (0.3)  
232.   The::e >sort of< individual thi::::ngs um (0.2) we sai:::d 
233.   (             ) each by himself  and Andrew is obviously  
234.   much better (.) <by himself> s[o now maybe= 
235. Cl:       [yes 
236. Th:  =it‟s a good opportunity having kinda got that bit settled a bi::::t  
237.    erm i- er th- the separateness sorted now you need to ACTually 
238.   be trying to to[ alter the the togetherness=  
239. Cl:      [ hmmm  
240. Th:   =or the $non-togetherness$ a bit [mo:::re  Oka:::y?= 
241. Cl:                 [ Yeah    
242. Th:  =and again >as I said< err constantly reinforcing? >TImes  
243.   when they are doing what they should do appropriately.<  
244.   >in some way and constantly um having to remind yourself 
245.   they‟ve been quite good< I must go in and sa:::y something 
246.   > And then you‟ve actually got to find a way of dealing with  
247.   (something in) the situation -< well FOR EXAMPLE if you find 
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248.   him you know <umm err> sort of err kind of kissing and  
249.         tortu(hh)ri(hh)ng Ste(hh)phen at the same ti::me= 
250. Cl:  =Yeah= 
251. Th:  =and when you say? I‟m suspecting he knows what he‟s 
252.   doing when he‟s doing that. I suspect he does know what he‟s 
253.   doing  .hh 
254. Cl:  Yea:::h! 
255. Th:  Um BUT YOU KNOW. Is there any other way  
256.   that you could approach that from the way you do:::o  
257.   which is to to to get in the aggravation like you do do::o 
258.   you get kicked and and and an an sort of 
259.        <*ge::t off your brother!*> all that kind of stuff 
260.   Is there any other way you can deal with it?  
261.   In a more positive manner.  
262.   (2.5) 
263. Cl:  Well I mean it‟s just? Because Ste::phen‟s got  
264.   such a piercing scream. It‟s like you just wan‟ it to stop!  
265.   Ev- >you know< every time something‟s happening  
266. Th:   Its ve(hh)ry useful <that scream> i(hh)sn‟t i(hh)t!   
267.   [HAH HAH. 
268. Cl:  [Ewweurgh! He‟d scream all the time! And the thing is you don‟t 
269.   even have to be in the same roo:::m and you automatically shout 
270.   <Andrew! Get off!> because it (0.9) its like you can see what‟s 
271.   happening throu- through a brick wall!  
272. Th:  Hmmm 
273. Cl:  Some times admittedly i- its not Andrew and  
274.   he says ooh I didn‟t do anything 
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Appendix 7: Glossary of terms 
 
Acknowledgement Utterances used to indicate listening or understanding of 
  tokens the speaker  
 
Adjacency pair These are commonly occurring pairs of utterances such 
as question-answer, introduction-greeting 
 
Analytic concepts The central features of CA include: turn-taking, 
management of overlapping talk, the organisation of 
repair and the organisation of turn construction design.  
 
Continuer Utterances made by the listener to signify agreement with 
content or to encourage the speaker to continue 
 
Discourse markers These are words such as „well‟ and „right‟ which are  
usually used to mark boundaries in conversation between 
one topic and the next. They can also sign post 
relationships between utterances 
 
Correction A specific form of repair of the substantive fault in the 
content of what was said 
 
Embedded The inclusion of some part of prior talk to show  
  repetition   connection and continuity  
 
Epistemic markers Phrases which refer to knowledge or belief e.g. “I think…” 
 
Evidential   Phrases that indicate uncertainty e.g. “it seems that”,  
  speculative   “maybe”, or “perhaps” 
  markers 
 
Exemplar An example of a conversational phenomenon to 
demonstrate analytical claims 
  
Extended   Long segments of monologue, e.g. stories 
  sequences 
 
Extended  Agreement to a speaker that involves an affirmative  
agreement  response and corroborative statements indicating 
agreement such as autobiographical material 
 
Extension A syntactic continuation of the others comment, through 
finishing the other‟s turn or continuing it, often in pursuit 
of the therapeutic agenda 
 
Filler  Fillers are utterances that do not usually carry 
conventional meaning. They are inserted in spoken 
discourse to allow time to think, to create a pause and so 
on. 
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Figure of speech An expression that uses language in a nonliteral way, 
such as a metaphor or synecdoche, or in a structured or 
unusual way, such as anaphora or chiasmus, or that 
employs sounds, such as alliteration or assonance, to 
achieve a rhetorical effect. 
 
First pair part  See adjacency pair 
 
Formulation The re-saying of the perspective expressed by the client 
which is often used to emphasise or extract the 
psychologically meaningful aspects 
 
Hedges Hedges are words and phrases which soften or weaken 
the force with which something is said e.g. „kind of‟, sort 
of‟, „by any chance‟, „admittedly‟. 
 
Hyperbole Obvious and intentional exaggeration. An extravagant 
statement or figure of speech not intended to be taken 
literally 
 
Idiolect  Also known as a „personal dialect‟, this term refers to the 
language particular to an individual. 
 
Insertion sequence A sequence of utterances separating an adjacency pair.  
 
Interruption A specific type of overlap, identifiable through the 
interrupted speakers response indicating the violation of 
turn-taking rules. 
 
Intonation The rise and fall in pitch that occurs in speaking 
 
Introduction   Utterances to set the tone for subject changes, used prior 
  Markers  to a shift in topic e.g. “OK”, “So” 
 
Irony The use of words to convey a meaning that is the 
opposite of its literal meaning. A technique of indicating 
an intention or attitude opposite to that which is actually 
or ostensibly stated 
 
Latching The seamless continuation of speech between speakers, 
denoted by a = sign in transcription between speakers or 
lines. Also used in the case of interruption 
 
Misalignment Misalignment is shown in the discrepancy of 
understanding in the talk between two or more people 
e.g. misunderstandings, mishearings, disagreement etc.  
 
Minimal response A brief utterance suggestive of understanding or but not 
necessarily agreement e.g. yes, hmm 
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Membership  An aspect of conversational description. Culturally 
  categories available resources which allow us to describe identify or 
make reference to other people, or to ourselves e.g. girl, 
trainee, snowboarder, sister. These are non-neutral 
inference-rich descriptions.  
 
Metaphor A symbolic use of language. Can refer to a figure of 
speech as a term or phrase that suggests a non-literal 
resemblance  
 
Neutral perspective A neutral perspective refers to the shift away from having 
  markers an identifiable perspective subject of I, you, he/she etc. 
Rather than saying “I kicked the cat”, a neutral 
perspective would phrase it “The cat was kicked”. Neutral 
perspective markers are phrases in conversation that 
mark this shift of perspective e.g. “from this point of view” 
or “in a sense”.  
 
Overlapping talk When two or more speaker talk simultaneously. Mostly 
occurs at transition relevance places  
 
Preference An inferential aspect of an adjacency pair sequence, 
where certain features of the first pair part indicate the 
preferred response in the second pair part. A preferred 
response is usually immediate. A dispreferred response 
usually features dispreference markers, including delay, 
qualification, explanation, pauses, hedges, etc.  
 
Projection  Projection refers to the listener‟s attempt to anticipate when the 
TCU will close and a transition relevance place will fall, 
ensuring the uninterrupted flow of talk. 
 
Prosodic features The features of the voice such as speed, volume, 
intonation and stress 
 
Pseudo-agreement Used to save face, the pseudo-agreement occurs when 
one speaker appears at first to agree with another, but in 
the continuing utterance the speaker expresses a 
viewpoint that differs from the initial agreement 
 
Re-interpretation  A statement that is grounded in what the client has said, 
but is caught and expressed from the therapist‟s own 
perspective and its meaning is transformed to something 
different from the client‟s. Usually associated with 
epistemic markers, neutral perspective markers, 
evidential speculative markers, an evaluative component, 
figures of speech, metaphors and psychological 
professional terms.  
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Repair Includes the remedying of turn-taking mismanagement 
and correction, which refers more to a substantive fault in 
the content of what was said through mishearing, 
misunderstanding, choice of words etc. 
 
Speech acts A speech act refers to what is done when something is 
said, such as warning, threatening, promising. It can be 
direct and explicit, congruently mapped onto what was 
said, or it can be indirect, such as having an implied 
meaning. 
  
Speech exchange  Structural characteristics governing the exchange of talk.  
  system  The system of conventions regulating the exchange of 
turns and the management of speaker roles among 
participants e.g. different systems for lectures, 
conversation etc. 
   
Second pair part See adjacency pair 
 
Tag questions Tags are strings of words which are normally added to a 
declarative statement. Their inclusion turns the statement 
into a question e.g. “…isn‟t it?” 
 
Turn Construction These are the way that speech are organised, which 
Unit broadly correspond to linguistic categories of sentences, 
clauses and words. 
 
Transition   Transition Relevance Places are the places in speech   
Relevance Place where a speaker may be indicating their turn construction unit 
will be ending and a listener can take up their turn to talk. 
 
Utterance Any use of words or sounds, the basic unit of research in 
CA 
 
Vague language Vague language such as “or something”, “or whatever”, 
occurs deliberately in spoken language to soften the 
impact made by the speaker 
 
Vocal sounds Sounds made in conversation non-recognisable as words 
 
Voiced pauses Noises made by the speaker to give the speaker time to 
pause, whilst indicating a desire to hold the speaking turn 
e.g. “err”, “umm” 
 
 
 
 
